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Abstract
Side-channel attacks appeared for the first time in the late 90's. They rely on
the observation that the physical features of a cryptographic device may reflect
its internal activity which may reveal sensitive information such as encryption
keys. This unintended leakage is hardly controlled, and in general cannot be
totally prevented. Therefore, determining the true security level given these
leakages is an important open problem in modern cryptography. In order to
provide worst-case security guarantees, the evaluator needs to accurately model
the leakages. Yet, in practice, various issues may be encountered and make this
task challenging. For example: (i) the sensitive data is generally processed at
different times, hence the leaked information is spread in the measurements, (ii)
the leakage model may be biased, in which case a part of the leaked information
is missed. In this thesis, we aim to contribute to the fair evaluation of cryptographic
devices in three directions: (1) the l...
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Abstract
Side-channel attacks appeared for the first time in the late 90’s. They
rely on the observation that the physical features of a cryptographic
device may reflect its internal activity which may reveal sensitive in-
formation such as encryption keys. This unintended leakage is hardly
controlled, and in general cannot be totally prevented. Therefore, de-
termining the true security level given these leakages is an important
open problem in modern cryptography. In order to provide worst-case
security guarantees, the evaluator needs to accurately model the leak-
ages. Yet, in practice, various issues may be encountered and make
this task challenging. For example: (i) the sensitive data is generally
processed at di↵erent times, hence the leaked information is spread in
the measurements, (ii) the leakage model may be biased, in which case
a part of the leaked information is missed. In this thesis, we aim to
contribute to the fair evaluation of cryptographic devices in three direc-
tions: (1) the leakage detection, (2) the detection of Points-Of-Interest
(POIs), and (3) the leakage certification. The leakage detection de-
termines if data-dependent leakages are present in the measurements,
independent of whether they can be exploited. By contrast, the POI
detection identifies the samples that can be used to recover the secret
key. In the first part of the thesis, we investigate these two tasks and put
forward that while having di↵erent purposes, they are also connected to
a significant extent. We also propose concrete improvements for both,
and show how to exploit heuristic optimization algorithms to improve
the POI detection for implementations protected by side-channel attack
countermeasures. In the second part of the thesis, we introduce leak-
age certification methods in order to test the quality of the evaluator’s
model. We show how the sources of error can be separately identified
and quantified. Moreover, we show that the underlying information loss
can be bounded.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cryptography is the science of communicating in the presence of an ad-
versary. This engineering field was originally dedicated to a military use.
The history keeps tracks of famous devices such as the Caesar’s cipher
or the Enigma machine used by German forces during the Second World
War. Their purpose was to exchange strategic plans that would remain
secret, even though the message was intercepted by a foe. More re-
cently, it has gained a certain interest for civilian applications with the
expansion of communication networks such as the Internet. Tremen-
dous amounts of our personal data are manipulated by these means and
this is becoming even more important with the ongoing progress of the
Internet-of-Things (IoT): every small object of our everyday life will be
connected. Sensitive information about our lives are collected and com-
municated through these networks: bank account details, personal and
business relationships, hobbies, family pictures, health status, and a lot
more. It usually makes our lifestyle more convenient but it is at the risk
of losing control on how and where this information is propagated, and
for what purpose. Therefore, communication devices generally make
use of cryptographic primitives (e.g. for encryption, authentication, and
signature) in order to protect our personal data against outside threat.
However, even though these primitives are proved to be secure, news-
papers frequently relate stories of huge security flaws that are revealed,
often to the disadvantage of the users. In fact, the overall security of the
device may su↵er from unintended implementation side-e↵ects. In this
context, providing independent and fair security evaluations is an urgent
matter. It is one of the biggest challenges the research community in
cryptography is currently facing. Evaluating the side-channel security
of cryptographic primitives is a small step in this direction.
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In general, while cryptographic algorithms are designed to be the-
oretically secure against hypothetical adversaries with high computa-
tional power, their physical realization – their implementation – may
contain major security flaws that are independent of their mathematical
properties. In this thesis, we focus on Side-Channel Analysis (SCA),
introduced in the late 90’s by Paul Kocher. Under the assumption that
the adversary has a physical access to the device, it is possible for him
to monitor (and possibly tamper with) its physical features that depend
on the algorithm execution (operation and data). With the appropriate
statistical tools, he can thereby extract information about the sensitive
values, including the secret key. Since SCAs were first described, they
have proved to be a real threat to embedded devices. An evaluator
must consider this type of attacks in order to provide a realistic security
evaluation of the systems.
In this context, the security level directly depends on the amount
of information contained in the measurements taken by the adversary,
and his ability to exploit it. The measurements can be seen as a se-
ries of noisy time samples, each corresponding to a given instant of the
algorithm execution. Some contain useful information for attacking (de-
noted as signal), others do not. Protections against side-channel attacks
do exist. Among the wide variety of countermeasures that are proposed
in the literature, masking is one of the most challenging to deal with for
an attacker. It consists in mixing intermediate values with random val-
ues, called masks. Concretely, it has the e↵ect of splitting the sensitive
information into shares that are spread on di↵erent time samples in the
measurements. This technique increases the data complexity of a poten-
tial attack: more traces (i.e. measurements) are needed to retrieve the
sensitive information hidden in higher statistical moments. It also gen-
erally increases the complexity of the preprocessing the adversary needs
to perform prior to an attack, as he must find the useful points first.
Indeed, they must be treated simultaneously, otherwise no information
is visible.
Nowadays, security evaluations are performed by certification labs.
The question they aim to answer is twofold: (i) “Is there any leak-
ing information?” and (ii) “How many traces are needed to recover the
key?”. The first question relates to the leakage detection and Points-
Of-Interest (POI) detection problems, which are done as preliminary
steps before attacking. Leakage detection usually refers to the task of
identifying data-dependent information in side-channel measurements,
independently of whether this information can be exploited. Detecting
POIs in leakage traces is a complementary task that is a necessary first
3step in most side-channel attacks where the adversary wants to turn this
information into (e.g.) a key recovery. Yet, it is a frequently neglected
problem in the side-channel literature, even though it can become the
bottleneck of practical adversaries/evaluators as the size of the mea-
surement traces increases. This is particularly true in the challenging
context of masked implementations where only a combination of the in-
formative samples reveals exploitable information. The second question
is a leakage certification problem. Evaluating side-channel attacks and
countermeasures requires determining the amount of information leaked
by a target device. For this purpose, information extraction procedures
published so far essentially combine a “leakage model” with a “distin-
guisher”. A leakage model is an approximation of how the sensitive data
is reflected in the physical feature of the device. The distinguisher is gen-
erally a statistic that identifies the best key candidates, i.e. for which the
leakage model best fits the observations. Fair evaluations ideally require
exploiting a perfect leakage model (i.e. exactly corresponding to the true
leakage distribution) with a Bayesian distinguisher. But since such per-
fect models are generally unknown, density estimation techniques have
to be used to approximate the leakage distribution. This raises the fun-
damental problem that all security evaluations are potentially biased by
both estimation and assumption errors. Estimation errors appear if not
enough samples are used to estimate the considered model, while the as-
sumption errors appear if the model does not correspond to the actual
observations. Hence, the best that we can hope is to be aware of these
errors.
In this thesis we consider these aspects and aim to provide a fair side-
channel security evaluation for embedded devices. For this purpose, we
tackle the two aforementioned questions in di↵erent parts of the reported
work:
(1) We discuss the connections between the leakage detection and POIs
detection tasks, by investigating the di↵erences between a popular so-
lution to leakage detection based on a t-test (currently widely used by
certification labs), and an alternative method exploiting Pearson’s cor-
relation coe cient. We first show that the simpler t-test can have better
sampling complexity, and that its gain over the correlation-based test
can be predicted by looking at the signal-to-noise ratio of the leakage
partitions used in these tests. This implies that the sampling complexity
of both tests relates to their implicit leakage assumptions, rather than
the actual statistics exploited. We then show that this gain comes at the
cost of some intuition loss regarding the localization of the exploitable
leakage samples in the traces, and their informativeness. Therefore,
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whereas t-tests are the method of choice for leakage detection only,
correlation-based tests exloiting larger partitions are preferable for de-
tecting POIs. In parallel, we describe new (black box) tools for e ciently
selecting the time samples of masked implementations. The proposed
techniques exploit projection pursuits and specialized local search algo-
rithms, work with minimum memory requirements and practical time
complexity. We validate them with two case-studies of unprotected and
first-order masked implementations in an 8-bit device, the latter one be-
ing hard to analyze with previously known methods. Next, we confirm
the intuition drawn from our leakage detection investigation by integrat-
ing a correlation-based leakage detection test in the automated tool for
the detection of POIs in masked implementation traces.
(2) Considering the estimation and assumption errors that may appear
in the certification process, we provide and implement methodological
tools to identify and quantify them. First, we show how sound statistical
techniques allow both quantifying the leakage of a chip, and certifying
that the amount of information extracted is close to the maximum value
that would be obtained with a perfect model. Side-channel attacks gen-
erally rely on the availability of good leakage models to extract sensitive
information from cryptographic implementations. The proposed tool
aims to guarantee that this condition is fulfilled based on sound statis-
tical arguments. They are important ingredients in the evaluation of
leaking devices since they allow a good separation between engineering
challenges (how to produce clean measurements) and cryptographic ones
(how to exploit these measurements). Next, we propose an alternative
leakage certification test that is significantly simpler to implement. This
gain admittedly comes at the cost of a couple of heuristic (yet reason-
able) assumptions on the leakage distribution. To confirm its relevance,
we first show that it allows confirming our first (more formal) results
of leakage certification. We then put forward that it leads to additional
and useful intuitions regarding the information losses caused by incorrect
assumptions in leakage modelling.
Main contributions
During our investigations, many e↵orts were made in order to provide a
better understanding of the current security evaluation process, and to
enhance the tools provided in the literature. This led to the following
contributions:
• Practical insight. In the research, we investigate the practical
challenges that are encountered by an evaluator. We also analyze
5the tools that are generally used by most certification labs. Con-
cretely, we study the connection between the leakage detection and
POI detection problems, which is not really discussed in the litera-
ture. For that purpose, we also analyse the functioning of a widely
used tool based on a t-test and underline its pros and cons. This
analysis also allows us to propose a tweaked version of the test
that provides better detection results. Regarding the certification
problem, we show that the di↵erent sources of errors can be iden-
tified, separated and treated independently. We also show how the
results provided by these techniques are linked to the information
theoretic and security metrics provided in the literature.
• New tools. In the POI detection part of this work we provide a
new method and algorithm in order to find the informative points
in masked implementation traces. This method allows us to gain a
constant – but practically significant – factor in the search speed,
in comparison to all the methods that were previously proposed.
Regarding the certification process, we propose new methods that
allow the evaluator to estimate the quality of his leakage model,
which is a premiere in the context of side-channels.
• New application of existing tools. In this thesis we also ex-
tend the use of some already existing tools in order to complete our
investigations. For instance, we show how the well-known Pear-
son’s correlation can be used in order to answer various questions
such as leakage detection, high-order POI detection, and quantify-
ing the information loss (if any) during a certification process. We
also show how the t-test, that is originally used for leakage detec-
tion, can be extended to assumption error detection. Finally, we
introduce the use of methods such as the cross-validation (widely
used in machine learning) or the local search algorithms family in
the context of side-channel, in order to provide new solutions and
best existing results.
• Investigations in practical scenarios. Applying signal pro-
cessing methods and new attacks on actual measurements is not
always an easy thing to do. In this thesis, we always confirm our
claims and our proposed approaches on actual leakage measure-
ments. In other words, we show how our results can e↵ectively be
reproduced in real world evaluations with reasonable and practical
assumptions.
To sum up, in this thesis we provide a complete set of tools that
simplify side-channel security evaluations of embedded devices. The
6 Chapter 1. Introduction
proposed methods are designed such that they are as independent as
possible from any evaluator’s assumption. They are a first step towards
fair side-channel security evaluations which, we believe, will open doors
to future research in that direction.
Chapter 2
Background
The work reported in this thesis focuses on providing fair side-channel se-
curity evaluations. We first investigate statistical tools and heuristics for
a better understanding of side-channel leakages. We then provide meth-
ods and statistics for (i) enhancing the leakage and points-of-interest de-
tections and (ii) evaluating the soundness of statistical models. All our
experiments are performed on an 8-bit implementation of the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES). This background section places the context
of this work and introduces the tools and concepts it is based on. A first
overview of the structure of iterated block ciphers is given. AES and its
software implementation for embedded applications is then described.
Next, the concept of Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) and standard DPA
are introduced, and an overview of existing side-channel countermea-
sures is given. Details are provided for a pre-computed masking scheme
whose implementation is used to validate our work on points-of-interest
detection. We refer to the Eurocrypt 2009 framework in order to define
the metric we use to interpret our results on a fair basis. Next, the
instantiations of our setup and the metrics we use are described. The
literature provides all kind of statistics for evaluating the side-channel
security of cryptographic implementations. We list the ones that best ap-
ply to our context and that we further investigate in this work. Finally,
an informal description of a practical side-channel analysis workflow is
given and the non-specific leakage detection test is introduced.
2.1 AES on microcontrollers
The reasoning and the experiments in the next chapters are based on
the AES in the context of embedded devices, microcontrollers in par-
ticular. For this purpose, this first section introduces the cryptographic
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algorithm family that is the iterated block ciphers. Then, the AES
instantiation is presented. We next present the microcontroller archi-
tectures and their programming specificities. The exact implementation
used for all the experimental validations made along this work is even-
tually described.
2.1.1 Iterated block ciphers
Cryptography is a very wide topic that involves lots of di↵erent engi-
neering skills. It is intended for applications that require some of the
following properties: confidentiality (hiding sensitive information), data
integrity (preventing data from being altered by an unauthorized party),
and authentication (verifying user’s identity, which generally implies the
integrity) [52]. In this thesis, we illustrate our claims with the confiden-
tiality property. For this purpose, cryptographic algorithms are divived
into two main families: symmetric and asymmetric algorithms. The
former refers to algorithms that use the same key for encryption and
decryption (respectively hiding and recovering the sensitive data). The
latter refers to algorithms that respectively use a public key (known
by everyone) and a private key (only known by the recipient) for these
operations. In practice, implementations of asymmetric algorithms are
orders of magnitude more expensive (in terms of resources) than their
symmetric counterpart [32]. Yet, symmetric algorithms require to se-
curely exchange the secret key as a first step. An (o✏ine) asymmetric
encryption can be used for that purpose.
Most of the discussion and results reported in this thesis are based
on the AES, that is an iterated block cipher. In general, block ciphers are
symmetric encryption primitives that, as their name indicates, operate
on n-bit “blocks” of data (typically 64, 128, or 256-bit wide). As rep-
resented on Figure 2.1, the plaintext p is transformed into a ciphertext
c under the action of the secret key . The plaintext can be recovered
from the ciphertext through the decryption process, but only if the same
key is used. In security definitions [48], the block cipher can be seen as a
keyed permutation F that is a bijective function mapping n-bit strings
to n-bit strings. The goal is to make F indistinguishable from a pseu-
dorandom permutation. That is, the adversary should not be able to
guess which of the permutations was used to generate the output he has
access to. The encryption is written as c = F(p) and the decryption
as p = F 1 (c). It is designed such that computing F or F 1 with the
knowledge of the key is easy (polynomial-time), while retrieving the key
from p or c (or both simultaneously) is not.
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Figure 2.1: Symmetric encryption/decryption process
In order to allow e cient implementations on a wide range of plat-
forms, block ciphers are usually made of operations that are easy to
compute independently. Iterated block ciphers come from the observa-
tion that a repeated application of a transformation that is weak by itself
can lead to a strong cipher [92]. In general, the transformation is called a
round and is built with di↵erent components. Every round transforma-
tion inserts a round key that is derived from the master key  by means
of a key scheduling algorithm. We call state the intermediate values in
the round transformation. The two most common round structures are
the Feistel network and Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN). The
structure ot the AES is an SPN. Hence it is the focus of the rest of
the section. Moreover it was designed with the wide trail design strat-
egy [27]. In this context, the SPN-based round transformation is made
of three layers:
• The key addition is the operation that inserts the round key in the
enryption/decryption process, by mixing it with the state.
• The substitution layer consists in a complex non-linear transforma-
tion on bundle of bits (neighboring bits) of the state. Since these
operations involve a few bits at a time, it is usually implemented
with look-up tables, called S-boxes. Yet, some hardware or bitslice
implementations may require a combinatorial representation [56].
• The di↵usion layer is used in order to propagate the information
through the state bits. It is defined such that neighboring bits in
a round are not neighbors in the next one. The substitution layer
operates on bundles, hence there is no interaction between them,
i.e. no di↵usion. The di↵usion layer provides the required inter-
bundle interaction for thwarting cryptanalysis attacks. This layer
is usually made of simple linear operations that can be e ciently
implemented without look-up tables.
The purpose of the key schedule algorithm is to produce round keys
from the master key that are mixed with the state in the key addi-
tion layer. It is mainly used to provide security against related keys
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attacks [49]. Yet, the research in cryptography community is divived
on its exact requirements. Some algorithms have no key schedule. The
master key is then used at every round (e.g. LED [42]). Some algo-
rithms have a key shedule as complex as the round transformation (e.g.
KHAZAD [8]). The AES key schedule is a trade-o↵ between these two
extrema.
2.1.2 Advanced Encryption Standard
The AES Rijndael [26] was proposed by Joan Daemen and Vincent Rij-
men as a candidate at the National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST) contest for finding a new encryption standard. The purpose
of this contest was to find a suitable substitute for the Data Encryption
Standard (DES) that was becoming obsolete (56-bit keys). We have se-
lected this algorithm to lead our experimentation for two main reasons.
Since its o cial election in 2001, it has been the target of many attacks
and other research. It is thus deeply studied and well-known, and com-
parison with other works is easy. Moreover, it is widely spread in the
industry.
The AES comes in three di↵erent versions: all processing blocks of
128 bits but di↵ering by their key sizes (namely 128, 192, and 256 bits)
and the number of round iterations (10, 12, and 14 respectively). In the
work reported in this thesis, we make use of the 128-bit key and 10-round
version. The state and rounds keys are represented as a 4-by-4 matri-
ces containing bytes in a column-major order. This describes a matrix
arrangement for which consecutive elements in a column are contiguous
in the memory storing these values. The AES round transformation
(Figure 2.2) involves four di↵erent byte-oriented operations:
• SubBytes is the non-linear (substitution) layer of the AES. The
S-box tansformation is defined as an 8-bit multiplicative inverse in
the Galois field GF(28) combined with an a ne transformation. It
is applied on every state byte.
• ShiftRows is the first part of the di↵usion layer. It operates on the
rows of the state. A byte-wise circular shift on the left is applied
on the last three rows, while the first row remains unchanged. The
second, third and fourth rows are respectively shifted by one, two
and three positions.
• MixColumns is the second part of the di↵usion layer. It operates
on the columns of the state and consists in applying a reversible
linear transformation: a matrix multiplication of every column
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with a fixed matrix with coe cients in GF(28). Its combination
with ShiftRows provides a good di↵usion as reported in the wide
trail design strategy [27].
• AddRoundKey is the key addition layer. The state and the round
key are mixed with a bit-wise exlusive-or operation (XOR).
The AES execution (Figure 2.3) consists in a first (isolated) key
addition between the plaintext and the first round key. Next, the round
transformation is iterated ten times (MixColumns is skipped in the tenth
iteration). The round keys are derived from the master key with the AES
key schedule algorithm: the first round key is directly the master key
while the others are generated with 32-bit word shifting, XOR operations,
and S-boxes. A round constant is integrated in the key schedule in order
to avoid slide attacks (and other structural attacks) that would take
advantage of similarities between the rounds.
S S S S
S S S S
S S S S
S S S S
round key
SubBytes ShiRows MixColumns AddRoundKey output stateinial state
Figure 2.2: AES round operations
2.1.3 Software implementations
There are two main families of implementations (i.e. physical realiza-
tions), namely hardware and software. Generally, hardware implemen-
tations aim at providing high-end and optimized implementations with
very high performances. They are built with directly assembling logics
gates in order to implement every required mathematical function. It
results in an integrated circuit that is optimized for the targeted appli-
cation. However, the development process is long and expensive. For
some applications, less performances may be su cient. In this case,
software implementations are often a suitable alternative. They make
use of general purpose integrated circuits that are built with a set of
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Figure 2.3: AES execution overview
pre-defined (hence not optimized) mathematical functions. These cir-
cuits are capable of executing a sequence of instructions defined by the
user, called a program. Developing software (i.e. programming) usually
goes faster than its hardware counterpart, but trades performances for
a gain of development cost. This section describes microcontrollers that
are a variety of these platforms.
General description. Microcontrollers are specially designed for em-
bedded applications and integrate a whole electronic system. Their ar-
chitecture (depicted on Figure 2.4) is usually composed of the following
elements [44]:
• The control unit decodes the sequence of instructions defined in the
program. It then drives and synchronizes all the components of the
circuit to transfer the data and perform the requested operations.
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• The Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU) is the part that e↵ectively com-
putes the required mathematical operations. It is usually com-
posed of a set of basic arithmetic operations. The control unit sets
the one that is required by the instruction.
• The memory components come with di↵erent sizes and purposes.
The general purpose registers are small and very fast memory el-
ements used for storing the ALU operands and intermediate com-
putation results. The instruction memory stores the program in
the form of a machine code that can be interpreted by the control
unit. The data memory stores the data to be processed and the
computation results.
• The peripherals are other components that are driven by the con-
trol unit. They may be for internal usage (e.g. timer) or they may
serve as the interface with the outside world (e.g. serial communi-
cation controller, analog-to-digital converter).
• The system bus is the inter-components communication part. This
is basically parallel interconnections and is usually composed of
three di↵erent parts: (1) The data bus is used for transferring
the processed data. (2) The address bus carries the information
about the recipient component. (3) The control bus contains all
the control signals emitted by the control unit to synchronize the
communicating components. The architectures are generally de-
nominated by their data bus width (typically 8, 16, or 32-bit wide)
which also limits the range of the data that can be processed.
The Central Processing Unit (CPU) is the core of the microcon-
troller. It includes the control unit, the general purpose registers, and
the ALU. Microcontrollers may di↵er by their architecture, namely Von
Neumann or Harvard [44, 74]. In the Von Neumann architecture, in-
struction and data memories share the same physical resources (mem-
ory component and bus). By contrast, the Harvard architecture uses
two separate bus systems to carry the instructions to execute and the
data to process. Most of today’s microcontrollers are based on a modi-
fied Harvard architecture that allows fetching data from the instruction
memory. Microcontrollers commonly use two kinds of memories, namely
a Read-Only Memory (ROM) and a Random-Access Memory (RAM).
As its name implies, the ROM can only be read by the CPU. Yet, some
ROM technologies may be written but at the cost of a slow and di -
cult process, e.g. Flash or EEPROM. By contrast, RAM are in general
faster to access and can be written and read by the CPU. However, they
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are generally volatile and lose their content once the microcontroller is
powered down, e.g. SRAM.
A typical instruction execution occurs in two cycles, namely fetch
and execute cycles. During the former, the CPU reads the instruction to
execute in the instruction memory. The latter carries out the operation
indicated by the instruction. They do not necessarily take the same time,
depending on the number of required instructions and their complexity.
The Harvard architecture allows fetching the next instruction while the
current one is executed.
ALU
general
purpose
registers
control
unit
CPU
peripherals
data
memory
instrucon
memory
system bus
Figure 2.4: General architecture of a microcontroller
Programming languages. The program is the sequence of instruc-
tions defined by the user. The machine code is its representation and is
stored in the instruction memory. Because directly manipulating oper-
ation codes and operands addresses is not an easy task, a programming
language is used. Its purpose is to simplify the machine code develop-
ment in order to make it more understandable by the developer. There
are many di↵erent languages, corresponding to di↵erent levels of ab-
straction. They go from higher level ones such as C/C++, Python, or
Java (and many others) to low level languages such as assembly. Higher
level languages are generally compiled and/or interpreted. That is, they
need an intermediate program to run in order to translate the high
level instructions into machine code. In this case, predicting the result-
ing machine code is di cult. It may be significantly a↵ected by the
constraints set by the developer in charge of running the compiler/in-
terpreter. By contrast, the assembly language is closer to the machine
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code although it also requires a translation step. Yet, each developer
instruction corresponds to exactly one subset of machine code instruc-
tions. It is generally used for bypassing compilers/interpreters artifacts
(not always in control of the developer) and/or for optimizing software
implementation performances. As developped in the next sections, the
physical security of cryptographic implementations is highly dependent
on the executed operations and processed data. This can be e ciently
controlled in assembly implementations.
Performance metrics. Performances of microcontroller implementa-
tions can be evaluated considering di↵erent criteria [4]:
• The code size is the size (number of bytes) of the program stored in
the instruction memory. Complex algorithmic operations generally
imply more machine code instructions, hence a bigger code size.
Some algorithms are designed such that this metric is mitigated,
e.g. the NOEKEON block cipher [25]. Yet, this generally comes
at the price of lower security margins.
• The RAM use is the space occupied by the intermediate values in
the data memory. In the context of block ciphers, it can be due to
the state and/or the expanded key (round keys) sizes.
• The cycle count is an image of the execution time. Integrated
circuits operate at a given frequency that is dictated by the tran-
sition (edge) of a signal called the clock. A cycle corresponds to
the period between two clock edges with the same sign (i.e. rising
or falling edges). Every ALU operation requires a certain amount
of clock cycles to be fully executed. The bigger is the number
of operations the algorithm has to process, the larger is the cycle
count. The actual execution time (in seconds) can be computed
by dividing the cycle count by the clock frequency.
• The combined metrics aim to summarize the e ciency of an im-
plementation. Multiplying (i) the code size and the cycle count,
and (ii) the RAM use and the cycle count are good candidates in
order to evaluate block cipher implementations on a fair basis.
2.1.4 Case-study: AES Furious
In this thesis, our experiments are based on an AES Furious implemen-
tation run by an 8-bit Atmel AVR (ATmega 644P) microcontroller at
20 MHz clock frequency.
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The AES Furious [77] is a 128-bit AES software implementation writ-
ten in an assembly language that targets the AVR microcontrollers fam-
ily. It was developed with a small code size optimization goal which
is mainly achieved by interleaving the SubBytes and ShiftRows layers,
hence reducing the memory access. This implementation targets em-
bedded devices and requires 1570 bytes of code size for both encryption
and decryption, which are respectively computed within 2739 and 3579
clock cycles (resp. 137 and 179 µs at 20 MHz, which corresponds to
⇠ 117kB of encrypted data per second). The only source of RAM use is
the key scheduling output, i.e. the round keys, that occupies 176 bytes.
The ATmega644P [3] is an 8-bit Atmel AVR microcontroller working
at low clock frequencies up to a maximum operating frequency of 20 MHz
(the one we choose for our setup). It is a modified Harvard architecture
for which the instructions are stored in a separate physical memory with
a di↵erent address space, but special instuctions allow fetching data
from that memory location. There are two ROM memories (Flash and
EEPROM) of respectively 64k and 2048 bytes, and a RAM (SRAM) of
4kB.
2.2 Side-channel analysis
Block ciphers are designed such that they are resilient to “classical”
cryptanalysis attacks. That is, they must be indistinguishable from a
pseudorandom permutation, and it must not be computationally possi-
ble for a potential adversary to retrieve the secret key by only having
access to the plaintext and/or the ciphertext. This relies on the relatively
strong assumption that he has no physical access to the device. Yet, it
is not always verified in practice, especially in the context of embedded
devices. In some cases, the adversary has the possibility to a↵ect and
monitor the physical features of the device during the execution of the
encryption algorithm. Exploiting these unintended side-e↵ects is called
physical cryptanalysis. Since it was first described in the 90’s [55], it has
proved to be a real threat against embedded devices. Physical attacks
are usually classified according two orthogonal axes [64]: invasive vs.
non-invasive and active vs. passive.
• In invasive attacks, the device is physically tampered by the adver-
sary in order to get access (or at least facilitate the access) to the
information about the processed data. It can for instance be done
by removing or altering the package of the chip. Non-invasive
attack only exploit physical leakages of the device that can be
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measured externally. That is, conversely to invasive attacks, no
damage is involved, hence making them harder to detect.
• Active attacks imply modifications of the chip behaviour in order
to extract information about the processed data. It can be for
instance, switching the values contained in the memory thanks to
a laser beam, modifying the power supply voltage, or generating
glitches on the clock signal. The goal is in general to induce faults
in the algorithm execution [7]. By contrast, passive attacks exploit
physical leakages recorded without altering the behaviour of the
device.
In this thesis, we focus on side-channel power analysis attacks that
are non-invasive and passive physical attacks. They exploit physical leak-
ages that are measurements of the instantaneous power consumption of
the device during the algorithm execution. This section first introduces
this kind of physical leakages and their origin. We then provide a gen-
eral description of the Di↵erential Power Analysis (DPA) that exploits
the data dependency in leakages. Next, we briefly introduce the exist-
ing countermeasures developped in order to thwart these attacks. More
attention is given to a precomputed masking instantiation. Finally, we
introduce the Eurocrypt 2009 framework that defines useful metrics for
an evaluator’s analysis.
2.2.1 Power traces
In general, when an algorithm implementation is processing data, some
of its physical features are reflecting its activity. These are physical leak-
ages. In the side-channel research community, the most popular ones are
timing [54], power consumption [55], and electromagnetic radiations [87].
This thesis exclusively focuses on power consumption leakages.
Side-channel attacks are based on the observation that physical leak-
ages vary with the executed operations and the processed data. In the
case of cryptographic algorithms, it implies that leakages possibly con-
tain some information about the manipulated data, including data de-
pendent on the key. The power consumption of integrated circuits carries
information about the processing activity because of their construction.
Let us represent these circuits as a set of logic cells. The total power
consumption, denoted as Ptotal, essentially depends on the number of
logic cells. It can be divided into two parts: the static and dynamic
power consumptions. The former is due to leakage currents drawn by
the idle logic cells. The latter is proportional to the switching activity,
18 Chapter 2. Background
i.e. the bit transitions 0! 1 and 1! 0. Four contributions to the total
power consumption based on these sources can be identified [64]:
1. The executed operations mainly di↵er by the amounts of working
logic cells. Hence, they impact both static (due to the number
that stays idle) and dynamic components (due to those that are
e↵ectively working). Their contribution to the total consumption
is referred to as Poperation.
2. Processing the sensitive data (containing information about the
key) directly a↵ect the number of bit transitions, hence impact
the dynamic part. Its contribution is referred to as Pdata.
3. Sometimes, other (irrelevant) data are processed in parallel. This
creates additional switching activity and causes algorithmic noise.
Its impact is denoted as Palgo noise.
4. The last (but not the least) contribution is the electronic noise. It
essentially includes all the physical noise (e.g. power supply noise,
clock noise, radiations) and the measurement noise (e.g. quantiza-
tion). It is next denoted as Pelec noise.
A power trace is a measure of the total power consumption Ptotal
of a cryptographic device which is a function P of the aforementioned
contributions (they are all functions of the time). For simplicity, the
function P can be modelled as a sum:
Ptotal = P(Poperation, Pdata, Palgo noise, Pelec noise)
= Poperation + Pdata + Palgo noise + Pelec noise
An example of a power trace of a complete AES execution on an AVR
microcontroller (Section 2.1.4) is presented on Figure 2.5 (smoothed for
legibility purpose). The algorithm is easily recognized thanks to the
round pattern that is reproduced ten times (the last is shorter due to
MixColumns absence). The eleventh peak corresponds to the extra key
addition. The relative di↵erence of peaks amplitude results from the
di↵erent values of the state at every round iteration.
Attacks that exploit operation and data variations on a single power
trace are usually referred to as Simple Power Analysis (SPA) [55]. They
are particularly e↵ective if a sequence of operations depends on the sen-
sitive data. For instance, some modular exponentiation methods may
require an extra multiplication if the exponent value (the key) equals 1.
Exploiting the presence (or not) of the multiplication in the leakage
trace directly returns the key bits. Block ciphers are generally safe
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Figure 2.5: AES leakage traces
against SPA attacks since they consists in executing the same sequence
of operations, no matter what is the key value. Yet, they are often an
interesting preliminary step for extracting relevant feature of the algo-
rithm, e.g. the position of the rounds. Our focus is on Di↵erential Power
Analysis (DPA) [55] that only exploits the data dependency on multiple
leakage traces.
2.2.2 Standard DPA
Block ciphers are usually designed such that small size blocks (typically
8-bit) can be processed independently, providing e cient implementa-
tions on all kinds of platforms. Even though they can have di↵erent
structures, the beginning of the algorithm is often similar. Figure 2.6
illustrates a typical 8-bit key addition and S-box layer in the first round
of the AES. This is a usual target for side-channel attacks since these
operations only involve a known plaintext byte x and the secret subkey
s (i.e. key byte). In this case, the adversary can exploit the information
leaked about either of the operations results, respectively denoted as
y and z. He follows a divide-and-conquer stategy. During the “divide”
step, all subkeys are attacked and recovered separately. In the “conquer”
step, they are assembled in order to recover the whole secret key .
The thesis focuses on DPA attacks that can generally be described
as illustrated on Figure 2.7 [10, 65]. Let us consider that the adversary
targets the output z of the S-box. For multiple plaintexts xi and a fixed
subkey s, he has leakage samples liz that are generated by a leakage
function depending on the intermediate values zi. The exact behaviour
of this function depends on physical features on the processing devices
and is considered unknown to the adversary. The DPA attack follows
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Figure 2.6: Leaking S-box of the first AES round
three main steps:
1. From the plaintext xi and di↵erent subkey candidates s⇤, the ad-
versary predicts the intermediate values of the implementation.
Under Kerckho↵’s principle [51] which states that a cryptosystem
should be secure even if everything, except the key, is public knowl-
edge, we consider that the adversary knows the target algorithm
details. In this case, as he targets the outputs zi of the S-box, the
prediction consists in computing z⇤i = S(xi   s⇤).
2. For each of the predicted values, the adversary then models the
leakages as model(z⇤i ). For that purpose, he makes use of a leakage
model that aims to emulate the leakage function.
3. For each of the subkey candidates s⇤, the approximated values
model(z⇤i ) are compared with the actual leakages liz. For that pur-
pose, the adversary makes use of a distinguisher that returns the
similarity between the two sets of values.
An attack succeeds when the subkey candidate returning the highest
similarity corresponds to the actual subkey. It can easily be verified
by performing the encryption of a plaintext with the recovered key and
by comparing the output ciphertext with the original one. If it fails, it
can either be caused by a wrong leakage model, or because the targeted
implementation is secure (probably due to noise or countermeasures).
The literature provides lots of solutions for the modelling step and lots
of statistical tools that can be used as distinguisher. We list those we
consider for our experiments in a next section.
DPA attacks are usually classified according to three orthogonal axes:
non-profiled vs. profiled, univariate vs. multivariate, and the order.
• In a non-profiled attack scenario, the adversary only has access to
the attack set of traces. That is, the plaintext is known/controlled
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Figure 2.7: DPA attack
while the key remains secret. In order to model the leakage func-
tion, he makes (strong) assumptions (e.g. Hamming weight [23])
that exploit his knowledge of the device. In a profiled attack set-
ting, the adversary has access to the same implementation of the
targeted algorithm with the possibility to control the plaintext as
well as the key. It allows him to build a profiling set of traces
in order to train his leakage model on actual observations. This
training step (denoted as profiling) allows relaxing assumptions on
the leakage model even though a few (lighter) ones remain to be
made (e.g. Gaussian noise distributions [16]). The work reported
in this thesis mainly focuses on profiled side-channel analysis.
• In general, univariate (one) or multivariate (at least two) denotes
the number of dimensions that are simultaneously observed within
a given statistic. In the context of DPA, this mostly depends on
the distinguisher that is used, i.e. if it can handle more than one
dimension at the same time. The dimensions relate to the time
samples that may contain information about the same or di↵erent
intermediate values. However, they may be combined or com-
pressed with dimensionality reduction techniques, e.g. Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) [2] or Linear Discriminant Analysis
(LDA) [103]. As their name implies, they are used to reduce the
number of dimensions to handle. They can be used for instance in
order to evaluate multiple time samples within a univariate statis-
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tic.
• The order of an attack refers to the statistical moment that needs
to be observed for the attack to succeed. The power traces de-
scribed in Section 2.2.1 are first-order leakages if the information
about the sensitive data is in the mean. An attack that would need
to exploit a moment of a higher order d (e.g. variance, skewness,
kurtosis) is denoted as dth-order.
2.2.3 Countermeasures
Side-channel attacks have appeared to be a real threat against crypto-
graphic devices. Since they were discovered, lots of e↵orts have been
made in order to mitigate their impact by the mean of countermeasures.
They aim to remove the sensitive data dependency in physical leakages
and can be integrated at three di↵erent levels: hardware, algorithmic,
and protocol levels. In general, they mitigate the data dependency but
do not completely remove it. Defining and implementing a countermea-
sure is typically a matter of trade-o↵ between performances and security.
In industrial applications, several countermeasures are usually combined
in order to increase the security against side-channel analysis. Attacking
multiple countermeasures at the same time remains a real challenge [94].
This section briefly introduces the di↵erent kinds of countermeasures
provided in the literature. More details about a pre-computed masking
scheme is given next. It is used as a case-study in the point-of-interest
detection work that is reported in this thesis.
General description
Hardware countermeasures work at the logic gate level and generally
make use of a dedicated logic style designed to reduce the data depen-
dency. One of the main advantages of gate-level countermeasures is that
they do not depend on the targeted algorithm. Hence, they can be eas-
ily applied to any other cryptographic primitive. Literature proposes
solutions such as Dual-Rail Precharge (PRD) logic style, also called Dy-
namic and Di↵erential Logic (DDL) [109, 110]. The basic idea behind
this solution is that every manipulated bit is encoded on two wires, one
with its value, the other with its negative: 0 ! (0, 1) and 1 ! (1, 0).
The consumption is then expected to remain constant, whatever the
processed value. In practice, perfectly balancing the two wires is not
feasible. Hence some information goes on leaking.
Algorithmic countermeasures work at the implementation level (in the
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behavioural description, i.e. in the programming process in the case of
microcontrollers). Using this type of countermeasure is usually at the
cost of deacreased performances and a higher algorithmic complexity.
Moreover, they are generally specific to a targeted algorithm, thus they
cannot be used for every cryptographic primitive. This kind of counter-
measure is generally classified in two main families, namely hiding and
masking countermeasures.
• The hiding countermeasures aim to, as their name implies, hide the
information in the leakages. A standard side-channel attack relies
on the assumption that the same data is always processed at the
same time instant. Hiding countermeasures usually consist in ran-
domizing the time location of the processing of the targeted data.
(1) The shu✏ing [45, 113] consists in randomizing the operation
execution order. If the adversary is attacking an implementation
protected with shu✏ing, he is still able to identify the operations,
e.g. the S-box layer. However, he should not be able the deter-
mine their execution order. For instance, if an unprotected device
processes the AES S-boxes as (S0, S1, . . . , S15), a shu✏ed execution
would be (Si0 , Si1 , . . . , Si15) where (i0, i1, . . . , i15) is a random map-
ping and is regularly refreshed. (2) The random delays [111, 22]
are sequences of dummy operations (or dummy execution of real
algorithm operations) that are inserted at various times in the ac-
tual algorithm execution. The length of the delays is randomly set
for every new encryption. This countermeasure has the e↵ect of
misaligning all the traces.
• The masking [41, 15] aims to directly randomize the processed
data. This type of countermeasure is designed such that the sen-
sitive data are never directly processed. Instead, the data are
decomposed into d+ 1 shares, for a dth-order scheme [93]. For in-
stance, in the case of a first-order masking scheme, the first share
carries the sensitive data that are mixed with a mask, i.e. a random
value that is generated internally, while the second share carries
the mask. Both shares are processed independently and combined
at the end of the algorithm in order to remove the mask. Masking
schemes mainly di↵er by their combination function: (1) boolean
masking uses a bitwise XOR operation (2) multiplicative masking
uses a multiplication over GF(28) (3) a ne masking implements
an a ne mapping with look-up tables. In general, the higher is
the order of the masking scheme, the safer is the implementation
against side-channel attacks. In order to attack such protected
devices, the adversary must consider the leakages of all the shares
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at the same time. This generally requires high-order side-channel
attacks. Yet, higher-order masked implementations usually come
at the price of a huge overhead of resource consumption and exe-
cution time.
Protocol-level countermeasures are applied at a higher level than the
encryption algorithm. For example, re-keying [69, 67] consists in regu-
larly changing the secret key used by the device such that the same key
is never used for more than a specified number of encryptions. It relies
on the assumption that a side-channel attack requires a minimum num-
ber of traces to recover the key. Hence, changing the key within that
number of encryptions should prevent attacks from succeeding. The
main challenge is for the algorithm to generate the new keys. If not
enough attention is paid, successive leakages from di↵erent encryptions
can be used by the adversary to recover the master key [67]. In gen-
eral, combining this of countermeasure with lower level ones ensures a
better security against side-channel attacks. Leakage resilience cryptog-
raphy formalizes this solution and provides proofs that cryptographic
constructions such as Pseudo-Random Generators (PRG) [31, 108] and
Pseudo-Random Functions (PRF) [28] are secure against side-channel
attacks. PRGs and PRFs can be build from cryptographic primitives
(e.g. block ciphers). This is however under strong assumptions, e.g. no
more than a given number of bits of information can be extracted from
the leakages of the primitives, which is hard to verify.
Pre-computed masking
In the reported work, we make use of a masked implementation of the
AES S-box to validate our experiments. For this purpose, we consider
the actual measurements of a first-order (boolean) masked AES S-box
based on table lookups [82, 97]. For every pair of input/output masks
(m, q), it pre-computes an S-box S⇤ such that S⇤(x   s  m) = S(x  
s)   q (illustrated on Figure 2.8), where S is the AES S-box. For our
experiments, we focus on an 8-bit key addition and S-box layer in the
first round of the AES, due to the large execution time overhead caused
by the pre-computation part.
As described in Algorithm 1, the pre-computation and execution are
in separate parts of the algorithm (and performed at separate times).
The pre-computation consists in (1) exploring the 256 possible input
values, (2) removing the input mask m, (3) applying the AES S-box
S, and (4) protecting the output value with the output mask q. In
order to execute the S-box S⇤ and keep the sensitive value protected,
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Figure 2.8: Pre-computed masked AES S-box
the input mask m is first applied to the (known) plaintext x. Then,
the key addition is performed. The underlying idea is to avoid any
direct manipulation of the sensitive values y = (x   s) or z = S(y).
The protected intermediate value ym = (y  m) is substituted with the
table S⇤ whose output zq = S(y)   q is protected with a mask q. The
masks m and q are uniformly distributed and drawn independently such
that they are most likely di↵erent. When the table S⇤ is read, leakages
depend on both the input and the ouput. For instance, if the masks
were equal, a Hamming distance-like e↵ect exposing the sensitive values
would possibly appear: HD(y m, z m) = HW(y z ⇢m ⇢m), where HD
is the Hamming distance, and HW is the Hamming weight. The values
m and q are generated on-chip and require to be regularly refreshed (the
best is at every encryption). It is assumed they cannot be accessed by
the adversary. With this kind of implementation and if he targets the
S-box S ouput z, the adversary must simultaneously exploit leakages of
the two shares, i.e. both the pre-computation (where q is processed) and
the S-box S⇤ execution, where zq is manipulated.
Algorithm 1 Protected S-box S⇤ pre-computation and execution
/⇤ Pre computation ⇤/
m = rand(0 . . . 255); q = rand(0 . . . 255);
for i = 0! 255
a = i m;
b = S(a);
S⇤(i) = b  q;
end
/⇤ Execution ⇤/
xm = x m;
ym = xm   s;
zq = S⇤(ym);
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2.2.4 Eurocrypt 2009 framework
The key recovering process of a side-channel attack is formally gener-
alized in the framework reported at Eurocrypt 2009 [105]. It aims to
tackle two very di↵erent questions that are (i) “how safe is the imple-
mentation?” and (ii) “how strong is the adversary?”. Authors propose
a methodology for identifying and removing subjective parameters in
order to evaluate implementations and attacks on a fair basis.
A general key recovery procedure is illustrated on Figure 2.9. We
consider a device running the AES cryptographic primitive. The device
leaks some information through a side-channel that is an unintended
communication channel. The information is carried by a physical media
(e.g. power consumption, electromagnetic radiation) that is physically
observable. The leakage function is an abstraction that models the side-
channel as well as the measurement setup used to monitor the physical
observables. Its ouput is the physical leakage. The side-channel ad-
versary is defined as an algorithm that queries the implementation in
order to get physical leakages of the algorithm execution in addition to
the classical access. The adversary’s goal is to recover the key within
certain computational bounds and capabilities.
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Figure 2.9: Side-channel key recovery
Given this representation, two aspects have to be considered. First,
it is important to note that actual implementation leaks information
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that is independent of the adversary exploiting it. Information Theo-
retic (IT) metrics are used in order to give a sound answer to the first
question, i.e. regarding the implementation quality. The metric that is
considered in this thesis is the mutual information (Section 2.3.3) that is
based on Shannon’s conditional entropy. Second, the adversary exploits
these leakages whose interpretation depends on his assumptions. Se-
curity metrics measure the extent to which this exploitation e↵ectively
uses the available information. Therefore it aims to answer the second
question that involves gauging the adversary’s strength. For this pur-
pose, we make use of the success rate, or more precisely the first-order
success rate. It is defined as the probability that the actual secret key
 is ranked at the first position in the most probable keys at the end of
the side-channel attack. The success rate is returned for a given number
of attack traces and a given model.
2.3 Instantiation
All the work reported in this thesis is related to DPA attacks on an 8-bit
AES implementation. This section introduces our measurement setup
and all the statistics from the literature on which our experiments are
based.
2.3.1 Measurement setup
Our experiments are based on measurements of an AES implementa-
tion run by an 8-bit Atmel AVR (ATmega644P) microcontroller at a
20 MHz clock frequency. We monitored the voltage variations across a
22 ⌦ resistor introduced in the supply circuit of our target chip. Ac-
quisitions were performed using a Lecroy HRO66ZI oscilloscope running
at 200 MHz and providing 8-bit samples. For concreteness, most of our
evaluations focused on the leakage of the first AES master key byte (but
would apply identically to any other enumerable target). For illustra-
tion, leakage traces were produced according to the following procedure.
Let x and s be our target input plaintext byte and subkey, and y = x s
denote a key addition. For each of the 256 values of y, we generated 1000
unprotected encryption traces (resp. 500 for masked traces), where the
rest of the plaintext and key was random, i.e. we generated 256 000 (resp.
128 000) traces in total, with plaintexts of the shape p = x||r1|| . . . ||r15,
keys of the shape  = s||r16|| . . . ||r30, and the ri’s denoting uniformly
random bytes. In case of masked implementations, additional uniform
randomness was used to generate the shares (Section 2.2.3). In order to
reduce the memory cost of our evaluations, we only stored the leakages
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corresponding to the first 2 AES rounds in the unprotected case (as the
dependencies in our target byte y = x  s typically vanish after the first
round, because of the strong di↵usion properties of the AES). As for the
protected case, we only considered a single S-box, for which the precom-
putation of a masked table already implies large traces withNs = 30, 000
time samples (vs. Ns = 1500 for the unprotected one). As will be clear
further, these sets of measurements were large enough to emphasize the
interest of our evaluations goals. In the following, we denote the 1000
(resp. 500) encryption traces obtained from a plaintext p including the
target byte x under a key  including the subkey s as: AESs(px) liy,
with y = x  s and i 2 [1; 1000] (resp. i 2 [1; 500]). Whenever accessing
the points of these traces, we use the notation liy(⌧), with ⌧ 2 [0;Ns 1].
These subscripts and indexes will be omitted when not necessary. We
denote a set of traces, for a given kind of inputs (typically for profiling
or attacking), as L. Note that the sets of traces that are subsequently
used for validating our experiments may slightly di↵er from this general
description. In this case, the new set and its di↵erences are introduced
at the beginning of the chapter.
2.3.2 PDF estimation methods
Side-channel attacks such as the standard DPA described in Section 2.2.2
require a leakage model. It can either be non-profiled (based on knowl-
edge of the device), or profiled (estimated from actual measurements).
In the latter case, such models generally correspond to estimations of
the leakage Probability Density Function (PDF – possibly simplified to
certain statistical moments). In the following, we will consider two im-
portant PDF estimation techniques for this purpose.
Gaussian templates
The Template Attack (TA) in [16] approximates the leakages using a set
of normal distributions. It assumes that each intermediate computation
generates Gaussian-distributed samples. In our typical scenario where
the targets follow a key addition, we consequently use: Pˆrmodel[ly|s, x] ⇡
Pˆrmodel[ly|s x] ⇠ N (µy, 2y), where the “hat” notation is used to denote
the estimation of a statistic. This approach requires estimating the
sample means and variances for each value y = x  s (and mean vectors
/ covariance matrices in case of multivariate attacks). We denote the
construction of such a model with Pˆr
ta
model  LpY , where LpY is a set of
Np traces used for profiling.
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Regression-based models
To reduce the data complexity of the profiling, an alternative approach
proposed by Schindler et al. is to exploit Linear Regression (LR) [96].
In this case, a stochastic model ✓ˆ(y) is used to approximate the leakage
function and built from a linear basis g(y) = {g0(y), ..., gB 1(y)} chosen
by the adversary/evaluator (usually gi(y) are monomials in the bits of
y). Evaluating ✓ˆ(y) boils down to estimating the coe cients ↵i such
that the vector ✓ˆ(y) =
P
i ↵igi(y) is a least-square approximation of the
measured leakages Ly. In general, an interesting feature of such models
is that they allow trading profiling e↵orts for online attack complexity,
by adapting the basis g(y). That is, a simpler model with fewer param-
eters will converge for smaller values of Np, but a more complex model
can potentially approximate the real leakage function more accurately.
Compared to Gaussian templates, another feature of this approach is
that only a single variance (or covariance matrix) is estimated for cap-
turing the noise (i.e. it relies on an assumption of homoscedastic errors).
Again, we denote the constructions of such a model with Pˆr
lr
model  LpY .
Histograms and kernels
The previous estimation methods make the assumption that the non-
deterministic part of the leakage behaves according to a normal distri-
bution. This may not always be correct, in which case other techniques
need to be used. For illustration, we considered two non-parametric so-
lutions for density estimation, namely histograms and kernels. These
allow the non-deterministic part of the leakage to be finely character-
ized. First, histogram estimation performs a partition of the samples by
grouping them into bins. More precisely, each bin contains the samples
of which the value falls into a certain range. The respective ranges of
the bins have equal width and form a partition of the range between the
extreme values of the samples. Using this method, one approximates a
probability by dividing the number of samples that fall within a bin by
the total number of samples. The optimal choice for the bin width h is
an issue in statistical theory, as di↵erent bin sizes can have great impact
on the estimation. In our case, we were able to tune this bin width
according to the sensitivity of the oscilloscope. Second, kernel density
estimation is a generalization of histograms. Instead of bundling sam-
ples together in bins, it adds (for each observed sample) a small kernel
centered on the value of the leakage to the estimated PDF. The result-
ing estimation is a sum of small “bumps” that is much smoother than
the corresponding histogram, which can be desirable when estimating
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a continuous distribution. In such cases, kernels usually provide faster
convergence towards the true distribution. Similarly to histograms, the
most important parameter is the bandwidth h. In our case, we used the
modified rule of thumb estimator in [98].
2.3.3 Metrics
In this section, we present useful statistics that were introduced in pre-
vious works on side-channel attacks and countermeasures. Most of these
metrics were originally introduced as distinguishers for standard DPA
attacks. We rely on them for extended evaluations as introduced in the
next chapters.
Di↵erence of means
The first distinguisher proposed for DPA attacks is the di↵erence of
means [55]. This technique is non-profiled and is based on partitioning
the set of traces into two di↵erent classes. Traces are sorted according
to the value of an arbitrary selected bit of the adversary’s predictions
z⇤ (Section 2.2.2). The two resulting subsets are denoted as L0 and L1
and the metric is computed as:
D⇤(⌧) = | Eˆi(Li0(⌧))  Eˆi(Li1(⌧)) |
where Eˆ is the sample mean operator. The correct subkey candidate s⇤
is the one that maximizes the di↵erence between these mean values.
Correlation coe cient
In view of the popularity of the Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) dis-
tinguisher in the literature [13], the second metric to introduce is Pear-
son’s correlation coe cient. In the non-profiled setting, an a priori (e.g.
Hamming weight) model is used to compute the metric. The evaluator
then estimates the correlation between his measured leakages and the
modeled leakages of a target intermediate value. In our AES example,
it would lead to ⇢ˆ(LY (⌧),modelcpa(Y )). In practice, this estimation is
performed by sampling (i.e. measuring) Nt test traces from the leakage
distribution (we denote the set of these Nt test traces as LtY ). Next, and
in order to avoid possible biases due to an incorrect a priori choice of
leakage model, a natural solution is to extend the previous proposal to
the profiled setting. In this case, the evaluator will start by estimating
a model from Np profiling traces: ˆmodelcpa  LpY (with LpY ? LtY ).
In practice, ˆmodelcpa can be seen as a simplification of the previous
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Gaussian templates (Section 2.3.2) that only include estimates for the
first-order moments of the leakages. That is, for any time sample ⌧ , we
have ˆmodelcpa(y) = mˆ1y(⌧) = Eˆi(L
i
y(⌧)), with mˆ
1
y a first-order moment
and Eˆ the sample mean operator.
Signal-to-Noise Ratio
Introduced by Mangard in the side-channel analysis context [62], the
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) of the measurements is defined as:
ˆSNR =
vˆary(Eˆi(Liy))
Eˆy(vˆari(Liy))
,
where Eˆ and vˆar denote the sample mean and variance of the leakage
variable that are estimated from the Nt traces in LtY (like the correlation
coe cient).
Mutual and perceived information
In theory, the worst-case security level (i.e. the maximum amount of
available information) of an implementation can be measured with a
Mutual Information (MI) metric. Taking advantage of the notations in
Section 2.3.1 and considering the standard case where a key byte S is
targeted, it amounts to estimating:
MˆI(S;X,L) =
H[S] +
X
s2S
Pr[s]
X
x2X
Pr[x]
X
liy2Lt
Prchip[l
i
y|s, x]. log2 Pˆrchip[s|x, liy]
When summing up all s and x values, and a su ciently large number of
leakages, the estimation tends to the correct MI. Yet, as mentioned in
Section 2.2.2, the leakage function is generally unknown to the evaluator,
and so is the chip distribution Prchip[liy|s, x]. Then, in practice, the best
that we can hope is to compute the following Perceived Information (PI):
PˆI(S;X,L) =
H[S] +
X
s2S
Pr[s]
X
x2X
Pr[x]
X
liy2Lt
Prchip[l
i
y|s, x]. log2 Pˆrmodel[s|x, liy]
where Pˆrmodel  LpY is typically obtained using the previous Gaussian
templates or LR-based models (Section 2.3.2). Under the assumption
that the model is properly estimated, it is shown in [65] that the CPA
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and PI metrics are essentially equivalent in the context of standard uni-
variate side-channel attacks (i.e. exploiting a single leakage point liy(⌧)
at a time). By contrast, only the PI naturally extends to multivariate
attacks. It can be interpreted as the amount of information leakage that
will be exploited by an adversary using an estimated model. So just as
the MI is a good predictor for the success rate of an ideal TA exploiting
the perfect model Prchip, the PI is a good predictor for the success rate
of an actual TA exploiting the “best available” model Pˆrmodel obtained
thanks to profiling.
Moments-correlating DPA
Eventually, and in order to extend the CPA distinguisher to higher-
order moments, the Moments-Correlating Profiled DPA (MCP-DPA)
was introduced in [70]. It features essentially the same steps as a pro-
filed CPA. The only di↵erence is that the adversary first estimates
dth-order statistical moments with his profiling traces, and then uses
ˆmodel
d
mcp dpa(y) = mˆdy(⌧), with mˆdy a dth-order moment. For concrete-
ness, in our experiments, we consider d’s up to four (i.e. the sample mean
for d = 1, variance for d = 2, skewness for d = 3 and kurtosis for d = 4).
This allows us to discuss the relevant case-study of a masked implemen-
tation with two shares. Yet, the tool naturally extends to any d. One
useful feature of this distinguisher is that it embeds the same “metric”
intuition as CPA: the higher the correlation estimated with MCP-DPA,
the more e cient the corresponding attack exploiting a moment of given
order.
Regarding our work on the points-of-interest detection, we will be
particularly interested in the Moments against Moments Profiled Cor-
relation (MMPC) criteria:
MMPC(⌧) = ⇢ˆ(mˆdy(⌧), m˜
d
y(⌧)),
where m˜dy(⌧) are another vector of moments, estimated with the test
traces. As detailed in [70], MCP-DPA is able to capture information in
any statistical moment, while enjoying the implementation e ciency of
CPA (which is highly beneficial in our context where it will be intensively
used).
2.3.4 Estimating a metric with cross–validation
In a profiled side-channel analysis setting, estimating a metric ↵ from
a leaking implementation holds in two steps. First, a model has to be
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estimated from a set of profiling traces Lp: ˆmodel Lp. Second, a set of
test traces Lt (following the true distribution Prchip) is used to estimate
the metric: ↵ˆ  (Lt, ˆmodel). As a result, two main types of errors can
arise. First, the number of traces in the profiling set may be too low to
estimate the model accurately (which corresponds to estimation errors).
Second, the model may not be able to accurately predict the distribution
of samples in the test set, even after intensive profiling (which then
corresponds to assumption errors).
In order to verify that estimations in a security evaluation are suf-
ficiently accurate, the solution used in the next chapters is to exploit
cross–validation. In general, this technique allows gauging how well a
predictive (here leakage) model performs in practice. For k-fold cross–
validations, the set of evaluation traces L is first split into k (non over-
lapping) sets L(i) of approximately the same size. Let us define the pro-
filing sets L(j)p = Si 6=j L(i) and the test sets L(j)t = L \L(j)p . The sample
metric is then repeatedly computed k times for 1  j  k as follows.
First, we build a model from a profiling set: ˆmodel
(j)  L(j)p . Then we
estimate the metric with the associated test set ↵ˆ(j)  (L(j)t , ˆmodel(j)).
Cross–validation protects evaluators from obtaining too optimistic sam-
ple metric values due to over-fitting, since the test computations are
always performed with an independent data set. Finally, the k outputs
can be averaged in order to get an unbiased metric estimate, and their
spread characterizes the result accuracy.
2.4 SCA workflow
An intuitive description of a side-channel attack is given in Section 2.2.2
and a formalized framework for their evaluation in Section 2.2.4. Yet,
these representations do not take into account some preliminary pro-
cedures that are generally required in practice. Figure 2.10 informally
illustrates the complete workflow of a practical side-channel analysis. It
can be decomposed into five steps, having di↵erent purposes and requir-
ing di↵erent skills and tools:
1. Measure: this is the process of recording the physical leakages
with measurement equipments. It is the interface between the
analog real world and the digital evaluator’s work environment.
This step is made thanks to analog-to-digital apparatus (e.g. oscil-
loscopes, see Section 2.3.1). The parameters of the measurement
process (e.g. sampling frequency, trigger event, requests order) may
significantly a↵ect the attack outcome.
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Figure 2.10: Steps of a complete side-channel analysis
2. Preprocessing: it consists in signal processing techniques that
are used in order to increase the attack e ciency. Sometimes, they
are even necessary to make it succeed. They are for instance meth-
ods for enhancing the measurement quality (e.g. filtering [71]), for
detecting the (hidden) time samples that contain useful informa-
tion [91], i.e. the points-of-interest, or for combining that informa-
tion captured within di↵erent POIs [2, 103] (e.g. lower dimensional
subspace projection).
3. Modelling: it is the step that aims to predict the leakage function
outcome by approximating its behaviour with a model. As men-
tioned in Section 2.2.2, it can be either entirely based on assump-
tions (e.g. Hamming weight, Hamming distance), or estimated (i.e.
profiled) with actual observations of the leakages (i.e. measure-
ments) and with less (or lighter) assumptions. In our experiments,
we focus on profiled settings (Section 2.3.2). During the profiling,
the evaluator is able to manipulate the plaintext and the key such
that the targeted intermediate values are processed. The leakage
function is then estimated thanks to, for instance, PDF estimation
methods. IT metrics (described in Section 2.2.4) are computed at
this level in order to determine the amount of meaningful infor-
mation that is captured by the model.
4. Exploitation: this is the process of exploiting the time samples in
order to recover the secret key. The exploitation outcome is signif-
icantly a↵ected by the quality of the previous steps realization. In
general, it follows the same procedure as described in Section 2.2.2
(minus the modelling step that is here considered independently)
and makes use of distinguishers such as introduced in Section 2.3.3.
Security metrics (described in Section 2.2.4), that determine the
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quality of attack, are computed at this level.
5. Detection: like the preprocessing, the detection is a preliminary
step, yet with a di↵erent (orthogonal) goal. It aims to detect
whether leakages of a given order are e↵ectively present in leak-
age traces or not. Therefore, the result returned by this process
may not indicate the points-of-interest, i.e. the points that can ef-
fectively be used for an attack. Moreover, it may not reflect the
amount of information that is actually contained in the leakage.
It mainly depends on the statistical metric used by the evaluator
for this purpose.
In this thesis, we focus on the preprocessing, modelling and detection
steps of a practical side-channel analysis. The first part of our work
investigates points-of-interest detection and the relation with leakage
detection. For that purpose, we make the comparison with the widely
spread Cryptography Research (CRI)’s non specific (fixed vs. random)
t-test that is introduced in the next sub-section. The second part is
focused on evaluating the quality of models that are built in a profiled
setting. This latter part of the work aims to tackle the question “how
can we make sure that our model reflects the reality?”.
2.4.1 Fixed vs. random leakage detection test
Introduced by Cryptography Research (the company created by Paul
Kocher), the fixed vs. random t-test [38] takes advantage of leakage ob-
tained from two di↵erent sets of inputs, namely fixed and random. The
first corresponds to a fixed plaintext and key, while the other corresponds
to random plaintexts and a fixed key. They are next denoted as Lf and
Lr respectively. This test is inspired from the di↵erence of mean distin-
guisher (Section 2.3.3) and essentially works by comparing the leakages
corresponding to these two sets. For this purpose, and for each sample,
one simply has to estimate and compare two mean values. The first one,
denoted as µˆf (⌧), corresponds to the samples in the fixed set of traces
Lf . The second one, denoted as µˆr(⌧), corresponds to the samples in the
random set of traces Lr. Intuitively, being able to distinguish these two
mean values indicates the presence of data-dependencies in the leakages.
For this purpose, and in order to determine whether some di↵erence ob-
served in practice is meaningful, Welch’s t-test is applied (which is a
variant of Student’s t-test that considers di↵erent variances and sample
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size for the sets Lf and Lr). The statistic to be tested is defined as:
 (⌧) =
µˆf (⌧)  µˆr(⌧)r
 ˆ2f (⌧)
Nf
+  ˆ
2
r(⌧)
Nr
,
where  ˆ2f (⌧) (resp.  ˆ
2
r (⌧)) is the estimated variance over the Nf (resp.
Nr) samples of Lf (resp. Lr). Its p-value, i.e. the probability of the null
hypothesis which assumes  (⌧) = 0, can be computed as follows:
p = 2⇥ (1  CDFt(| (⌧)|, ⌫)),
where CDFt is the cumulative function of a Student’s t distribution, and
⌫ is its number of freedom degrees, which is derived from the previous
means and variances as: ⌫ = ( ˆ2f/Nf +  ˆ
2
r/Nr)/[( ˆ
2
f/Nf )/(Nf   1) +
( ˆ2r/Nr)/(Nr   1)]. Intuitively, the value of ⌫ is proportional to the
number of samplesNf andNr. When increasing, Student’s t distribution
gets closer to a normal distribution N (0, 1).
2.5 Conclusion
In this first chapter, the basic concepts and statistics that are necessary
for a complete understanding of the rest of the thesis are introduced.
The block cipher and more specifically the AES are introduced as the
case-study we use for validating our experiments. Side-channel analysis
and standard DPA are then described, as well as the possible counter-
measures. Next, we list the statistics and metrics we make use of and
describe how they are used in the context of a practical side-channel
analysis flow. This flow is referred to for setting the context of our
experiments.
Chapter 3
Leakage and points-of-interest
detection
Leakage detection tests have recently emerged as a convenient solution to
perform preliminary (black box) evaluations of resistance against side-
channel analysis. Cryptography Research (CRI)’s non-specific (fixed
vs. random) t-test (described in Section 2.4.1) is a popular example of
this trend [38]. It works by comparing the leakages of a cryptographic
(e.g. block cipher) implementation with fixed plaintexts (and key) to the
leakages of the same implementation with random plaintexts (and fixed
key), thanks to Welch’s t-test [116]. Besides their conceptual simplicity,
the main advantage of such tests, that was carefully discussed in [66],
is their low sampling complexity. That is, by comparing only two (fixed
vs. random) classes of leakages, the detection problem is reduced to a
very simple estimation task.
The selection of Points-Of-Interest (POIs) in leakage traces is an
important (and not very discussed) problem in the application of Side-
Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks. When targeting unprotected imple-
mentations, the naive strategy that is commonly used in the literature
is to test all the time samples independently. It raises two important
challenges. First, how to combine these time samples e ciently, in or-
der to maximize the amount of information extracted from each leakage
trace? Second, how to extend this technique in the context of masked
implementations where the sensitive data are split into d shares manipu-
lated in di↵erent clock cycles (as it is typically the case in software), and
only the combination of these shares’ leakage reveals key-dependent in-
formation – which makes the complexity of an exhaustive analysis grow
combinatorially with d? Solutions to the first problem typically include
dimensionality reduction techniques such as PCA and LDA. These tools
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(introduced to SCA in [2, 103] and recently revisited in [11, 17]) es-
sentially project the leakage traces into a lower-dimensional subspace
that optimizes some objective function. Namely, PCA usually maxi-
mizes the variance between the mean leakage traces – i.e. the signal of a
first-order DPA, while LDA maximizes the ratio between inter-class and
intra-class variances – i.e. its Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR), essentially.
Their main advantage is to provide a principled and intuitive solution to
the problem, since the projection (i.e. eigenvectors) they produce indi-
cate the POIs. Yet, they are somewhat limited when moving to masked
implementations for which the information lies in high-order statistical
moments, since their objective function is based on a definition of signal
that primarily captures first-order leakages1. Solutions to the second
problem are even sparser. To the best of our knowledge, the usual ref-
erence for selecting POIs for masked implementations is the educated
guess proposed by Oswald et al. in [72] (i.e. an exhaustive search over all
d-tuples of time samples in a window that is selected with engineering
intuition). Next, Reparaz et al. proposed an alternative solution ex-
ploiting Mutual Information Analysis (MIA) [36] that allows gaining a
constant (but practically meaningful) factor corresponding to the num-
ber of key hypotheses in the attack [91]. In both cases, the proposed
tools do not output a projection but a list of the most useful POIs (i.e.
d-tuples) in function of the (non-profiled) attack considered.
In this chapter, we want to push the understanding of leakage de-
tection tests one step further, by underlining more precisely their pros
and cons, and clarifying their connection with the problem of detecting
points-of-interest in leakage traces. As clear from [37], those two prob-
lems are indeed related, and one can also exploit t-tests for the detection
of POIs in leakage traces. For this purpose, we introduce an alternative
test that is based on the CPA distinguisher, the ⇢-test. In parallel, we
investigate the use of Projection Pursuits (PPs), that are optimization
algorithms, for the POI detection process. We show how they can easily
be instantiated in order to answer the two aforementionned questions.
Finally, we show how the ⇢-test that is introduced as a leakage detec-
tion test, can be used in order to extend the POI detection results for
high-order DPA attacks to a non-profiled setting.
1Of course, a trivial solution would be to apply PCA/LDA to “product traces”
containing all the possible products of d-tuples, but this rapidly leads to unrealistic
memory requirements in the masked software context that we consider next.
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3.1 Understanding the leakage detection
The main factor influencing the intuitions that one can extract from
leakage detection is the implicit assumptions that we make about the
partitioning of the leakages (aka leakage model). In the first part of our
work, we notice that CRI’s fixed vs. random t-test is one extreme in
this direction (since it relies on a partitioning in two classes), which is
reminiscent of Kocher’s single-bit DPA (with di↵erence of mean distin-
guisher, Section 2.3.3). For comparison purposes, we start by specifying
an alternative leakage detection test based on the popular Correlation
Power Analysis (CPA) distinguisher. The resulting ⇢-test directly de-
rives from the hypothesis tests for CPA provided in [64], and relies on
a partitioning into 2n classes where n is the bitsize of the fixed por-
tion of plaintext in the test. We then compare the t-test and ⇢-test
approaches, both in terms of sampling complexity and based on their
exploitability.2 That is, does a positive answer to leakage detection im-
ply exploitable leakage, and does a negative answer to leakage detection
imply no exploitable leakage? Our experimental analysis based on real
and simulated data leads to the following observations:
• First, the sampling complexity of the t-test is (on average) lower
than the one of the ⇢-test, as previously hinted [38, 66]. Interest-
ingly, we show that the sampling complexity ratio between the two
tests can be simply approximated as a function of a signal-to-noise
ratio for the leakage partition used in these tests. This underlines
that the di↵erence between the tests is mainly due to their dif-
ferent leakage assumptions, i.e. it is independent of the statistical
2One could also compare the computational complexity of the tests. Since they
are based on simple statistics, we will assume that both the t-test and ⇢-test can be
implemented e ciently. Besides, a minor advantage of the ⇢-test is that it can be
implemented in a known-plaintexts scenario (vs. chosen-plaintext for the t-test).
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test used (backing up the conclusions of [65] for “standard DPA
attacks”).
• Second, the exploitability of the tests is quite di↵erent. On the one
hand, leakages that are informative (and therefore can be detected
with the ⇢-test) but cannot be detected with the t-test are easy
to produce (resp. can be observed in practice). Take for example
a fixed class of which the mean leakage is the same as (resp. close
to) the mean leakage of the random class. On the other hand,
the fixed vs. random t-test leads to the detection of many time
samples spread around the complete leakage traces. Hence, not all
of these samples can be exploited in a standard DPA (because of
the di↵usion within the cipher).
Concretely, these observations refine the previous analysis in [66],
where it was argued that leakage detection is a useful preliminary to
white box (worst-case) security evaluations such as advertised in [105].
This is indeed the case. Yet, certain leakage detection tests are more
connected with the actual security level of a leaking implementation. In
this respect, the fixed vs. random t-test is the most e cient way to per-
form leakage detection. And the minor drawback regarding its unability
to detect certain leakages (e.g. our example with identical means) is eas-
ily mitigated in practice, by running the test on large enough traces, or
for a couple of keys (as suggested in [38]). By contrast, the main price to
pay for this e ciency is a loss of intuition regarding (i) the localisation
of the leakage samples that are exploitable by standard DPA, and (ii)
the complexity of a side-channel attack taking advantage of the leakage
samples for which the detection test is positive. In this respect, the
⇢-test can be viewed as a perfect complement, since it provides these
intuitions (at the cost of higher sampling complexity).
Next, we show that our reasoning based on the SNR not only al-
lows a better statistical understanding of leakage detection, but can
also lead to more e cient t-tests. Namely, it directly suggests that if
the evaluator’s goal is to minimize the number of samples needed to
detect data-dependent information in side-channel measurements, con-
sidering a partitioning based on two fixed plaintexts (rather than one
fixed and one random plaintext) leads to significantly faster detection
speeds. This is both due to an improved signal (since when integrated
over large execution times, samples with large di↵erences between the
two fixed classes will inevitably occur) and a reduced noise (since the
random class in CRI’s t-test implies a larger algorithmic noise that is
cancelled in our proposal). We also confirm these intuitions experimen-
tally, with two representative AES implementations: an 8-bit software
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one and a 128-bit hardware one. In both cases, we exhibit detections
with roughly 5 times less measurements than when using the previous
fixed vs. random non-specific t-test. We believe these results are highly
relevant to evaluation laboratories since (i) they lead to reductions of
the measurement cost of a leakage detection by a large factor (whereas
improvements of a couple of percents are usually considered as signifi-
cant in the side-channel literature), and (ii) they imply that a device for
which no leakages have been detected with one million measurements us-
ing a fixed vs. random t-test could in fact have detectable leakages with
200,000 (or even less) measurements.
Specific measurement setup
Our experiments are based on measurements taken as described in Sec-
tion 2.3.1. Yet, for this part of the work, in each of our experiments, the
128-bit AES master key remains the same for all the measurements as
 = s0||s1|| . . . ||s15, where the si’s represent the 16 key bytes. Another
di↵erence is that we take measurements of a complete AES execution.
When evaluating the fixed vs. random t-test, we build sets of 2000 traces
divided into two subsets of 1000 traces each, one corresponding to a
fixed plaintext and key, the other corresponding to random plaintexts
and a fixed key, denoted as Lf and Lr respectively. When evaluating
the correlation-based test, we build single sets of 2000 traces L, corre-
sponding to random plaintexts and a fixed key.
In Section 3.1.3, we additionally consider a hardware implementation
of the AES of which the design is described in [50]. The same amount of
measurement as for the Atmel case are taken, based on a prototype chip
embedding an AES core with a 128-bit architecture requiring 11 cycles
per encryption, implemented in a 65-nanometer low power technology,
running at 60 MHz and sampled at 2 GHz.
3.1.1 A correlation-based leakage detection test
We start by describing an alternative leakage detection test based on the
CPA distinguisher, inspired from the hypothesis test described in [64],
and taking further advantage of the cross-validation techniques intro-
duced in Section 2.3.4. For k-fold cross–validation, the set of acquired
traces L is first split into k (non overlapping) sets L(i) of approximately
the same size. We then define the profiling sets L(j)p = Si 6=j L(i) and
the test sets L(j)t = L \ L(j)p . Based on these notations, our ⇢-test is
defined as follows, for a target plaintext byte variable X. First, and
for each cross-validation set j with 1  j  k, a model is estimated:
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ˆmodel
(j)
⌧ (X)  L(j)p . For n-bit plaintext bytes, this model corresponds
to the sample means of the leakage sample ⌧ corresponding to each
value of the plaintext byte, i.e. µˆ(j)x (⌧).3 Next, the correlation between
this model and the leakage samples in the test sets L(j)p is computed as
follows:
rˆ(j)(⌧) = ⇢ˆ(L(j)X (⌧),
ˆmodel
(j)
⌧ (X)).
The k cross-validation results rˆ(j)(⌧) can then be averaged in order to
get a single (unbiased) result rˆ(⌧) obtained from the full measurement
set L. Following, and as in [64], Fisher’s z-transformation is applied to
obtain:
rˆz(⌧) =
1
2
⇥ ln
✓
1 + rˆ(⌧)
1  rˆ(⌧)
◆
.
By normalizing this value with the standard deviation 1p
N 3 , where
N is the size of the evaluation set L, we obtain a sample that can be
(approximately) interpreted according to a normal distribution N (0, 1).
This allows us to compute the following p-value for a null hypothesis
assuming no correlation:
p = 2⇥ (1  CDFN (0,1)(|rˆz(⌧)|)),
where CDFN (0,1) is the cumulative function of a standard normal dis-
tribution. Besides exploiting cross-validation (which allows us to obtain
unbiased estimates for Pearson’s correlation coe cient), the main di↵er-
ence between this test and the hypothesis test in [64] is that our model
is built based on a plaintext byte rather than a key-dependent interme-
diate value. This allows us to implement it in a black box manner and
without key knowledge, just as the previous t-test.
3.1.2 Comparison with the fixed vs. random test
In order to discuss the pros and cons of the two leakage detection tests,
we now consider various experimental results. We start with a simulated
setting which allows us to control all the parameters of the leakages to
detect, in order to discuss the sampling complexity of both methods.
Next, we analyze actual leakage traces obtained from a measurement
setup similar to the one described in Section 2.3.1, which allows us to
put forward the intuitions provided by the t-test and ⇢-test regarding
the time localization of the informative samples in our traces.
3If there is no available trace for a given value of x, which happens when the
evaluation set is small, the model takes the mean leakage taken over all the traces in
L(j)p .
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Simulated experiments
We define a standard simulated setting for the leakages of a block cipher,
where an intermediate computation z = S(y = x  s) is performed, with
S an 8-bit S-box. It gives rise to a (multivariate) leakage variable of the
form:
LX = [HW(X) +R1, HW(Y ) +R2, HW(Z) +R3],
where HW is the Hamming weight function, R1, R2 and R3 are Gaus-
sian distributed random noises with mean 0 and variance  2n, and the
index X recalls that in our detection setup, the evaluator only varies
the plaintext. For t-tests, the set Lf contains leakages corresponding
to fixed values of x, y or z, denoted as xf , yf , zf , while the set Lr cor-
responds uniformly random x’s, y’s or z’s. For ⇢-tests, the leakages all
correspond to uniformly random x’s, y’s or z’s.
Concretely, we analyzed the t-test based on the third sample of LX
(which corresponds to the target intermediate value z), and for di↵erent
fixed values of this intermediate value. This choice is naturally motivated
by the counter-example given in introduction. That is, since the average
leakage of the random class equals 4 in our simulation setting, a fixed
class such that HW(zf ) = 4 should not lead to any detection. And
extending this example, the bigger the di↵erence between HW(zf ) and
4, the easier the detection should be.
In parallel, we investigated the ⇢-test in two di↵erent scenarios.
First the realistic case, where the model estimation using k-fold cross-
validation described in Section 3.1.1 is applied (using the standard k =
10). Second, a theoretical simplification where we assume that the eval-
uator knows the perfect (here Hamming weight) model, which implies
that all the samples in the set L are directly used to compute a single
estimate for the correlation rˆ(⌧) = ⇢ˆ(LX(⌧),model⌧ (X)).
The results of our experiments are given in Figure 3.1, where the
upper part corresponds to a noise variance  2n = 50 and the lower part to
a noise variance  2n = 100. In both cases, we set the detection threshold
to 5, which is the value suggested in [6]. They allow the following relevant
observations:
1. On the impact of the noise. As doubling the noise variance gener-
ally doubles the measurement complexity of a side-channel attack,
it has the same impact on the sample complexity of a leakage de-
tection test. For example, detecting a di↵erence between a fixed
class such that HW(zf ) = 2 and a random class with the t-test
requires ⇡ 1300 traces in the upper part of the figure and ⇡ 2600
traces in its lower part. Similar observations hold for all the tests.
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t-test, HW(zf)=0
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t-test, HW(zf)=4
rˆz, k=10
rˆz, perfect model
Figure 3.1: Leakage detection on simulated traces, Hamming weight
leakage function.
2. On the impact of the fixed value for the t-test. As expected, for
both  2n, a fixed class such that HW(zf ) = 4 cannot be distin-
guished at all from the random class (since they have the same
mean). By contrast, a fixed class such that HW(zf ) = 0 is ex-
tremely fast to distinguish from the random class.
3. The ⇢-test can have larger sampling complexity. This naturally
depends on the fixed value for the t-test. But assuming that several
samples from a trace are used in a the leakage detection (which
is usually the case, as will be shown in our following measured
experiments), some of them should lead to faster leakage detection
with the t-test than with the ⇢-test.
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4. It’s all in the SNR. That is, just as in standard DPA, the sampling
complexity of a detection test essentially depends on the SNR of its
leakage partitioning. For the ⇢-test, we can directly exploit Man-
gard’s definition from CT-RSA 2004 for this purpose [62]. That
is, the signal corresponds to the variance of the random variable
HW(Z) with Z uniform, which equals 2 for 8-bit values, and the
noise variance equals to  2n. As for the t-test, we need to define
an binary random variable B that is worth HW(zf ) with proba-
bility 1/2 and HW = 4 with probability 1/2. For each value of
the fixed zf , the signal then corresponds to the variance of B, and
the noise variance equals to  2n for the fixed class, and  
2
n + 2 for
the random class (since in this case, the noise comes both from the
variable Z and from the noise R). For example, this means a signal
0 for the fixed class HW(zf ) = 4, a signal 0.25 for the fixed class
HW(zf ) = 3, a signal 1 for the fixed class HW(zf ) = 2, a signal
2.25 for the fixed class HW(zf ) = 1, and a signal 4 for the fixed
class HW(zf ) = 0. Ignoring the small noise di↵erences between the
tests, it means that the sampling complexity for detecting leakages
with the t-test and a fixed class HW(zf ) = 1 should be close to
(and slightly smaller than) the sampling complexity for detecting
leakages with the ⇢-test. And this is exactly what we observe on
the figure, for the ⇢-test with a perfect model (see next). Note
that the same reasoning can be used to explain the sampling com-
plexities of the t-test for di↵erent fixed values. For example, the
case HW(zf ) = 3 requires four times as many traces than the case
HW(zf ) = 2 on the figure.
An important consequence of this observation is that, as for stan-
dard DPA attacks, the choice of statistic (here the t-test or ⇢-test)
has limited impact on the sampling complexity. For example, one
could totally design a ⇢-test based on a partition in two (fixed and
random) classes, that would then lead to very similar results as
the t-test (up to statistical artifacts, as discussed in [65]).
5. Estimating a model can only make it worse. Besides the poten-
tially lower signal, another drawback of the 256-class ⇢-test from
the sampling complexity point-of-view is that it requires the esti-
mation of a model made of 256 mean values. This further increases
its overheads compared to the t-test, as illustrated in Figure 3.1
(see the rˆz curve with k = 10-fold cross-validation). In this re-
spect, we first note that considering larger k’s only leads to very
marginal improvements of the detection (at the cost of significant
computational overheads). Besides, we insist that this estimation
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is unavoidable. For example, ignoring the cross-validation and
testing a model with the same set as its profiling set would lead
to overfitting and poor detection performances. In other words, it
is the size of the partition used in the ⇢-test that fixes its SNR (as
previously discussed) and estimation cost, and both determine the
final sampling complexity of the test.
Note that the above conclusions are independent of the leakage func-
tion considered (we repeated the same experiments with identity rather
than Hamming weight leakages, and reached the same conclusions).
Therefore, these simulated results confirm our introduction claim that
for leakage detection only, a fixed vs. random t-test is the preferred
method, and that their gains over a ⇢-test can be easily predicted from
a leakage function/partition and its resulting SNR metric.
Measured experiments
We now extend the previous simulated analysis to a practically-relevant
case of actual AES measurements, obtained from the setup described in
Section 2.3.1. We will divide our investigations into two parts. First, a
global analysis will consider the leakage traces of the full AES executions,
in order to discuss the sampling complexity and intuitions regarding the
POIs for our two detection tests. Next, a local analysis will be used
in order to discuss possible false negatives in the t-test, and intuitions
regarding the informativeness of the detected samples.
Global analysis. The results of a fixed vs. random t-test and a ⇢-
test for leakage traces corresponding to an entire AES Furious execution
are provided in Figure 3.2, from which two main observations can be
extracted:
1. The t-test has lower sampling complexity on average. This is essen-
tially the concrete counterpart of observation (3) in the previous
section. That is, we already know that for some fixed values of the
plaintext, the t-test should have a lower sampling complexity. Fig-
ure 3.2 confirms that when looking at complete AES traces, those
“easy-to-detect” fixed values are indeed observed (which is natural
since the AES Furious implementation accounts for a bit more than
3000 clock cycles, and the intermediate values within such a block
cipher execution should be uniformly distributed after a couple of
rounds). Concretely, this means that the sampling complexity for
detecting leakages with a similar confidence increases from ⇡ 200
traces for the t-test to ⇡ 2000 traces for the ⇢-test, i.e. a factor
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⇡ 10 which is consistent with the previous simulations. Note that
even in the context of a hardware implementation with a reduced
cycle count (e.g. 11 cycles per AES execution), finding fixed values
that are easy-to-detect for the t-test is feasible by trying a couple
of fixed plaintexts and keys.
2. The ⇢-test (resp. t-test) does (resp. not) provide intuitions regard-
ing exploitable leakage samples. This is easily seen from the figure
as well. Whereas the t-test detects information leakage everywhere
in the trace, the ⇢-test is much more localized, and points towards
the samples that depend on the single plaintext byte that is vary-
ing. Since the key is fixed in leakage detection, it implies that
peaks are observed whenever this (useless) plaintext byte and the
(useful) intermediate values that bijectively depend on it are ma-
nipulated, e.g. the key addition and S-box outputs in Figure 3.2.
In other words, the ⇢-test is mostly relevant for the detection of
POIs that are exploitable in a standard DPA attack (i.e. excluding
the false positives corresponding to plaintext manipulations).
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Figure 3.2: Leakage detection on real traces, entire AES execution.
Local analysis. The results of a fixed vs. random t-test and a ⇢-test
for leakage traces corresponding to the beginning of the first AES round
48 Chapter 3. Leakage and POI Detection
execution are provided in Figure 3.3, from which two main observations
can be extracted.4
1. Hard-to-detect leakage samples for the t-test can be observed. More
precisely, the lower part of Figure 3.3 exhibits three peaks which
exactly correspond to the manipulation of a plaintext byte (first
peak), the key addition (second peak) and the S-box execution
(third peak), just as the three samples of our simulated setting.
Knowing that our Atmel implementation of the AES has leakages
that can be e ciently exploited with a Hamming weight model
(as in our simulations) [104], we selected the fixed plaintext byte
of the t-test such that HW(zf ) = 4. As illustrated in the upper
part of the figure, the leakages of this fixed intermediate value are
indeed di cult to tell apart from the ones of its random counter-
part. More precisely, the ⇢-test clearly exhibits a peak for this
intermediate value after 2000 traces, which does not exist in the t-
test experiment using a similar sampling complexity. Whereas we
cannot exclude that such a peak would appear for a larger num-
ber of traces (since the chip does not exactly follow the Hamming
weight leakage model), this confirms that not all leakage samples
are easier to detect with the t-test than with the ⇢-test.
2. The ⇢-test does provide intuitions regarding the informativeness of
the leakage samples. Eventually, a straightforward advantage of
the ⇢-test is that the value of its correlation coe cient estimates
brings some intuition regarding the complexity of a side-channel
attack exploiting this sample, which is only provided up to a lim-
ited extent by the t-test. Indeed, a side-channel attack exploiting
an n-bit intermediate value is most e cient if it relies on an n-bit
model, as considered by the ⇢-test (otherwise n   1 bits out of n
will produce “algorithmic noise”). In this context, we can take
advantage of the connection between Pearson’s correlation coef-
ficient and the information theoretic metrics in [105] (see [65]),
themselves related to the worst-case complexity of standard DPA
attacks [29].
3.1.3 Improved leakage detection test
One central conclusion of the previous section is that the sampling com-
plexity of leakage detection tests highly depends on the SNR of the
4Exceptionally for this experiment, we considered a single varying byte for the
t-test, in order to better exhibit intuitions regarding the detected samples for a single
S-box.
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Figure 3.3: Leakage detection on real traces, first-round AES key addi-
tion and S-box.
leakage partition on which they are based. Interestingly, this observa-
tion directly suggests a natural improvement of CRI’s non-specific (fixed
vs. random) t-test. Namely, rather than performing the test based on
a fixed and a random class, a more e cient solution is to perform a
similar test based on two fixed classes (i.e. two fixed plaintexts). On
the one hand, this directly reduces the detection noise from 2 2n +  
2
alg
to 2 2n, since it cancels the algorithmic noise due to the variations of
the random class. Taking the example of Hamming weight leakages,
this algorithmic noise corresponds to  2alg = 2 for 8-bit values, but it
increases for larger parallel implementations (e.g. it is worth  2alg = 32
for 128-bit implementations). On the other hand, and when applied
to large traces, such a partitioning also increases the signal with high
probability, for the same argument as used to avoid false positives in
CRI’s t-test (i.e. by applying the detection to large enough traces, large
di↵erences between the two fixed classes will inevitably occur). Taking
the example of Hamming weight leakages again, we can easily compute
the probability (over random inputs) that a certain leakage di↵erence is
obtained for both types of partitions (i.e. fixed vs. random and fixed vs.
fixed), and the resulting signal variance, as illustrated in Figure 3.4. We
conclude from this figure that (i) the fixed vs. fixed partitioning allows
reaching larger di↵erences (so larger signals) and (ii) the fixed vs. fixed
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Figure 3.4: Fixed vs. random and fixed vs. fixed leakage detection signal.
partitioning allows doubling the average signal (i.e. the dot product of
the probabilities and variances in the figure). So both from the noise
variance and the (best-case and average case) signal points-of-views, it
should improve the sampling complexity of the detection test.5 In other
words, a leakage detection based on a fixed vs. fixed leakage partition
should theoretically have better sampling complexity than with a fixed
vs. random one.
Quite naturally, the exact gains of this new detection test depend
on the actual leakages. So as in the previous section, we confirmed
our expectations with two case studies. First, we compared the fixed vs.
random and fixed vs. fixed t-tests based on our software AES implemen-
tation. The results of this experiment are in Figure 3.5 where we observe
that data-dependent leakages are detected with similar confidence with
approximately 5 times less traces thanks to our new partitioning. Next,
we investigated the context of the hardware implementation of the AES
described in introduction of this section. As illustrated in Figure 3.6,
similar gains are obtained. Note however that despite we gain an ap-
proximate factor 5 in both cases, the reasons of this gain are di↵erent.
Indeed, the software implementation case is dominated by an increase
of signal (due to its large cycle count) and has limited algorithmic noise.
By contrast, the hardware implementation has larger algorithmic noise
(corresponding to 128-bit random values) but less improvements of the
signal (because its traces are only 11-cycle long). Even larger gains
could be obtained by combining both the signal and noise e↵ects (e.g.
by considering multiple keys for the hardware implementation). Based
5A similar conclusion can be obtained for other leakage functions, though the
binomial distribution of the Hamming weight leakages naturally make computations
easier.
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Figure 3.5: Improved leakage detection on real traces (Atmel implemen-
tation).
on these theoretical arguments and experimental confirmation, we ex-
pect our fixed vs. fixed partitioning to lead to faster leakage detections
in most practical scenarios.
3.1.4 Summary & open problems
The discussion in this section highlights that there are significant dif-
ferences between current approaches to side-channel security evaluation.
On the one hand, CRI’s Test Vector Assessment Methodology (TVLA)
aims at minimizing the evaluator’s e↵orts. Very concretely, non-specific
t-tests as proposed in [21, 38] are indeed good to detect univariate and
first-order leakages. As we observed in Section 3.1.3, slightly tweaking
the selection of the classes (from fixed vs. random to fixed vs. fixed)
allows significantly improving the detection speed in this case. In this
respect, we note that our investigations focused on plaintext variations
(allowing non-profiled detections), but similar conclusions hold for other
types of dependencies (e.g. one could consider two fixed keys with the
same plaintext, or two di↵erent pairs of plaintext and key). Despite
minor theoretical caveats (i.e. the possibility of false positives and nega-
tives), the application of such 2-class t-tests turns out to be extremely ef-
ficient. On the other side of the spectrum, complete (ideally worst-case)
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Figure 3.6: Improved leakage detection on real traces (ASIC implemen-
tation).
security evaluations such as discussed in [105] rather aim at a precise rat-
ing of the security level, possibly considering the adversary’s computing
power [112], which is an arguably more expensive task. In this case, the
selection of POIs is a usually a necessary first step. As also discussed in
this section, and when restricted to univariate and first-order leakages,
the main reason for the additional cost of this approach (including the
selection of POIs) is the larger number of classes for which the leakage
distribution has to be well estimated. In this context as well, our investi-
gations focused on non-profiled POI detection (which can be performed
e ciently for the first/last cipher rounds). But similar conclusions hold
in the profiled evaluation setting, which allows finding POIs in all the
cipher rounds, and is necessary for worst-case analysis.
These di↵erent methodologies naturally raise the question of which
one to use in which context, and whether they can be connected to some
extent, leading to the following open problems. First, how to general-
ize (simple) detection tests to capture more types of leakages? Moving
from univariate first-order leakages to univariate higher-order leakages
appears reachable with existing tools. One option is to exploit more
general statistical tests, e.g. the mutual information based one in [66].
Another option is to work “by moments” and to test higher-order mo-
ments of the leakage distributions (with t-test, F-tests, . . . , if 2 classes
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are considered, with Moments-Correlating DPA or equivalent tools if
more classes are considered). Moving to multivariate leakage detection
appears much more di cult. At least, testing all pairs/triples/. . . of
samples in a trace rapidly turns out to be infeasible as the size of the
traces increase, which usually leads current evaluations to be based on
heuristics (e.g. further discussed in Section 3.2). Second, can we extrap-
olate or bound the worst-case security level of an implementation based
on simple statistical tests? For example, the recent work in [29] shows
that one can (in certain well-defined conditions) bound the security level
of an implementation, measured with a success rate and in function of
the number of measurements and computing power of the adversary,
based on information theoretic metrics (such as the mutual information
in general, and the SNR if we only consider univariate attacks). But as
discussed in this section, evaluating an SNR is still significantly more
expensive than detecting leakages with non-specific tests. So of course,
it would be interesting to investigate whether it is possible to bound the
security level based on simpler leakage detection tests. In case of neg-
ative answer, it anyway remains that such leakage detection tests can
always be used as a preliminary to more expensive approaches (detect-
ing POIs, security evaluations), e.g. to reduce the dimensionality of the
traces.
3.2 Selecting time samples with projection pur-
suits
In this section, we investigate the use of Projection Pursuits (PPs), as
alternative tools for the selection of POIs in leakage traces [34]. Intu-
itively, PPs machine-pick “interesting” low-dimensional projections of a
high-dimensional data space by numerically maximizing a certain objec-
tive function. They essentially work by tracking the improvements (or
lack thereof) of the projection when applying small random modifica-
tions. Their main advantage in our context is that they can deal with
any objective function, which naturally fits the problem of higher-order
SCA. Their main drawback is (in general) their heuristic nature, since
the convergence of the method is not guaranteed and its complexity is
context-dependent. As a result, and in order to validate the interest
of PPs in our SCA context, we first applied them to the simple case
of an unprotected implementation of the AES. We show that di↵erent
objective functions can be e ciently used for this purpose, leading to
powerful subspace-based attacks, with similar informativeness as previ-
ous solutions such as LDA.
54 Chapter 3. Leakage and POI Detection
Next, we moved to the more challenging context of masking. In this
case, we combined the (linear) projection with an objective function
exploiting higher-order statistical moments. Initial experiments sug-
gest that the straightforward implementation of a PP algorithm is not
e cient at detecting the POIs of such protected implementations (es-
pecially as the number of useless dimensions in the traces increases).
The main reason is that as long as a d-tuple of POIs is not present in
the projection, the objective function essentially returns random indi-
cations. Interestingly, we then show that a specialized PP algorithm
exploiting an improved local search could give excellent results even in
this challenging context. Intuitively, it works by looking for the best
size and position of d windows covering parts of the traces, again by
iterating small random perturbations. Our experiments suggest that we
can recover POIs with significantly less calls to the objective function
than an exhaustive analysis. We further discuss the main parameters
influencing the success of such a detection method, and detail the time
vs. measurement complexity tradeo↵ resulting from these parameters.
Cautionary note & related works. In general, a projection search
algorithm can be evaluated according to two orthogonal axes, namely
its time and data complexity (i.e. how many iterations and measure-
ments do we need to obtain a projection?) or the informativeness of its
outputs (which relates to the data complexity of an attack exploiting
the projections obtained). Hence, it is worth recalling first that (stan-
dard) dimentionality reductions for unprotected implementations indeed
optimize informativeness, whereas existing solutions to detect POIs in
masked implementations focus on the complexity issue (because of the
more challenging nature of the problem). In this context, we note that
comparing di↵erent projection informativeness (e.g. PCA, LDA and the
recent works in [43, 71]), in the context of unprotected implementations,
is of limited interest anyway. Indeed, it has been shown in [65] that the
objective functions of LDA (which improves over PCA in terms of infor-
mativeness) and [43, 71] are essentially equivalent in this case, meaning
that LDA, these works and our new projections all have similar infor-
mativeness as well (up to statistical artifacts). Nevertheless, and for
completeness, we show empirical evidence of the gain they provide over
PCA and its impact in the DPA contest v2 [75]. As for comparisons in
the case of higher-order leakages and masked implementations, the main
issue is that none of the previous dimensionality reductions generalizes
to such contexts6. In fact, and as witnessed by the previous state-of-
6More precisely, the results in [43, 71] are actually similar to ours in the first-order
setting. In fact, they can be viewed as a heuristic (computationally e cient) analogue
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the-art, existing solutions for detecting POIs in masked implementations
are mainly based on exhaustive approaches, which turns out to be too
intensive as the size of the leakage traces increases. Hence, our main
contribution is to provide a first e cient alternative for dealing with
large traces containing only higher-order information leakages. For this
purpose, and since our focus is on complexity issues, we will put our-
selves in the most challenging scenario, i.e. a black box analysis where no
information about the source code is available, and compare the gains of
our optimizations over combinatorial search and other naive approaches
such as signal integration [18]. Quite naturally, any engineering intu-
ition allowing an educated guess – by focusing only on certain parts of
the traces – could be exploited as well. Besides we will also discuss the
di↵erences between our work and the one of Reparaz et al. and exhibit
that they are essentially complementary.
3.3 PPs against unprotected devices
In this section we investigate the application of PPs to the simple case
of the (unprotected) AES Furious implementation (Sections 2.1.4 and
2.3.1). In this context, our goal is to find a projection vector ↵ that
will convert the Ns samples of a leakage vector liy to a single (projected)
sample  iy, that is:
 iy =
Ns 1X
⌧=0
↵(⌧) · liy(⌧)
such that univariate attacks exploiting the  iy’s will be most e cient.
This essentially requires defining an objective function that measures
the “informativeness” of these samples. As previously mentioned, this
task is quite easy when first-order information is available in the leakage
traces: Pearson’s correlation coe cient obtained from a CPA and Man-
gard’s SNR (Section 2.3.3) are natural candidates – we will try them
both in our experiments. Following the equivalence results in [65], they
should provide similar results in this case (also similar to the ones that
would be obtained with an information theoretic metric).
to LDA. But their application to the higher-order case would be di cult for the
same reasons as mentioned at the beginning of Section 3.4 for our (non-specialized)
projection search. In this respect, an important di↵erence between this previous
work and ours is the separation between the objective functions and optimization
algorithms: we need to change both in order to e ciently deal with higher-order
leakages.
56 Chapter 3. Leakage and POI Detection
3.3.1 Projection pursuit algorithm
The pseudo-code of our projection pursuit algorithm is given in Algo-
rithm 2. It essentially repeats (Nr times) the selection of a random
index r followed by a maximization of the objective function for the cor-
responding time sample, based on the set of profiling traces Lp (which
contains traces for all the intermediate values y). For this purpose, the
max search() function consists in successive parabolic interpolations (il-
lustrated in Figure 3.7), which work in two iterated steps. We first look
for samples that enclose the extremum as follows. From a starting point
x1, we add a   in the direction that increases fobj (blue plain curve) to
get x2. Then, we keep adding  ’s until finding x3 such that y3 < y2 (see
Figure 3.7.a). As the weights assigned to each time sample are between
0 and 1, we typically take  ’s corresponding to a couple of percents
(e.g. 0.1 in our experiments) and repeat such additions at most 1/ 
times. Then, based on these three points, we start interpolating (as in
the dashed red curve of Figure 3.7.b-c). This process is iterated Nit
times, during which we replace the “oldest” x-point by the x-coordinate
(xv) of the parabola vertex (y-values are re-computed accordingly). The
new ↵(t) gets its value from the median x-value at the end of the last
iteration. In our experiments, Nit = 3 iterations were enough to get a
good approximation of the maximum. This method has the advantage of
being very fast to compute and converge. Note finally that the number
of repetitions Nr should ideally be larger than the number of samples
Ns (e.g. twice, typically), because some weights benefit from being re-
adjusted after the modification of other ↵(t)’s. Yet, when applied in
the context of an unprotected implementation, the time complexity of
Algorithm 2 was never a practical limitation (it typically corresponded
to a couple of minutes of computations in our experiments).
Algorithm 2 Projection Pursuit.
basic PP(Nr,Nit)
↵ = initialize();
repeat Nr times
r = rand index(Ns);
↵new = max search(@fobj ,Lp,↵, r,Nit);
↵ = ↵new;
end
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Figure 3.7: Successive parabolic interpolations.
3.3.2 Experimental results
We implemented the PP algorithm for both the CPA and SNR objective
functions, and targeted the first AES key byte for illustration. For each
of the 256 values of y = x  s, we measured Np = Nt = 50 traces for the
CPA objective function, and Nt = 100 traces for the SNR one, each of
them made of Ns = 1500 time samples. We set Nr, Nit and   as just
explained (to 3000, 3 and 0.1, respectively). The projections obtained
in both cases are given in Figure 3.8, for illustration. As expected,
they are very similar. We then computed success rates to compare the
quality of the projections obtained with the most informative sample, by
performing 2000 experimental univariate Template Attacks (TA). These
results show the e↵ectiveness of the projections as they only need 7
traces to get a 90% success rate, against 28 traces for the univariate TA.
It also confirms that both objective functions are indeed equivalent in
this case. It is finally interesting to compare our findings with the results
in [104] that target a similar implementation (with very similar success
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rate for the univariate TA). In particular, we see that the univariate
attack based on the single sample provided by our projections leads to
approximately the same data complexities as the hexavariate template
attack taking (heuristic) advantage of all the POIs in this previous work.
This informally confirms the quality of our projection.
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Figure 3.8: Projection profiles
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3.3.3 Discussion & comparison with existing works
As mentioned in introduction, the open literature essentially provides
satisfying solutions for detecting POIs and reducing the dimensionality
of leakage traces obtained from unprotected devices, and this holds both
from the complexity and informativeness points-of-view. Namely, from
the complexity point-of-view, testing all time samples exhaustively is
usually achievable in this case. And from the informativeness point-of-
view, any projection using one of the criteria in [65], e.g. like LDA does
with the SNR, should be optimal. In practice though, computing LDA
for large traces may lead to numerical issues, as it requires estimating a
covariance matrix of the size of the leakage traces (whereas PCA enables
a “small sample size variant” where the size of this covariance matrix can
be limited to the number of key hypotheses [2]). In this respect, both our
projection pursuits in Algorithm 2 and the proposal in [71] provide useful
alternatives. Note that the approach in this previous work slightly di↵ers
from ours since its experiments are specialized to CPA with a Hamming
distance leakage model (hence deviate from our optimality goal). By
contrast, we rather suggest to use a profiled correlation coe cient (or
the SNR) as objective function(s), since the evaluation of the objective
function requires some key knowledge anyway. These minor di↵erences
highlight that projection pursuits are versatile and can be applied with
a variety of objective functions. Eventually, and despite it is not the
main concern in this work, we want to emphasize that deviating from
an optimal objective function can lead to substantial di↵erences in the
attack success rates. For example, both PCA and our projection pursuit
algorithm using the SNR as objective function were tested in the context
of the DPA contest v2 [75]. As illustrated in Figure 3.10, the data
complexity of an attack using PCA is approximately doubled in this case,
which can be explained by the correlation between the noise distributions
taken at di↵erent time samples. Note that this projection pursuit was
included amongst the best attacks of this contest, leading to a data
complexity of 1173 traces (439 after key enumeration) as detailed in [19].
3.4 PPs against masked implementations
In contrast with the previous section, detecting POIs in leakage traces
of masked implementations (Section 2.2.3) is a quite challenging task.
From the complexity point-of-view, exhaustive approaches may grow ex-
ponentially with the number of shares (if these shares are manipulated
at di↵erent time samples), making them unpractical for long traces.
Furthermore, the information in the leakages of masked implementation
60 Chapter 3. Leakage and POI Detection
lies in higher-order moments of their probability distribution, which are
harder to estimate. As a result, the direct application of Algorithm 2
with the previous objective functions in this context does not provide
successful results. In the (simple) case where the shares of a masking
scheme are manipulated in parallel, adapting the objective function may
be su cient to deal with this problem. But in case of software imple-
mentations, where the shares are manipulated at di↵erent time samples,
the algorithm itself has to be adapted. Intuitively, this is because it
works by modifying time samples one at a time, while for such masked
implementations, we require at least one meaningful d-tuple of samples
to be active in the projection for an objective function to output rele-
vant information. We now describe how to specialize PPs to take this
constraint into account, and detect POIs for masked implementations.
3.4.1 Specialized projection pursuit algorithm
The main tool used in our following optimization is local search, which
is a collection of iterative methods that are e cient for quickly finding
good solutions to optimization problems (note that the previous PP al-
gorithm can be viewed as a simple local search). Despite heuristic, it
generally works more e ciently than exhaustive analyses. Furthermore,
local search has very limited storage requirements. For example, in our
context, it exploits the leakage traces directly – which is a significant
advantage compared to heuristics exploiting “product traces” as men-
tioned in the introduction of this section. A good reference to these
methods is [47]. Their working principle is simple: they always keep a
solution (called the current solution) as well as the best solution found
since the beginning of the search. At each iteration of the algorithm,
the current solution is perturbed, giving a set of new solutions, called its
neighbourhood. One of the neighbouring solutions is then selected and
replaces the current solution. The algorithm terminates when its conver-
gence criterion is met (e.g. number of iterations without improvement,
time limit, etc.). Intuitively, such an approach to optimization exploits
diversification and intensification. The former aims at exploring a large
and diverse search space, while the latter intends to improve the current
solution. Their combination is expected to avoid being trapped in local
optima.
When applied to masking, one key element has to be taken into
account by optimizations. Namely, the sensitive variables are split into
d shares and the objective function should not be informative as long as a
meaningful d-tuple of shares is not present in the projection. Besides, in
practice it frequently happens that dimensions near a POI also contain
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valuable information. These two facts motivate the way we designed our
improved search algorithm as follows. First, we consider a projection
vector containing d windows of non-zero weights (all the others being
zero) and denote a group of successive dimensions as a window. The
weights inside these windows are uniform. In this context, and since
local search only considers local modifications of the current solution,
the information given by the objective function will return essentially
random indications (so no reliable information) if this current solution
does not cover the d shares. On the contrary, when the windows span a
d-tuple of shares, the objective function can be used to refine the current
solution. For this reason, our specialized PP algorithm will be split into
two parts next denoted as find sol and improve sol. The find sol phase
probes the search space with large windows and a lot of randomness until
it has good indication that the windows span the d-tuples of shares.
In order to detect that the windows span these d-tuples, we use two
sets of profiling traces (Lptr and Lpva, where tr stands for training and
va for validation). Then, the improve sol phase refines those windows.
The find sol phase thus puts more emphasis on diversification and the
improve sol, on intensification.
Algorithm 3 Specialized projection pursuit algorithm using local
search.
specialized PP Local Search(d,Wlen, Tdet,TP:=TP’[ TP’’)
↵ = find sol phase(d,Wlen, Tdet,TP’);
if(↵ 6= null)
return improve sol phase(↵,TP’’);
end
The pseudocodes of the specialized PP algorithm using local search
are given in Algorithms 3, 4 and 5. These algorithms depend on vari-
ous parameters: some of them will be explicitly discussed as they hold
important intuitions, the remaining ones – next denoted as technical
parameters (TP) – will be fixed according to state-of-the-art strategies.
Our main tool is the specialized PP Local Search function (Algorithm 3).
As just explained, it organizes the search in two main steps. The first
one is the find sol phase which returns a first candidate projection ↵
(after Nfr repetitions). If this first step is successful, the improve sol
phase is repeated N ir times to refine the solution. The find sol phase is
described in Algorithm 4. At each iteration, it randomly selects d win-
dows of length Wlen with non-zero weights (function random window).
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Algorithm 4 Find solution phase.
find sol phase(d,Wlen, Tdet,TP’)
TP’:={Nfr ,num hops}
i=0;
repeat Nfr times
↵ = random window(d,Wlen);
neighbourhood = get neighbours FS (↵,num hops);
best neighbour = max(@fobj ,neighbourhood ,Lptr);
if fobj(best neighbour ,Lptr) > Tdet
if fobj(best neighbour ,Lpva) > Tdet
return (i+ 1, best neighbour);
end
end
i++;
end
end
All the neighbours of the solution are then computed with the function
get neighbours FS. Each neighbour is constructed by moving one of the
windows left or right (if we see the projection vector as a row vector).
The lengths of the moves considered are small multiples of the window
length (as set by the num hops parameter). During the computation
of the neighbours, the collisions between windows are avoided in order
to keep d distinct windows. Next, the best neighbour is selected as the
neighbour having the maximal evaluation of fobj on the set Lptr. This
best neighbour is finally tested to detect if a d-tuple of shares is spanned
by the windows. The detection is based on a threshold Tdet on the ob-
jective function that will be carefully discussed in the next section. In
order to dodge the randomness of the objective function when the d
shares are not spanned, this threshold has to be exceeded on both the
training and validation sets of traces Lptr, Lpva. If those two conditions
are met, the projection vector is returned by the algorithm.
If the find sol phase was able to find a solution spanning the d shares,
the objective function is informative enough to allow a second (intensi-
fication) step, and the improve sol phase (in Algorithm 5) is run for N ir
iterations. At each iteration, the entire neighbourhood is constructed
with the function get neighbours IS. Each neighbour results from the
shift (left or right) of one window or the resizing of all the windows
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Algorithm 5 Improve solution phase.
improve sol phase(↵,TP’’)
TP’’:={N ir,move steps, resize steps,minWS ,maxWS , Nn,max stagn}
↵best = ↵;
Repeat N ir times
neighbourhood = get neighbours IS (↵,move steps,
resize steps,
minWS ,maxWS );
↵ = select neighbour(@fobj ,Lptr, Nn);
if fobj(↵,Lptr) > fobj(↵best,Lptr)
↵best = ↵;
num stagn = 0;
else
num stagn ++;
end
if num stagn > max stagn
return ↵best;
end
end
return ↵best;
end
(we keep the same size for all windows). The move steps considered are
given in move steps, and the resize steps in resize steps. The size of the
windows is constrained to remain between min WS and max WS. The
selection of the neighbour is then performed by select neighbour, as a
random neighbour amongst the Nn best neighbours. Using this selec-
tion strategy allows the search to avoid being trapped in local optima,
ensuring a su cient diversification. The search also memorizes the best
projection obtained since the beginning of the phase in ↵best. This is
mandatory as it is allowed to select projection vectors that decrease
the objective function. Eventually, the variable num stagn records the
number of iterations without improvement of the best solution. Once
num stagn is larger than max stagn or when the number of iterations
reaches Nr = N
f
r +N ir, the search returns the best solution ↵best.
As far as the technical parameters are concerned, we first set the
number of hops (num hops) in the find sol phase to allow the windows
to cover all the dimensions of the traces. It enables an iteration to find
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a covering set of windows when one window is incorrectly placed. Next,
in the improve sol phase, the more move steps (move steps) and resize
steps (resize steps), the quicker the algorithm converges towards the
optimal windows, but the longer each iteration is. We found that a good
tradeo↵ in our context was to use move steps of 1, 3 or 5 dimensions and
resize steps of 1 dimension. Those settings allow the iterations to be fast
while still covering a large part of the search space around the solution
found by the find sol phase. The min WS parameter typically depends
on the sampling rate of the oscilloscope used in the attack: we set it
to 5 which corresponds to half a cycle in our experiments, based on the
intuition that dimensions next to a POI may also contain information.
max WS was then chosen as 2*Wlen, reflecting that this information
can be spread on multiple clock cycles. Finally, a max stagn value of
50 allows the local search to stop when it is unlikely to further improve
the quality of the windows. And given the low span of the moves and
the resizes, an exploration parameter Nn of 3 is enough to escape local
optima and still converge towards the optimal solution.
3.4.2 Simulated experiments
We now discuss the setting of the more intuitive parameters Wlen and
Tdet together with the performance gains obtained thanks to our special-
ized PP algorithm. In view of their heuristic nature, these questions are
best investigated with simulated examples, where we can play with some
important parameters of leaking implementations. For this purpose, we
will consider a first-order masked S-box where the adversary receives Ni
pairs of leakage variables of the form:
L1i = HW(S(x  s) m) +R1i ,
L2i = HW(m) +R
2
i ,
where HW is the Hamming weight function, S the AES S-box, x a plain-
text byte, s a key byte, m a secret random mask, and R1i , R
2
i are nor-
mally distributed noise variables with variance  2n (1 < i  Ni). For
simplicity, we make sure that the Ni samples corresponding to the two
shares are not overlapping. Next to these 2 ⇥ Ni informative samples,
we finally add Ns   2⇥Ni random samples Nj , so that Ns is the total
number of samples in our simulated traces.
Setting the detection threshold. An important parameter in Al-
gorithm 4 is the threshold value used to decide whether an improvement
of the objective function is significant. In this context, a particularly
convenient feature of the MMPC criteria (defined in Section 2.3.3) is
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that it gradually tends to one as the number of measurements used in
the detection increases. That is, given that the order of the statistical
moment (e.g. d = 2 in our current simulations) and number of mea-
surements used in the detection is su cient, this criteria always reaches
high values. Intuitively, it is because the MMPC relates to the statis-
tical confidence we have in our estimated moments rather than their
informativeness (see [70] for a discussion). As a result, and using such
an objective function, we are able to set the detection threshold Tdet in
a completely black box manner (i.e. independent of the implementation
details). Indeed, the only thing we have to guarantee is that the MMPC
as computed by the objective function is significant in front of the one
that would be obtained by chance, for non-informative samples. But this
essentially depends on the size of the target operations. For example, the
correlation between random 256-element vectors is (roughly) Gaussian-
distributed7 with mean zero. And the probability that MMPC > 0.2
by chance in this case is already below the one corresponding to three
 ’s (i.e. below 0.1%). Of course, one can expect slight deviations from
such an ideal behaviour (e.g. so-called ghost peaks leading to non-zero
mean MMPC for non-informative samples), but our next experiments
will confirm that setting Tdet to 0.2 is generally good.
Impact of Wlen,  2n and Ni on the detection success. Given a
detection threshold set as just explained, we can now evaluate the impact
of di↵erent parameters on the success of our find sol phase. In particular,
the noise variance  2n, number of informative pairs of samples in the
traces Ni and window lengthWlen are important in this respect. As just
explained, we know that given a large enough number of measurements,
the MMPC criteria should become larger than 0.2 for the informative
samples. But it also means that if this number of measurements is
not su cient, the moments used in MCP-DPA will not be su ciently
well estimated and the detection may fail. As usual, the main parameter
influencing the estimation complexity is the noise variance  2n. Yet, since
we apply the objective function after projection in our PP algorithm, the
size of the window Wlen also matters here. Indeed, adding Wlen samples
with noise variance  2n implies a larger noise variance Wlen ⇥  2n after
projection. This is typically illustrated in the left part of Figure 3.11,
where we see the impact of increasingWlen for two noise levels ( 2n = 0.1
in the top figure,  2n = 2 in the bottom one). That is, for too large noise
variances or window lengths, the estimation of the MMPC criteria is
not good enough to take good decisions (i.e. is below Tdet). In other
7More precise estimates can be obtained with Fisher’s Z transform.
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words, more measurements are needed in this case for the PP algorithm
to output meaningful results. Interestingly, we also see in the right part
of the figure that adding meaningful samples in the traces (i.e. increasing
Ni) quite significantly mitigates the impact of large window lengths. So
intuitively, traces with multiples POIs available will benefit better from
our proposed method.
Time complexity. The previous results suggest that the complexity
of PP algorithms is essentially a tradeo↵ between time and measure-
ment complexities. That is, increasing the window length should de-
crease their time complexity8, but increase the noise after projection,
and so the number of measurements needed to estimate the MMPC cri-
teria with su cient confidence. This is typically illustrated in Table 3.1,
where we also see the benefit of having more informative samples in the
traces (i.e. increasing Ni). Furthermore, Table 3.2 highlights the impact
of increasing the size of the traces Ns. As in a combinatorial search,
the time complexity of the PP algorithm should increase quadratically
with it (more generally, it depends on Nds with d the number of shares
in the masking scheme). Yet, increasing Wlen or Ni can make this in-
crease quasi-linear for some (not too large) values of Ns. Besides, note
that both tables include all the constant factors related to the technical
parameters in the previous section, which may a↵ect these asymptotic
predictions. Note also that these tables count the calls to the objective
function for readability, but this count is not fully reflective of the PP’s
time complexity when changing the size of the profiling sets Lptr and Lpva,
since larger sets also increase the complexity of each evaluation of the
objective function. Yet, thanks to the parallelism of MCP-DPA attacks,
the impact of these increases was limited in our experiments, leaving us
with strong concrete results, as the next section will show.
3.4.3 Measured experiments
The previous simulated experiments suggest that a specialized PP algo-
rithm can be an e cient way to find POIs in the leakage traces of masked
implementations. Now, we would like to confirm this hope in front of a
real case-study. For this purpose, we consider actual measurements of
the first-order masked AES S-box described in Section 2.2.3. For every
pair of input/output masks (m, q), it pre-computes an S-box S⇤ such
that S⇤(x   s   m) = S(x   s)   q Since this pre-computation is part
of the adversary’s measurements, it leads to quite memory-consuming
8At most linearly since the benefit of increasing the window length Wlen saturates
whenever it is not negligible in front of the number of samples in the traces Ns.
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Table 3.1: Impact of Wlen, Ni on the average number of fobj calls.
Ns = 1000
Ni
5 10
Wlen
10 7306 4681
20 3920 3008
30 3266 2782
50 - 2138
100 - 1020
150 - -
Table 3.2: Impact of Ns on the average number of fobj calls.
Ns
500 1000 2000
Wlen = 50, Ni = 10 905 2138 4673
traces of Ns = 30, 000 samples (which would be a challenging target for
a combinatorial search). Furthermore, we empirically verified that our
implementation does not lead to any (easy-to-detect) first-order infor-
mation leakage, by running template attacks for all the time samples,
and making sure that the success rate remained negligible (which should
be guaranteed by the use of independent masks m and q, in order to pre-
vent leakages based on the transitions between the the S-box input and
output). Our motivation for using this setup was twofold. First, we se-
lected a masking countermeasure based on pre-computed tables in view
of the di culty to obtain a first-order secure implementation based on
other standard masking schemes such as [93] – see [6] for a recent discus-
sion of this problem. Second, we purposely put ourselves in a challenging
scenario with large traces, without trying to compress them (e.g. by re-
ducing the sampling frequency or through educated guess). While we
agree that concrete adversaries would try to exploit these possibilities,
we assume that they would not always be able to compress traces up to
feasible combinatorial search, and the experiments in this section aim
to reflect this possibility.
We then analyzed our set of profiling and test traces, in order to
evaluate the success and e ciency of our POI detection tool. We used
the same MMPC criteria and detection threshold of 0.2 as previously
discussed, and selected a window length Wlen of 25, corresponding to
approximately two clock cycles in our measurements: this is the only
physical intuition used in our experiments. With these parameters, it
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turned out that the estimation of the objective function was su ciently
accurate (for our detection threshold to make sense) with 50 profiling
traces per template (i.e. 50⇥256 among the 500⇥256 measured). Based
on our 1500 test traces, we then evaluated that the local search algorithm
was able to return a solution within an average of 12 000 calls to fobj
(roughly corresponding to 7 minutes of execution time on our desktop
computer). We then repeated this search multiple times in order to find
several pairs of informative windows. We finally used these windows
to launch multivariate (Gaussian) template attacks using 2, 4 and 8
dimensions. For this purpose, we selected the smallest windows (which
turned out to contain 5 samples) and built templates for their mean
values (so that each pair of window provided us with 2 dimensions). The
results of these attacks are illustrated in Figure 3.12 and confirm that our
tool successfully detected POIs in this challenging case. For convenience,
and in order to limit our measurement needs, we estimated a 4th-order
success rate which corresponds to an adversary able to enumerate 232
keys. Interestingly, we see that the gain due to increased dimensionalities
vanishes when moving from 4-dimension templates to 8-dimension ones.
We conjecture that this mainly relates to template estimation issues.
Note anyway that, as mentioned in introduction, these attacks are not
aimed to be optimal from the data complexity point-of-view (since we
have no guarantee to find the most informative samples). Our main
goal was to provide a time-e cient POI detection tool, in a black box
setting. To the best of our knowledge, previous methods for this purpose
would not have been able to deal with 30,000-sample traces without
an educated guess (For illustration, the product traces mentioned in
footnote 1 would correspond to 900.106 samples).
3.4.4 Discussion & comparison with existing works
The previous (simulated and actual) experiments underline that the de-
tection of POIs in the leakage traces of masked implementations is a
tradeo↵ between the time complexity of the PPs and the amount of
traces available for this purpose. In this context, it is first important
to remark that the selection of a good objective function is essential.
In theory, any objective function that captures higher-order statistical
moments of the leakage distribution can lead to successful detections.
For example, the information theoretic metric (MI) of Section 2.3.3 is a
possibility. Yet, concretely, it would be more expensive to compute and
estimate, so the MMPC criteria used in this section appeared more con-
venient for the purposes of this section (where we want to detect POIs,
not to optimize their informativeness). Next, this tradeo↵ also draws
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pretty intuitive connections between our work and naive approaches
to the detection of POIs. On the one hand, (randomized) combinato-
rial search corresponds to one extreme scenario, where we use windows
of length one, implying minimum trace requirements (so the simplest
possible estimation) at the cost of maximum time complexity. On the
other hand, signal integration corresponds to the other extreme scenario,
where we use a single window of maximum length, implying very large
trace requirements (since it implies estimating very noisy projected sam-
ples) but minimum time complexity (since the window covers the full
trace). Hence, PPs can be viewed as a natural and practically useful
way to explore the tradeo↵s between these extremes.
Besides, we would like to end this section by discussing its di↵er-
ences (and complementarity) with the recent work of Reparaz et al. In
summary, the results in [91] start from a di↵erent context than ours,
as they primarily focus on a non-profiled attack setting. In this con-
text, they made the useful observation that, while naive approaches
to POI detection usually launch the (non-profiled) attacks for all key
candidates independently, it is in fact possible to (approximately) de-
tect these points independently of the key material first, and to launch
the attacks for all the key candidates on a subset of relevant points
afterwards (leading to a reduction of the time complexity by a factor
roughly corresponding to the number of key hypotheses in the attack).
We take the example of a masked S-box to illustrate this idea, where
we manipulate a masked value V = S(x   s)   M (with the plain-
text x fixed/chosen) and its corresponding mask M . The proposal of
Reparaz et al. intuitively works because the informative pairs of samples
for which Iˆ(S;X, L(V ), L(M)) is non negligible also correspond to pairs
of samples for which Iˆ(L(V ), L(M) is significantly larger than 0 (for a
chosen x – the CHES 2012 paper also describes known plaintext vari-
ants). Interestingly, while the first quantity can only be computed using
key knowledge, the estimation of the second one does not require s to be
known. So overall, this previous work does not reduce the complexity
of the POI detection (which is still performed based on a combination
of educated guess and combinatorial search over 800 samples in [91]).
It rather makes it possible to be performed only once for all key can-
didates in a non-profiled setting. As a result, PP algorithms could be
directly combined with this proposal, by simply using Reparaz et al.’s
criteria (i.e. Iˆ(L(V ), L(M)) as objective function. This would extend the
applicability of our work to the non-profiled setting, at the cost of a less
favourable “number of measurements vs. time complexity tradeo↵”. In-
deed, estimating such a (non-profiled) objective function would be more
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expensive than our profiled MMPC criteria. Computing such an objec-
tive function implies (constant but significant) performance overheads,
because it requires applying Bayes’ law and marginalizing over the key
hypotheses, as the information theoretic metric.
This discussion eventually allows us to clarify what we mean by
“black box evaluation”. In our experiments, we did not require imple-
mentation details nor mask knowledge, but assumed key knowledge to
speed up estimations. We believe this realistically captures the con-
straints of an evaluation lab. But extending our work to a non-profiled
setting may be achieved by changing the objective function, as just dis-
cussed. In this context, it is important to remark that the POI detection
not only depends on the tradeo↵ between number of measurements and
time complexity, but also on the “engineering intuition available” and
“type of information detected”. Starting with the engineering intuition,
we can observe that directly using Iˆ(L(V ), L(M)) as objective function
would make the setting of the detection threshold more challenging (i.e.
require some engineering intuition). Indeed, the asymptotic value of this
objective function depends on the leakage function, in contrast with the
MMPC criteria that asymptotically tends to be independent of the leak-
age function (which allows a well motivated and black box choice of the
detection threshold, as discussed in Section 3.4.2). Note that using the
confidence level of an hypothesis test is an interesting alternative for this
purpose, and will be investigated in the next section. Next, the type of
information detected is another parameter that may allow speeding up
POI detection. Namely, one of the reasons making an objective function
costly to estimate is that its argument is an intermediate computation of
which the output typically takes 256 possible values. This means that we
want to learn information about a random variable with (relatively) large
input range. In this respect, a natural solution is to consider a target
with smaller range, and at the extreme, a binary random variable. This
is in fact what is advertised in the fixed vs. random leakage detection test
discussed in Section 3.1. For this test, the authors try to detect leakage
points where there is a significant di↵erence between two classes: the
first corresponding to fixed plaintexts, the second corresponding to ran-
dom plaintexts. On the positive side, this allows detecting leaking points
without any profiling, with a simple (binary) hypothesis test, which in-
deed provides easy-to-compute confidence levels. On the negative side,
there is no guarantee that the detected samples all correspond to useful
(key-dependent) information, nor that all POIs can be detected in this
way. In practice though, such tests have been shown quite powerful for
detecting POIs in concrete implementations of, e.g. the AES. Note that
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leakage detection tests have mainly been applied to unprotected imple-
mentations so far, but their extension to masking is conceptually simple
(see, e.g. [6]).
Summarizing, this work puts forward the interest of PP algorithms
in the context of profiled black box evaluations, where they allow de-
tecting leakage points which are certainly “of interest” (since they are
key-dependent), with reasonable measurement vs. estimation cost and
no implementation details. Many variations are possible in order to move
to a non-profiled context, with a price to pay in estimation cost and/or
need of implementation details and/or type of information detected. But
all these changes of conditions will only be reflected by a change of ob-
jective function, hence preserve the relevance of our main contribution
(i.e. the specialized PP algorithm). In this respect, it is important to
note that independently of the evaluation context and objective func-
tion, trading time complexity for more measurements anyway becomes
necessary at some point, when traces become too large for exhaustive
combinatorial search. Last but not least, we recall that despite black box
in the sense described in this section, our techniques still rely on some
assumptions (e.g. whether the leakages are value-based or transition-
based [6]). Using non-specific tests such as [38, 66] can mitigate this
requirement (although it does not totally suppress it).
Before concluding, let us recall that in all these cases, the POI de-
tection is heuristic (which is especially clear in our algorithms taking
advantage of local search). Therefore, they do not guarantee that the
best (i.e. most informative) POIs are found. An exhaustive analysis
remains the only option for this purpose.
3.4.5 Conclusion
In this work we proposed an e cient method for finding POIs in the
leakage traces of cryptographic implementations. We exploited a com-
bination of PP and local search for this purpose, and discussed how to
adapt it to the side-channel cryptanalysis problem. One of the main
advantages of the method is its genericity, as it can be applied to any
implementation, by simply adapting its objective function. Besides, it
has very low memory requirements compared to state-of-the-art solu-
tions and (although heuristic) works in practical time complexity. We
applied our basic and specialized PP algorithms to two case studies of
unprotected and 2-share masked implementations to validate our claims.
Extending the specialized version to more shares would be straightfor-
ward, since this number of shares (i.e. d) is a parameter in our search
algorithms.
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Among the interesting open problems, we believe investigating the
informativeness of the projected samples obtained with PPs in the con-
text of protected implementations is promising – it was essentially left
out of our analysis so far. Di↵erent approaches could be considered for
this purpose. One would be to refine the projection vectors, possibly
based on an information theoretic objective function that would better
reflect the data complexity of the resulting attacks. An alternative one
would be to exploit non-linear projections, e.g. inspired by the “product
combining”, frequently used in second-order DPA [83, 102]. Yet, pre-
liminary results suggest that non-linear projections may be hard(er) to
exploit because the addition of non-informative samples when comput-
ing the objective function has higher impact on the (non-Gaussian) noise
in this case. Besides, testing new objective functions that are cheap to
compute and estimate, in the profiled and non-profiled settings, is an-
other interesting research direction.
3.5 From leakage detection to POI detection
The conclusions drawn in Section 3.1.2 lead to the next contribution of
the work reported in this thesis. That is, when extending leakage detec-
tion towards the detection of POIs, the ⇢-test proposed in Section 3.1.1
naturally gains additional interest, since it provides more intuitions re-
garding the exploitable samples in side-channel traces. More precisely,
it allows a better selection of POIs based on the criteria that these
POIs depend on an enumerable part of the key. It also maximizes the
SNR metric that can be easily connected to the worst-case complexity
of standard DPA attacks [29]. Therefore, and most importantly, our re-
sults directly imply that the automated tools for the detection of POIs
proposed in Section 3.4 are also applicable in a full black box setting,
without any key knowledge, by simply adapting the objective function
used in their optimization (i.e. replacing it by the ⇢-test in this section).
We finally confirm this claim by an additional experimental evaluation,
in the context of a first-order secure masked implementation. We also
put forward that the detection of a threshold for which an improvement
of the objective function is considered as significative in the optimiza-
tions of Section 3.4 is made easier when using the ⇢-test (and suggest
a minor improvement of these last methods, by taking advantage of
cross-validation when evaluating this objective function).
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3.5.1 The ⇢-test as a POI detection tool
One important conclusion of the experiments of Section 3.1.2 is that
leakage detection based on a ⇢-test provides useful intuitions regarding
the exploitable samples in side-channel traces. As a result, it is a good
candidate for the more specific task of detecting POIs for mounting an
attack. In this section, we conclude the chapter by putting forward that
a ⇢-test is in fact perfectly suited for integration in (and improvement
of) the POI detection tool proposed in Section 3.4. For this purpose, we
describe our improvements based on our proposed ⇢-test, and provide
some experimental confirmation of our claims.
Note that in general, the problem of detecting POIs is relatively
easy in the context of unprotected implementations. Indeed, exhaus-
tive analysis is usually feasible in this case, and it is even possible
to look for optimal transforms that project the samples towards small
(hence easier-to-evaluate) subspaces such that most of their informative-
ness is preserved, e.g. using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [2],
which maximizes the side-channel signal, or Linear Discriminant Analy-
sis (LDA) [103], which maximizes the side-channel SNR. In fact, in this
context, any criteria can be easily optimized using local search (Sec-
tion 3.3 and [71]), and most criteria are essentially equivalent anyway
(i.e. correlation, SNR, mutual information and success rate [29, 65]).
Therefore, our focus will be on the more challenging case of masked
implementation, which requires the specialized local search proposed in
Section 3.4.
This contribution
We first recall that the POI detection tool of Section 3.4 is black box in
the sense that it does not require any knowledge of the target implemen-
tation. By contrast, it does require key profiling, since the MCP-DPA
distinguisher is a profiled one. In this respect, our first contribution is
the simple but useful observation that one can easily apply such a black
box POI detection without key profiling, by simply profiling the MCP-
DPA objective function based on plaintext knowledge, just as the ⇢-test
in this chapter. Indeed, when detecting POIs, it is su cient to know the
leakage model up to a permutation corresponding to key knowledge (a
quite similar idea is exploited in [91] for similar purposes). As discussed
in Section 3.1.2, this solution will su↵er from the (minor) risk of detect-
ing plaintext samples, but as will be detailed next, this can be easily
mitigated in practice.
Based on these premises, our second contribution is the equally sim-
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ple observation that our ⇢-test can be used identically with the MCP-
DPA distinguisher, so is theoretically eligible for detecting leakages and
POIs of any order. And this observation leads to our third contribu-
tion, namely that by replacing the MCP-DPA objective function by the
⇢-test (based on CPA or MCP-DPA), we obtain a very simple and rig-
orous way to set the detection threshold in Algorithm 3. That is, one
just has to use the same “five sigma rule” as used in the leakage de-
tections of Figures 3.2 and 3.3. Note that by changing the objective
function and selection of a detection threshold in this way, we bene-
fit from the additional advantage of estimating the objective function
with cross-validation, which is another (minor) improvement over the
previous method.
3.5.2 Experimental validation
In order to confirm the previous claims, we tested Algorithm 3 using
exactly the previously described modifications, based on the same target
implementation and measurement setup (Section 3.4.3). This masked
implementation which leads to large traces with Ns = 30, 000 samples
(for which an exhaustive analysis of all the pairs of samples is out of
reach). We verified that the implementation does not lead to any first-
order leakages with the ⇢-based test. We further set the window length
to 25 samples, which corresponds to a bit more than two clock cycles at
our clock frequency and sampling rate. With these parameters, the local
search was able to return a solution within the same number of objective
function calls, namely ⇡ 12 000 on average. An example of leakage
trace together with windows obtained thanks to Algorithm 3 is given in
Figure 3.13. As clear from the zoomed plots at the bottom of the figure,
the selection of POIs corresponds to leakage samples that combine the
precomputation and masked S-box computation. Interestingly, we could
expect some false positives due to the detection of plaintext bytes that
is possible in our non-profiled scenario. However, the improve solution of
Algorithm 3 (where the window size is adapated to be most informative)
combined with the fact that the most informative leakage samples in
our traces correspond to memory accesses (i.e. the S-box computations)
prevented these to happen. Note that even if the leakage of the plaintext
manipulations was more informative, we could easily “mark” the cycles
that correspond to plaintext knowledge only, and exclude them from
our optimization. Since the number of POIs corresponding to a single
plaintext byte is usually limited, this would lead to the detection of a
valid pair of POIs after a couple of iterations of Algorithm 3. Besides, we
note that Simple Power Analysis, or DPA against the plaintext (before
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it is XORed with the masks) are other simple ways to gain the minimum
intuition about the time localization of POIs to make non-profiled local
search applicable.
3.5.3 Conclusion
To conclude, we insist that this last section has admittedly limited tech-
nical novelty. However, we believe that the connections made are impor-
tant to raise awareness that up to the selection of POIs in the leakage
trace, side-channel security evaluations can essentially be performed in
a black box way, and without any key profiling. In this respect, leakage
detection and the detection of POIs are indeed very related tasks, with
the significant di↵erence that the latter has to take the exploitability
of the detected samples into account. And this is exactly the di↵er-
ence between simple t-tests and (slightly) more measurement-intensive
⇢-tests based on larger leakage partitions. Note that the non-profiled de-
tection in this section only applies to the first/last block cipher rounds
(i.e. before di↵usion is complete), which captures many relevant practi-
cal scenarios but could be an issue, e.g. in contexts where these extreme
rounds are better protected than the central ones. Besides, and more
generally, we recall that as soon as the POIs are detected and the evalua-
tor has to build a model for these samples, key profiling becomes strictly
necessary if the worst-case security level has to be evaluated [117].
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Figure 3.10: Template attack success rates from the DPA contest traces.
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Figure 3.11: Incidence of the window length Wlen on the information
detection.
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Figure 3.12: 4th-order success rates of multivariate template attacks.
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Figure 3.13: Non-profiled detection of POIs based on the ⇢-test.
Chapter 4
Leakage certification
Side-channel attacks are an important threat against the security of
modern embedded devices. As a result, the search for e cient ap-
proaches to secure cryptographic implementations against such attacks
has been an ongoing process over the last 15 years. Sound tools for quan-
tifying physical leakages are a central ingredient for this purpose, since
they are necessary to balance the implementation cost of concrete coun-
termeasures with the security improvements they provide. Hence, while
early countermeasures came with proposals of security evaluations that
were sometimes specialized to the countermeasure, more recent work has
investigated the possibility to consider evaluation methods that gener-
ally apply to any countermeasure. The unified evaluation framework
proposed at Eurocrypt 2009 (Section 2.2.4) is a typical attempt in this
direction. It suggests analysing cryptographic implementations with a
combination of information theoretic and security metrics. The first ones
aim at measuring the (worst-case) information leakage independently of
its exploitation by the adversary, and are typically instantiated with the
Mutual Information (MI). The second ones aim at quantifying how e -
ciently an adversary can take advantage of this leakage in order to turn
it into (e.g.) a key recovery, and are typically instantiated with a success
rate.
In this context, an important observation is that most side-channel
attacks, and in particular any standard DPA attack, require a leakage
model [65]. This model usually corresponds to an estimation of the leak-
age Probability Density Function (PDF), possibly simplified to certain
statistical moments. Since the exact distribution of (e.g.) power con-
sumption or electromagnetic radiation measurements is generally un-
known, it raises the problem that any physical security evaluation is
possibly biased by model errors. In other words, security evaluations
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ideally require a perfect leakage model (so that all the information is
extracted from the measurements). But in practice models are never
perfect, and thus the quality of the evaluation may highly depend on
the quality of the evaluator. This intuition can be captured with the
notion of Perceived Information (PI – described in Section 2.3.3) - that
is nothing else than an estimation of the MI biased by the side-channel
evaluator’s model [90]. Namely, the MI captures the worst-case security
level of an implementation, as it corresponds to an (hypothetical) ad-
versary who can perfectly profile the leakage PDF. By contrast, the PI
captures its practical counterpart where actual (statistical) estimation
procedures are used by an evaluator, in order to profile the leakage PDF.
The previous formal tools provide a sound basis for discussing the eval-
uation question “how good is my leakage model?”. The answer to this
question actually corresponds to the di↵erence between the MI and the
PI. Nevertheless, we remain with the problem that the MI is generally
unknown (just as the actual leakage PDF), which makes it impossible
to compute this di↵erence directly.
Picking up on this problem, the first section introduces a first “leak-
age certification” method. Intuitively, leakage certification starts from
the fact that actual leakage models are obtained via PDF estimation,
which may lead to both estimation and assumption errors. As a result,
and since it seems hard to enforce that such estimated models are per-
fect, the best that one can hope is to guarantee that they are “good
enough”. For estimation errors, this is easily verified using standard
cross–validation techniques (in general, estimation errors can anyway
be made arbitrarily small by measuring more). For assumption errors,
things are more di cult since they require us to find out whether the
estimated model is close to an (unknown) perfect model. Interestingly,
we show that indirect approaches allow determining if this condition is
respected, essentially by comparing the model errors caused by incorrect
assumptions to estimation errors.
Yet, this certification method involves a number of technical ingredi-
ents. That is, the evaluator has to characterize the leakages of the chip
and his model with distance cumulative distributions. Although work-
ing with distances is a sound approach to compare distributions and
does not require any assumption on the leakage distribution, it comes at
the cost of quite computationally intensive tools. In a second section of
this chapter, we propose a solution in order to mitigate the latter draw-
back. We show that a statistical moment based comparison can provide
a computationally cheaper and conceptually simpler certification pro-
cedure but obtained at the cost of mild assumptions on the statistical
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distributions in hand.
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4.1 How to certify the leakage of a chip?
In this context, we start with the preliminary observation that under-
standing these fair evaluation issues requires clearly distinguishing be-
tween estimation errors and assumption errors, leading to three main
contributions. First, we show how the cross–validation, described in
Section 2.3.4, can be used in order to precisely gauge the convergence
of an estimated model. Doing so, we put forward that certain evalua-
tion metrics (e.g. Pearson’s correlation or PI) are better suited for this
purpose. Second, we propose a method for measuring assumption er-
rors in side-channel attacks, taking advantage of the distance sampling
technique introduced in [114]. We argue that it allows detecting imper-
fect hypotheses without any knowledge of the true leakage distribution1!
Third, we combine these tools in order to determine the probability that
a model error is due to estimation or assumption issues. We then dis-
cuss the (im)possibility to precisely (and generally) bound the resulting
information loss. We also provide pragmatic guidelines for physical secu-
rity evaluators. For illustration, we apply these contributions to actual
measurements obtained from an AES implementation in an embedded
microcontroller (setup described in Section 2.3.1). As a result and for
the first time, we are able to certify that the leakage of a chip (i.e. its
worst-case security level) is close to the one we are able to extract.
1By contrast, the direct solution for quantifying the PI/MI distance would be to
compute a statistical (e.g. Kullback-Leibler) distance between the adversary’s model
and the actual leakages. But it requires knowing the true leakage distribution.
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These results have implications for the certification of any crypto-
graphic product against side-channel attacks - as they provide solutions
to guarantee that the evaluation made by laboratories is based in sound
assumptions. They could also be used to improve the comparison of
measurement setups such as envisioned by the DPA contest v3 [76].
Namely, this contest suggests comparing the quality of side-channel
measurements with a CPA based on an a-priori leakage model. But
this implies that the best traces are those that best comply with this
a-priori, independently of their true informativeness. Using the PI to
compare the setups would already allow each participant to choose his
leakage assumptions. And using the cross–validation and distance sam-
pling techniques described in this work would allow determining how
relevant these assumptions are.
4.1.1 Estimation errors and cross–validation
As a starting point, we represented illustrative traces corresponding to
our measurement setup of Section 2.3.1 in Figure 4.1. Considering an
8-bit implementation allows us to make the implicit assumption that
there’s not interaction between the bytes that cannot be captured by the
model. The figure further contains the SNRs and correlation coe cients
of a CPA using Hamming weight leakage model and targeting the S-
box output. While insu cient for fair security evaluations as stated
below, these metrics are interesting preliminary steps since they indicate
the parts of the traces where useful information lies, i.e. the points-of-
interest. In the following, we extract a number of illustrative figures
from meaningful samples.
From a methodological point of view, the impact of cross–validation
is best represented with the box plot of Figure 4.2: it contains the PI
of point 2605 in the traces, estimated with Gaussian templates and a
stochastic model using a 17-element linear basis for the bits of the S-
box input and output. This point is the most informative one in our
experiments (across all the measurements and estimation procedures we
tried). Results show that the PI estimated with Gaussian templates is
higher - hence suggesting that the basis used in our regression-based
profiling was not fully reflective of the chip activity for this sample.
More importantly, we observe that the estimation converges quickly (as
the spread of our 10 PI estimates decreases quickly with the number
of traces). As expected, this convergence is faster for regression-based
profiling, reflecting the smaller number of parameters to estimate in
this case. Note that we also performed this cross–validation for the
Kernel-based PDF estimation described in Section 2.3.2. The results are
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Figure 4.1: Measurements of a key addition and S-box layer in the first
round of the AES.
reported in Figure 4.3. Even though the Kernel-based PDF estimation
is slower to converge, both the expected value of the PI and its spread
suggest that these two density estimation techniques provide equally
satisfying results in our implementation context.
A natural next step is to analyse the quantity of information given
by alternative leakage points. An example is given in Figure 4.4 (where
we only plot the expected value of the PI). The left part of the figure
exactly corresponds to the most informative point of Figure 4.2. The
right part of the figure is computed with a later sample (time 4978) that
(we assumed) corresponds to the computation of the S-box output. In-
terestingly, we observe that while this second point is less informative, it
is more accurately explained by a stochastic model using the S-box out-
put bits as a basis, hence confirming our expectations. Eventually, we
also investigated the additional information gathered when performing
multivariate attacks in Figure 4.5. For this purpose, we measured an ad-
ditional set of traces by replacing the resistor of Section 2.3.1 by a 2 µH
inductance (everything else remains the same). On the left-hand side
of the figure, we considered a couple of points (2605 and 4978) coming
from the original setup. On the right-hand side of the figure, we con-
sidered a single point (2605) coming from the two di↵erent setups. This
experiment clearly suggests that combining information from di↵erent
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Figure 4.2: Perceived information estimated from Gaussian templates
and LR-based models, with cross–validation (target point 2605 from the
measurements).
operations leads to more PI than combining information from di↵erent
setups. It naturally fits with the intuition that two di↵erent block ci-
pher operations (corresponding to di↵erent intermediate values) lead to
more information leakage (i.e. less correlation) than the same operation
measured with two di↵erent (yet similar) measurement setups. Many
variations of such evaluations are possible (for more samples, estimation
procedures, . . . ). For simplicity, we will limit our discussion to the pre-
vious examples, and use them to further discuss the critical question of
assumption errors in the next section.
4.1.2 Assumption errors and distance sampling
Looking at Figures 4.2 and 4.4, we can conclude that our estimation of
the PI is reasonably accurate and that Gaussian templates are able to
extract a given amount of information from the measurements. Never-
theless, such pictures still do not provide any clue about the closeness
between our estimated PI and the (true, unknown) MI. As previously
mentioned in introduction, evaluating the deviation between the PI and
MI is generally hard. In theory, the standard approach for evaluating
such a deviation would be to compute a statistical (e.g. Kullback-Leibler)
distance DˆKL(Pˆrmodel,Prchip). But this requires knowing the (unknown)
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Figure 4.3: Perceived information quantiles estimated from Gaussian
templates and Kernels, with cross–validation (target point 2605).
distribution Prchip, leading to an obvious chicken and egg problem.
Since standard probabilistic distances cannot be computed, an al-
ternative solution that we will apply is to confront the test samples
output by the device with estimated samples produced with the evalu-
ator’s model. In order to check their coherence, we essentially need a
goodness-of-fit test. While several such tests exist in the literature for
unidimensional distributions (e.g. Kolmogorov–Smirnov [14] or Crame´r–
von–Mises [1]), much fewer solutions exist that generalize to multivariate
statistics. Since we additionally need a test that applies to any distribu-
tion, possibly dealing with correlated leakage points, a natural proposal
is to exploit statistics based on spacings (or interpoint distance) [86].
The basic idea of such a test is to reduce the dimensionality of the prob-
lem by comparing the distribution of distances between pairs of points,
consequently simplifying it into a one-dimensional goodness-of-fit test
again. It exploits the fact that two multidimensional distributions F
and G are equal if and only if the variables X ⇠ F and Y ⇠ G gener-
ate identical distributions for the distances D(X1,X2), D(Y1,Y2) and
D(X3,Y3) [9, 57]. In our evaluation context, we can simply check if the
distance between pairs of simulated samples (generated with a profiled
model) and the distance between simulated and actual samples behave
di↵erently. If the model estimated during the profiling phase of a side-
channel attack is accurate, then the distance distributions should be
close. Otherwise, there will be a discrepancy that the test will be able
to detect, as we now detail.
The first step of our test for the detection of incorrect assumptions
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Figure 4.4: PI for di↵erent PDF estimation techniques and two leakage
points. Left: most informative one (2605), right: other point of interest
(4978).
is to compute the simulated distance cumulative distribution as follows:
fsim(d, s, x) = Pr
h
L1y   L2y  d
   L1y, L2y ⇠ Pˆrmodel[Ly|s, x]i .
Since the evaluator has an analytical expression for Pˆrmodel, this cumu-
lative distribution is easily obtained. Next, we compute the sampled
distance cumulative distribution from the test sample set LtY as follows:
gˆNt(d, s, x) =
Pr
h
liy   ljy  d
    liy 1iNt ⇠ Pˆrmodel[Ly|s, x], ljy 1jNt = LtY i .
Eventually, we need to detect how similar fsim and gNt are, which
is made easy since these cumulative distributions are now univariate.
Hence, we can compute the distance between them by estimating the
Crame´r–von–Mises divergence:
ˆCvM(fsim, gˆNt) =
Z 1
 1
[fsim(x)  gˆNt(x)]2 dx.
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Figure 4.5: PI for univariate and multivariate leakage models. Left:
two points (2605, 4978) coming from the original measurements. Right:
multi-channel attack exploiting the same point (2605) from resistor- and
inductance-based measurements.
As the number of samples in the estimation increases, this divergence
should gradually tend towards zero provided the model assumptions are
correct.
4.1.3 Experimental results
As in the previous section, we applied cross–validation in order to com-
pute the Crame´r–von–Mises divergence between the distance distribu-
tions. That is, for each of the 256 target intermediate values, we gener-
ated 10 di↵erent estimates gˆ(j)Nt (d, s, x) and computed
ˆCvM
(j)
(fsim, gˆNt)
from them. An exemplary evaluation is given in Figure 4.6 for the same
leakage point and estimation methods as in Figure 4.2. For simplicity,
we plotted a picture containing the 256 (average) estimates at once2. It
shows that Gaussian templates better converge towards a small diver-
gence of the distance distributions. It is also noticeable that regression-
based models lead to more outliers, corresponding to values y for which
2It is also possible to investigate the quality of the model for any given y = x  s.
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the leakage Ly is better approximated. Figure 4.7 additionally provides
the quantiles of the Crame´r–von–Mises divergence for both univariate
and bivariate distributions (i.e. corresponding to the PIs in Figure 4.5,
original setup only). Interestingly, we observe that the better accuracy
of Gaussian templates compared to regression-based models decreases
when considering the second leakage point. This perfectly fits the in-
tuition that we add a dimension that is better explained by a linear
basis (as it corresponds to the right point in Figure 4.4). Note that
any incorrect assumption would eventually lead the CvM divergence to
saturate.
Figure 4.6: Crame´r–von–Mises divergence between simulated and sam-
pled distributions, with cross–validation (target point 2605). Left:
Gaussian templates, right: LR-based estimation (S-box input and out-
put bits).
4.1.4 Estimation vs. assumption errors
From an evaluator’s point of view, assumption errors are naturally the
most damaging (since estimation errors can be made arbitrarily small by
measuring more). In this respect, an important problem that we answer
in this section is to determine whether a model error comes from estima-
tion or assumption issues. For this purpose, the first statistic we need to
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Figure 4.7: Median, min and max of the CvM divergence btw. simulated
and sampled distributions for Gaussian templates and LR-based models.
Left: univariate attack (sample 2605), right: bivariate attack (samples
2605 and 4978).
evaluate is the sampled simulated distance cumulative distribution (for
a given number of test traces Nt). This is the estimated counterpart of
the distribution fsim defined in Section 4.1.2:
fˆNtsim(d, s, x) = Pr
h
liy   ljy  d
    liy, ljy 1i 6=jNt ⇠ Pˆrmodel[Ly|s, x]i .
From this definition, our main interest is to know, for a given divergence
between fsim and fˆ
Nt
sim, what is the probability for this divergence to be
observed for the chosen amount of test traces Nt. This probability is
directly given by the following cumulative divergence distribution:
DˆivNt(x) = Pr
h
ˆCvM(fsim, fˆ
Nt
sim)  x
i
.
How to exploit this distribution is then illustrated in Figure 4.8. For
each model Pˆr
(j)
model estimated during cross–validation, we build the cor-
responding Dˆiv
(j)
Nt ’s (i.e. the cumulative distributions in the figure). The
cross–validation additionally provides (for each cumulative distribution)
a value for ˆCvM
(j)
(fsim, gˆNt) estimated from the actual leakage samples
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DˆivNt(x)
ˆCvM(fsim, gˆNt)
0
1
Figure 4.8: Model divergence estimation.
in the test set: they correspond to the small circles below the X axis in
the figure. Eventually, we just derive:
Dˆiv
(j)
Nt
⇣
ˆCvM
(j)
(fsim, gˆNt)
⌘
.
Computing this statistic is simply obtained by projecting the circles
towards the Y axis in the figure. Large values indicate that there is
a small probability for the observed samples to follow the simulated
distributions. That is, the hypothesis, which states that the model is
correct, is therefore rejected. More precisely, high Dˆiv
(j)
Nt correspond to
low p-values (i.e. the probability that the null hypothesis holds) with
p(j) = 1   Dˆiv(j)Nt . Thanks to cross–validation, we can obtain 10 such
values, leading to answers laid on a [0; 1] interval, indicating the accuracy
of each estimated model. Values of Dˆiv
(j)
Nt (resp. p-values p
(j)) that are
grouped towards the top (resp. bottom) of the interval indicate that the
assumptions used to estimate these models are probably incorrect. We
will further focus on the p-values.
An illustration of this method is given in Figure 4.9 for di↵erent
Gaussian templates and regression-based profiling e↵orts, in function of
the number of traces in the cross–validation set. It clearly exhibits that
as this number of traces increases (hence, the estimation errors decrease),
the regression approach su↵ers from assumption errors with high prob-
ability. Actually, the intermediate values for which these errors occur
first are the ones already detected in the previous section, for which the
leakage variable Ly cannot be precisely approximated given our choice
of basis. By contrast, no such errors are detected for the Gaussian tem-
plates (up to the amount of traces measured in our experiments). This
process can be further systematized to all intermediate values, as in
Figure 4.10. It allows an evaluator to determine the number of mea-
surements necessary for the assumption errors to become significant in
front of estimation ones.
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Figure 4.9: Probability that the model is correct (i.e. p-values of a
“no assumption error” hypothesis) for Gaussian templates (GT) and
regression-based models (LR) corresponding to di↵erent target interme-
diate values y, in function of Nt (in subscript), on sample 2605.
4.1.5 Can we bound the information loss?
Interestingly, most assumptions will eventually be detected as incor-
rect when the number of traces in a side-channel evaluation increases3.
As detailed in introduction, it directly raises the question whether the
information loss due to such assumption errors can be bounded? Intu-
itively, the “threshold” value Ntht for which they are detected by our
test provides a measure of their “amplitude” (since errors that are de-
tected earlier should be larger in some sense). In this section, we dis-
cuss whether this intuition can be exploited quantitatively. Note that
the following reasoning is intentionally more informal than the previous
technical contributions: it mainly aims at explaining why measuring the
MI-PI di↵erence in general (i.e. independent of the leakage distribution)
is hard.
Ideal expectation. Taking the example of Figure 4.10, we see that
the stochastic model is already detected as imperfect after (roughly)
100 ⇥ 256 traces in the cross–validation set. This means that at this
point in our evaluations, the assumption errors start to be significant in
front of the estimation errors. As a result, a natural idea to quantify
3Non-parametric PDF estimation methods (e.g. as described in Section 2.3.2) could
be viewed as an exception to this fact, assuming that the sets of profiling traces LpY
and test traces LtY come from the same distribution. Yet, this assumption may turn
out to be contradicted in practice because of technological mismatches [33, 90], in
which case the detection of assumption errors remains critical even with such tools.
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Figure 4.10: Average p-values for Gaussian templates (left) and
regression-based models with a 17-element basis (right) corresponding
to all the target intermediate values y, in function of Nt, on sample 2605
the information loss due to assumption errors is to compute the (easier
to evaluate) information loss due to estimation errors occurring for this
number of test traces. For this purpose, first note that the PI compu-
tations in Section 4.1.1 are done globally (i.e. based on 10 estimations
from 256 ⇥ Nt traces). By contrast, the test in Section 4.1.2 is per-
formed per intermediate value (i.e. based on 256⇥ 10 estimations from
Nt traces). So in order to be comparable, we must repeat the estima-
tion of the PI based on 256⇥ 10 estimations from Nt test traces as well.
Next, we can measure the estimation error in function of the number of
traces in the cross–validation set, e.g. by computing the square root of
the Mean Square Error (MSE) for the PI based on these new estimates.
The result of this experiment is given in the left part of Figure 4.11
(as an alternative, we can also derive the quantiles of the estimated
PI as in Figure 4.12). After 100 traces, the root MSE approximately
equals 0.29 for the regression-based profiling. Our ideal expectation is
that by adding up the estimated PI obtained for LR-based profiling in
Section 4.1.1 (⇡ 0.38) with this value, we would obtain a “bound” on
the MI of ⇡ 0.67. Of course, this bound would be probabilistic (i.e.
with a certain chance that the information loss exceeds 0.29). A more
confident bound would then be obtained by summing this root MSE
twice, leading to an hypothetical MI of 0.96. Assuming the PI estimates
to be Gaussian-distributed, the probability that the MI exceeds these
bounds could also be quantified (to 31.8% and 4.6%, i.e. corresponding
to the addition of one or two standard deviations to the mean of a nor-
mal distribution). The quantiles in Figure 4.12 lead to similar results
(confirming the Gaussian assumption).
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Interpretation. Such an information theoretic evaluation would con-
clude that for leakage sample 2605 of our resistor-based measurements:
(1) we identified a regression-based attack able to exploit a PI of ⇡ 0.38;
(2) we identified a template attack able to exploit a PI of ⇡ 0.58; (3)
with some confidence, there may exist a stronger attack able to exploit
an hypothetical MI of ⇡ 0.67 (that would be identified with better as-
sumptions); (4) with higher confidence, there may exist an even stronger
attack able to exploit an hypothetical MI of ⇡ 0.96. Tighter “bounds”
can be obtained by using our Gaussian templates, since we could not
detect any assumption error in this case. That is, we would then ex-
pect that the assumption errors will be lower than the estimation errors
on the PI with 256 000 traces in the cross–validation set. This would
lead to MI bounds of ⇡ 0.58 + 0.11 = 0.69 (with some confidence) and
⇡ 0.58 + 2 ⇥ 0.11 = 0.8 (with higher confidence). As mentioned in
Section 2.3.3, these values of MI/PI can be used as predictors for the
success rates of the corresponding attacks. Such success rates can be
computed for the PI values and simulated for the hypothetical MI ones4,
as represented in the right part of Figure 4.11. Note that this figure is
only illustrative as the connection between the MI/PI and the success
rates of attacks using the same models is not proved (in fact, there exist
counter-examples [106]). But it was confirmed for many representative
case studies5, and illustrates (1) how the MI/PI metrics translate into
a number of traces to recover the key and (2) how better assumptions
generally lead to tighter security guarantees.
Can such bounds be accurate in general? Obtaining bounds on
the information loss, such as just described informally, would be highly
desirable. But it naturally requires a confirmation that such an approach
can be independent of the distributions and statistical tools used for
their estimation. Arguing about this issue once again faces the problem
that the leakage PDF of cryptographic devices are generally unknown.
Yet, one can use a simulated device for this purpose (i.e. a mathematical
object for which we generate the leakages according to a known distribu-
tion, hence for which we know the MI). For example, we can analyse the
MI and PI for a simulated device such that the leakage function devi-
ates from the Hamming weight abstraction, while the evaluator still uses
4The techniques in [89, 90] can be used for this purpose. Essentially, the evaluator
will use the (well estimated) means of the profiled models with additive Gaussian
noise to simulate the traces. He will then adapt the noise level to reach the required
MI value and use the corresponding simulated traces to compute success rates.
5Including but not limited to [5, 12, 35, 39, 58, 60, 61, 68, 84, 88, 95, 103, 99, 100,
101, 102, 113].
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Figure 4.11: Measurements of sample 2605. Left: root MSE for the PI
estimates obtained in Figure 4.2. Right: success rates of LR-based and
Gaussian template attacks compared with hypothetical template attacks
exploiting di↵erent MI bounds.
the Hamming weight function as leakage model. As a first step in this
direction, we considered the model error as additive and Gaussian, and
computed the MI, PI and three MI bounds, as illustrated in the left part
of Figure 4.13. We see that for low noise levels, the true leakage model
leads to 256 distinguishable events (i.e. MI = 8) while the PI is stuck
to ⇡2.5 (i.e. what can be extracted with a Hamming weight model).
And as the noise increases, these 256 events first merge into 9 Hamming
weight-like events which then become hard to distinguish for standard
deviations beyond 10 1. The bounds are given for three noise levels for
which the detection of assumption errors is given in the right part of
the figure. Two di↵erent (negative) observations can be extracted from
these experiments. First, many selection rules for the threshold value
Ntht could be defined (the figure uses average p-values), and none of the
ones we considered provided accurate bounds independent of the noise
level. For example, the bound for the standard deviation 10 4 does
not capture the large MI-PI di↵erence in our simulations. Second, any
bound obtained from the MSE will anyway become pessimistic as the
physical noise increases (since its impact will eventually dominate the
one of assumption errors in the MSE). This is typically observed for the
noise level 100 in Figure 4.13. As a result, we can conclude that pre-
cisely quantifying the information loss due to incorrect assumptions in
side-channel attacks is not possible with the techniques presented in this
section. Improving this situation is an interesting scope for further (the-
oretical) research. For example, one could try to establish selection rules
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Figure 4.12: Measurements of sample 2605. Quantiles for the PI esti-
mates obtained from the LR-based profiling (left) and Gaussian tem-
plates in Figure 4.2.
for Ntht that are well adapted to a class of relevant distributions. One
could also exploit blind source separation to better distinguish the con-
tributions of the physical noise and assumption errors in the MSE (but
this would require having more observations than sources [59], which
may not always be the case, e.g. in power analysis). Yet, in practice
these techniques would also drive us away from the goal of analysing
cryptographic devices independently of their leakage distributions. In
the following, we try to avoid such bottlenecks and conclude this section
by suggesting pragmatic guidelines for evaluators.
4.1.6 Pragmatic evaluation guidelines & conclusions
While measuring the information loss due to incorrect assumptions ap-
pears di cult in general, the experiments of Figure 4.13 can also be
concluded more positively. Namely, they exhibit that as these errors are
detected later, the MI-PI di↵erence also decreases. So even if the intu-
ition in the previous section cannot lead to quantitative bounds, it still
leads to qualitatively interesting outcomes. In this respect, we believe
the tools introduced in this work are essential for the fair evaluation of
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Figure 4.13: Left: mutual information bounds for three noise standard
deviations (simulated attacks). Right: detection of assumption errors
for the same noise standard deviations.
side-channel attacks, and should be exploited as follows.
First note that the maximum number of measurements in an evalu-
ation is usually determined by practical constraints (i.e. how much time
is allowed for the evaluation). Given this limit, estimation and assump-
tion errors can be analysed separately, leading to quantified results such
as in Figures 4.2 and 4.6. These steps allow ensuring that the statisti-
cal evaluation converged. Next, one should always test the hypothesis
that the leakage model is incorrect, as described in Section 4.1.4. De-
pending on whether assumption errors are detected “early” or “late”,
the evaluator should be able to decide whether more refined PDF esti-
mation techniques should be incorporated in his analyses. As discussed
in Section 4.1.5, the precise definition of “early” and “late” is hard to
formalize in terms of information loss. Yet, later is always better and
such a process will at least guarantee that if no such errors are detected
given some measurement capabilities, an improved model will not lead to
significantly improved attacks (since the evaluator will essentially not be
able to distinguish the models with this amount of measurements). That
is, the proposed methodology can provide an answer to the pragmatic
question: “for an amount of measurements performed by a laboratory,
is it worth spending time to refine the leakage model exploited in the
evaluation?”. In other words, it can be used to guarantee that the secu-
rity level suggested by a side-channel analysis is close to the worst-case,
and this guarantee is indeed conditional to the number of measurements
available for this purpose.
Open problems can be envisioned in three main directions. First note
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that the most important contribution of this work is to put side-channel
evaluations on solid foundations. The separation between estimation
and assumption errors is fundamental in this respect. By contrast,
the precise procedures we propose for their estimation, as well as the
test for detecting incorrect models in Section 4.1.4, are first instances
for this purpose. Alternative solutions could certainly be investigated
(e.g. to obtain better confidence in the conclusions with less e↵orts),
and constitute an interesting research topic. Besides, the application of
the techniques described to more implementations (e.g. protected with
countermeasures such as masking), for which the selection of relevant
assumptions will be more di cult, is certainly worth further investi-
gations as well. Eventually, the best combination of our tools with
dimensionality reduction techniques (or any other preprocessing of the
measurements), allowing to e ciently detect/exploit multiple points of
interest in leakage traces, is another interesting question.
4.2 Towards easy leakage certification
A practical application of the leakage certification test provided in Sec-
tion 4.1 requires a number of technical ingredients. Namely, the evalu-
ator first has to characterize the leakages of the target implementation
with a sampled (cumulative) distance distribution, and to characterize
his model with a simulated (cumulative) distance distribution. Working
with distances allows exploiting a univariate goodness–of–fit test even
for leakages of large dimensionalities (i.e. it allows comparing the uni-
variate distances between multivariate leakages rather than comparing
the multivariate leakages directly). The Crame´r–von–Mises divergence
is used as a comparison tool in the proposed method. Qualitatively, large
divergences between the sampled and simulated distributions essentially
mean that the assumptions are imperfect. Quantitatively, the evaluator
then has to determine whether such divergences are significant, by ver-
ifying whether they can be explained by assumption errors. This essen-
tially requires computing the p-values when testing the hypothesis that
the estimated model is correct (which again requires computing many
simulated cumulative distance distributions). Summarizing, the beauty
of this approach lies in the fact that it only relies on non-parametric
estimations and requires no assumptions on the underlying leakage dis-
tributions. But this also comes at the cost of quite computationally
intensive tools.
In this section, we analyze solutions to mitigate the latter drawback,
by investigating whether (computationally) cheaper and (conceptually)
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simpler certification procedures can be obtained at the cost of mild as-
sumptions on the statistical distributions in hand. Two natural options
directly come to mind for this purpose. They both aim to avoid dealing
with the (expensive to characterize) cumulative leakage distributions di-
rectly. One possibility is to “summarize” the leakage distribution with its
MI/PI estimates (since they can be used as good indicators of the side-
channel security level, as now proved in [29]). Another one is to analyse
this distribution “moments by moments”, motivated by the recent re-
sults in [70]. In both cases, and following the approach in Section 4.1,
the main idea remains to compare actual leakage samples generated by a
leaking implementation with hypothetical ones generated with the eval-
uator’s model. Surprisingly, we show that the first approach cannot
work, essentially because of situations where model errors in one statis-
tical moment (e.g. the mean) are reflected in another statistical moment
(e.g. the variance). This typically arises when using the popular stochas-
tic models (introduced in Section 2.3.2), and actually corresponds to the
context of epistemic noise discussed in [46]. More interestingly, we also
show that a moment-based approach provides excellent results under rea-
sonable assumptions, and can borrow from the “leakage detection tests”
that are already used by evaluation laboratories [38, 66]. The resulting
leakage certification method is significantly faster than the one intro-
duced in Section 4.1 (and allows reproducing its experiments). We also
show that it easily generalizes to masked implementations, and enables
extracting very useful intuitions on the origin of the leakages. Eventu-
ally, our new tools additionally lead to simple heuristics to approximate
the information loss due to incorrect leakage models, which remained an
open problem in the previous method. Summarizing, we simplify leak-
age certification into a set of easy–to–implement procedures, hopefully
more attractive for evaluation laboratories.
4.2.1 A motivating negative result
As mentioned in the introduction of this section, detecting assumption
errors is generally more challenging than detecting estimation errors
(which is easily done with the previous cross–validation). Intuitively, it
requires investigating the likelihood that samples obtained from a leak-
ing device can indeed be explained by an estimated model, which re-
quires a (multivariate) goodness–of–fit test. Since such tests are compu-
tationally intensive, an appealing alternative would be to check whether
the samples obtained from the leaking device lead to a PI that is at
least close enough to the MI: this would guarantee a good estimation of
the security level. But, once again, we face the problem that the MI is
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unknown, which imposes trying indirect approaches. That is, we would
need a metric counterpart to the sampled simulated distance distribu-
tion in Section 4.1. This would typically correspond to the following
Hypothetical MI (HI):
HˆI(S;X,L) =
H[S] +
X
s2S
Pr[s]
X
x2X
Pr[x]
X
liy2Lt
Pˆrmodel[l
i
y|s, x]. log2 Pˆrmodel[s|x, liy].
Intuitively, this HI corresponds to the amount of information that would
be extracted from an hypothetical implementation that would exactly
leak according to the model Pˆrmodel. In itself, the HI is useless to the
evaluator, as it is actually disconnected from the chip distribution. For
example, even a totally incorrect model (i.e. leading to a negative PI)
would lead to a positive HI. By contrast, we could hope that as long as
the HI and PI are “close”, the assumption errors are “small enough” for
the number of measurements considered in the security evaluation. Fur-
thermore, we could use a simple hypothesis test to detect non-closeness.
For a number of traces N in the evaluation set, this would require com-
puting estimates PˆI(S;X,L)(j) and HˆI(S;X,L)(j) with cross–validation,
and checking whether these estimates come from di↵erent (univariate)
distributions. If they significantly di↵er, we would conclude that the
model exhibits assumption errors that degrade the estimated security
level, in a similar fashion as in Section 4.1.
Unfortunately, and although it can detect certain assumption errors,
this approach cannot succeed in general. A simple counter–example
can be explained in the context of LR. Say an adversary estimates a
model with a linear basis which leads to significant di↵erences between
the actual (mean) leakages and the ones suggested by the model. Then,
because of the homoscedastic error assumption, the single variance of the
LR-based model will reflect this error (i.e. capture both physical noise
and model error). As a result, whenever this type of error increases, the
PI will decrease (as expected) but the HI will also decrease (contrary
to the MI). So testing the consistency between the PI and HI estimates
will not reveal the inconsistencies between the PI estimates and the true
MI.
4.2.2 A new method to detect assumption errors
Although negative, the previous counter–example suggests two interest-
ing tracks for simplifying leakage certification tests. First, summarizing
a complete distribution into representative metrics (e.g. such as the PI)
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allows taking advantage of simpler statistical tests. Second, since the
fact that the homoscedastic error assumption is not fulfilled implies that
errors made in the estimation of certain statistical moments (or more
generally, parameters) of a distribution are reflected in other statistical
moments of this distribution, a natural approach is to test the relevance
of a model “moment by moment”. That is, for a number of traces N in
an evaluation set, one could verify that the moments estimated from ac-
tual leakage samples are hard to tell apart from the moments estimated
from the model (with the same number of samples N). Based on this
idea, our simplified method to detect assumption errors will be based
on the following two hypotheses (one strictly necessary and the other
optional but simplifying).
1. The leakage distribution is well represented by its statistical mo-
ments. This corresponds to the classical “moment problem” in
statistics, for which there exist counter-examples (e.g. the log-
normal distribution is not uniquely characterized by its moments).
So our (informal) assumption is that these counter-examples will
not be significant for our experimental case-studies.
2. The sampled estimates of our statistical moments are approxi-
mately Gaussian-distributed. This directly derives from the central
limit theorem and actually depends on the number of samples used
in the estimations (which will become su cient as the leakages be-
come noisier, e.g. in the case of protected implementations that are
most relevant for concrete investigations).
Let us add a couple of motivation words for those assumptions. First
recall that we know from the previous results in Section 4.1 that leak-
age certification is possible without such assumptions, at the cost of
somewhat involved statistical reasoning and estimations. So it seems
natural to investigate alternative (heuristic) paths allowing us to reach
similar conclusions. As will be shown next, this is indeed the case of our
simplified approach for a couple of relevant scenarios. Second, statistical
moments are at the core of the reasoning regarding the masking counter-
measure. That is, the security order of an implementation is generally
defined as the lowest informative moment in the leakage distribution
(minus one) – see [29] for an extensive discussion of this issue. Besides,
many concrete (profiled and non-profiled) side-channel attacks are based
(implicitly or explicitly) on parametric PDF estimation techniques that
rely on the estimation of moments (e.g. the Gaussian templates and
LR-based models in Section 2.3.2, but also second-order attacks such
as [24, 83]). So an approach based on an analysis of moments seems well
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founded in these cases.6 As a result, and maybe most importantly, we
believe that the following tools open interesting research avenues regard-
ing the intuitive evaluation of leaking devices based on their moments.
As for the Gaussian assumption, our motivation is even more prag-
matic, and relates to the observation that simple t-tests are becoming de
facto standards in the preliminary evaluation of leaking devices [38, 66].
So we find it appealing to rely on statistical tools that are already
widespread in the CHES community, and to connect them with leak-
age certification. As will be clear next, this allows us to use the same
evaluation method for statistical moments of di↵erent orders. However,
we insist that it is perfectly feasible to refine our approach by using a
well adapted test for each statistical moment (e.g. F-test for variances,
. . . ).
Test specification
The main idea behind of our new leakage certification method is to com-
pare (actual) dth-order moments mˆdy estimated from the leakages with
(simulated) dth-order moments m˜dy estimated from the evaluator’s model
Pˆrmodel (by sampling this model). Thanks to our second assumption,
this comparison can simply be performed based on Student’s t-test. For
this purpose, we need multiple estimations of the moments mˆdy and m˜
d
y,
that we will obtain thanks to an approach inspired from Section 2.3.4
(although there is no cross–validation involved next).
More precisely, we start by splitting the full set of evaluation traces
L into k (non overlapping) sets of approximately the same size L(j),
with 1  j  k. From these k subsets, we produce k estimates of
(actual) dth-order moments mˆd,(j)y , each of them from a set L(j). We
then produce a set of simulated traces L˜ that has the same size and
corresponds to the same intermediate values as the real evaluation set
L, but where the leakages are sampled according to the model that we
want to evaluate. In other words, we first build the model Pˆrmodel  L,
and then generate a simulated set of traces L˜  Pˆrmodel. Based on L˜,
we produce k estimates of (simulated) dth-order moments m˜d,(j)y , each of
them from a set L˜(j), as done for the real set of evaluation traces. From
these real and simulated moment estimates, we compute the following
6Non-parametric PDF estimations do not su↵er from assumption errors (at the
cost of a significantly increased estimation cost), so are out of scope here.
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quantities:
µˆdy = Eˆj(mˆ
d,(j)
y ),  ˆdy =
q
vˆarj(mˆ
d,(j)
y ),
µ˜dy = Eˆj(m˜
d,(j)
y ),  ˜dy =
q
vˆarj(m˜
d,(j)
y ),
where vˆar is the sample variance operator. Eventually, we simply esti-
mate the t statistic (next denoted with  dy) as follows:
 dy =
µˆdy   µ˜dyq
( ˆdy)
2+( ˜dy)
2
k
.
The p-value of this t statistic within the associated Student’s distribu-
tion returns the probability that the observed di↵erence is the result of
estimation issues, and is computed as:
p = 2⇥ (1  CDFt(| dy|, ⌫)),
where CDFt is the Student’s t cumulative distribution function, and ⌫ is
its number freedom degrees.7 In other words, a small p-value indicates
that the model is incorrect with high probability. Concretely, the only
parameter to set in this test is the number of non overlapping sets k.
Following [29], we used k = 10 which is a rather standard value in
the literature. Note that increasing k has very limited impact on the
accuracy of our conclusions since all variance estimates in the t-test are
normalized by k. By contast it increases the time complexity of the test
(so keeping k reasonably small is in general a good strategy).
4.2.3 Simulated experiments
In order to validate our moment-based certification method, we first
analyse a couple of simulated experiments where we can control the as-
sumption errors. In particular, and in order to keep these simulations
reasonably close to concrete attacks, we consider four distinct scenar-
ios. In the first one (reported in Figure 4.14), both the leakage function
Prchip and the leakage model Pˆrmodel follow a Gaussian distribution, but
the model’s estimated mean di↵ers from the true distribution. In the
second one (reported in Figure 4.15), the leakage function and the leak-
age model again follow a Gaussian distribution, this time with a model
error on the variance. These two examples informally correspond to
7Student’s t distribution is a parametric probability density function whose only
parameter is its number of freedom degrees, that can be directly derived from k and
the previous   estimates as: ⌫ = (k   1)⇥ [( ˆdy)2 + ( ˜dy)2]2/[( ˆdy)4 + ( ˜dy)4].
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the context of LR-based attacks where the basis is not large enough to
capture the exact mean values. (Yet, as previously discussed and will
be clear from the measured experiments in the next section, both errors
usually happen jointly in those cases). Our third and fourth examples
correspond to a slightly di↵erent setting aimed to emulate a masked im-
plementation for which the true distribution is typically a mixture [102].
So, in the third scenario (reported in Figure 4.16), the leakage function
has a Gaussian mixture distribution with a non-zero skewness, while
the leakage model is still a Gaussian approximation. And in the fourth
scenario (reported in Figure 4.17), the leakage function has a Gaussian
mixture distribution with a non-zero kurtosis, while the leakage model
is still a Gaussian approximation. In any case, we represent the true
distribution and the biased model, the estimated moments for these two
distributions, and the p-value of our certification test.
The results are mostly as expected and confirm the simplicity of the
method. That is, as the number of measurements in the evaluation set
increases, we are able to detect the assumption errors in all the cases.
The only di↵erence between the applications to di↵erent moments is
that errors on higher-order moments may be more di cult to detect
as the noise increases. This di↵erence is caused by the same argument
that justifies the relevance of the higher-order masking countermeasure.
Namely, the sampling complexity when estimating the moments of a
distribution increases exponentially in d. However, this is not a limita-
tion of the certification test: if such errors are not detected for a given
evaluation set, it just means that their impact is still small in front of
assumption errors at this stage of the evaluation. Besides, we note that
the respective relevance of the model errors on di↵erent moments will
be further discussed in Section 4.2.5.
4.2.4 Measured experiments
In order to obtain a fair comparison with the results provided in Sec-
tion 4.1, we also applied our new leakage certification method to the
same case-study. That is, we used the measurement setup from Section
2.3.1 and evaluated the relevance of two important profiling methods,
namely the Gaussian TA and LR, for the most informative time sample
in our leakage traces (i.e. the sample 2605, with maximum PI).
The main di↵erence with the previous simulated experiments is that
we now have to test 256 models independently (each of them correspond-
ing to a target intermediate value y = x s). Our results are represented
in Figure 4.18 where we plot the p-values output by our di↵erent t-tests
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Figure 4.14: Gaussian leakages, Gaussian model, error in the estimated
mean.
for four statistical moments (i.e. the mean, variance, skewness and kur-
tosis). A look at the first two moments essentially confirms the results
of the previous section. More precisely, the Gaussian templates seem to
capture the measured leakages quite accurately (for the 256,000 traces
in our evaluation set). By contrast, the linear regression quickly ex-
hibits inconsistencies. Interestingly, assumption errors appear both in
the means and in the variances, which corresponds to the expected intu-
ition. That is, errors in the means are detected because for most target
intermediate values, the actual leakage cannot be accurately predicted
by a linear combination of the S-box output bits. And errors in the
variances appear because the LR-based models rely on the homoscedas-
tic error assumption and capture both physical noise and noise due to
assumption errors in a single term.
By contrast, and quite intriguingly, a look at the last two moments
(i.e. skewness and kurtosis) also shows some di↵erences with the results
in Section 4.1. That is, we remark that even for Gaussian templates,
small model errors appear in these higher-order moments. This essen-
tially corresponds to the fact that our measured leakages do not have
perfectly key-independent skewness and kurtosis, as we assume in Gaus-
sian PDF estimations. This last observation naturally raises the question
whether these errors are significant, i.e. do they contradict the results of
4.2. Towards easy leakage certification 105
-5 0 5 10
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
pdf
 
 
true distribution
biased model
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
1
2
3
4
mean
e
s t
i m
a
t e
d  
m
o
m
e
n
t s
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
2
4
6
8
standard deviation
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
skewness
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
1
2
3
4
5
6
kurtosis
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
→ number of traces
p -
v a
l u
e
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
→ number of traces
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
→ number of traces
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
→ number of traces
Figure 4.15: Gaussian leakages, Gaussian model, error in the estimated
variance.
the previous leakage certification test? In the next section, we show that
it is not the case, and re-conciliate both approaches by investigating the
respective informativeness of the four moments in our new test.
4.2.5 Quantifying the information loss
Since Figure 4.18 suggests the existence of (small) model errors in our
Gaussian templates that are due to an incorrect characterization of the
third- and fourh-order moments in our leakage traces, we now want to
investigate whether these errors are leading to significant information
losses. Fortunately, our “per-moment” approach to leakage certification
also allows simple investigations in this direction (which incidentally and
heuristically answers one of the open questions in Section 4.1, about the
information loss due to model errors). In particular, we can simply use
the MCP-DPA mentioned in Section 2.3.3 for this purpose. Roughly,
this tool computes the correlation between a simplified model (that cor-
responds to dth-order moments of the leakage distribution) to samples
raised to the power d (possibly centered or standardized if we consider
centered and standardized moments). As discussed in [70], the result-
ing estimated correlation coe cient features a “metric intuition”: the
higher the value of the MCP-DPA distinguisher computed for an order
d, the more e cient the MCP-DPA attack exploiting this statistical or-
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Figure 4.16: Gaussian mixture leakages, Gaussian model, error in the
estimated skewness.
der of the actual leakage distribution. Hence, computing the value of
the MCP-DPA distinguisher for di↵erent values of d should solve our
problem.
Concretely, we start by applying MCP-DPA in the traditional sense
and exploit cross–validation for this purpose, this time following exactly
Section 2.3.4. That is, the set of evaluation traces L is again split into
k (non overlapping) sets L(i) of approximately the same size, and we
use profiling sets L(j)p = Si 6=j L(i) and test sets L(j)t = L \ L(j)p . We
then repeatedly compute the dth-order moments mˆd,(j)y  L(j)p , and the
dth-order MCP-DPA distinguisher:
MCP-DPA(j)(d) = ⇢ˆ
⇣
Mˆd,(j)Y , (Ly)
d  L(j)t
⌘
.
As previously mentioned, it corresponds to the sample correlation be-
tween the random variable representing the estimated moments MˆdY ,
and the random variable corresponding to the leakage samples coming
from the test set Ly  L(j)t , raised to power d (possibly centered or
standardized if we consider centered and standardized moments). The
k = 10 estimates for this MCP-DPA metric are represented in the top
part of Figure 4.19. We additionally considered two slightly tweaked
versions of MCP-DPA, where we rather estimate Gaussian TA (resp.
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Figure 4.17: Gaussian mixture leakages, Gaussian model, error in the
estimated kurtosis.
LR-based) models Pˆr
ta
model (resp. Pˆr
lr
model), and consider the two (resp.
one) key-dependent moments from these models to compute the metric.
These tweaked MCP-DPAs are represented in the middle (resp. lower)
part of the figure.
Our main observations are as follows. First, the upper part of the fig-
ure suggests that the most informative moments in our leakage traces are
the mean and variance. There is indeed a small amount of information
in the skewness and kurtosis. But by considering the classical rule–of–
thumb that the measurement complexity of a correlation-based attack
is inversely proportional to the square of its correlation coe cient, we
can see that the additional information gain in these higher-order mo-
ments is very limited in our context. This observation backs up the
conclusions of the generic leakage certification test in Section 4.1 that
Gaussian templates are su ciently accurate for our test set, even though
the noise is apparently not completely Gaussian (which is a usual as-
sumption in the literature). It can be similarly quantified by using the
following approximation from [65]:
I(X,Y ) ⇡  1
2
⇥ log2
⇣
1  ⇢(X,Y )2
⌘
,
considering that attacks exploiting two moments would take advantage
of the sum of their respective information (i.e. considering them as in-
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Figure 4.18: Results of the new leakage certification test for actual mea-
surements.
dependent information channels), and using the formula in [29] which
shows that the measurement complexity of a side-channel attack is in-
versely proportional to the MI/PI leaked by a target implementation.
Next, we also see that TA-based and LR-based MCP-DPA yield no in-
formation in the higher-order moments, which trivially derives from the
fact that they rely on a Gaussian assumption. Eventually, we notice that
the information loss between LR-based models and TA-based models can
be approximated thanks to the correlation between their moments. For
example, and considering the means in Figure 4.19, we can compute
the value of the LR-based MCP-DPA distinguisher – worth ⇡ 0.48 in
the figure – by multiplying the value of the TA-based MCP-DPA distin-
guisher – worth ⇡ 0.74 in the figure – by ⇢ˆ(Mˆd,taY , Mˆd,lrY ) – worth ⇡ 0.65
in our experiments (i.e. by taking advantage of the “product rule” for
the correlation coe cient in [107]).
Those final tools are admittedly informal. Yet, we believe they pro-
vide a useful variety of heuristics allowing evaluators to analyse the
results of their certification tests. In particular, they lead to easy–to–
exploit intuitions regarding the impact (or lack thereof) of model errors
detected in moments of a given order. As discussed in the beginning
of Section 4.2.2, further formalizing these findings, and possibly putting
forward relevant scenarios where our simplified approach leads to signif-
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icant shortcomings, is an interesting scope for further research.

Chapter 5
Other work
Since I started my PhD thesis, I have had the opportunity to work with
di↵erent researchers on various research topics. This led to the publica-
tion of papers that were the product of these collaborations, and that
were approved by the research community in multiple international con-
ferences. Doing this PhD also allowed me to go to San Francisco for a
3-month internship at Cryptography Research Inc. This chapter briefly
lists the publications that are sorted by theme, namely hardware imple-
mentations, intellectual property protection and side-channel attacks.
Their abstract is given as a short summary, followed by a brief descrip-
tion of my personnal contribution. A short summarize of my experience
at CRI is eventually given.
5.1 Hardware implementations
Compact FPGA Implementations of the Five SHA-3 Finalists
Authors: Ste´phanie Kerckhof, Franc¸ois Durvaux, Nicolas Veyrat-Char-
villon, Francesco Regazzoni, Guerric Meurice de Dormale and Franc¸ois-
Xavier Standaert
Published in Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications - 10th
International Conference, CARDIS 2011, Leuven, Belgium, September
14-16, 2011.
Abstract. Allowing good performances on di↵erent platforms is an im-
portant criteria for the selection of the future SHA-3 standard. In this
paper, we consider the compact implementations of BLAKE, Grøstl,
JH, Keccak and Skein on recent FPGA devices. Our results bring an
interesting complement to existing analyses, as the previous work on
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FPGA implementations of the SHA-3 candidates was for the most op-
timized for high throughput applications. Following recent guidelines
for the fair comparison of hardware architectures, we put forward clear
trends for the selection of the future standard. First, compact FPGA
implementations of Keccak are less e cient than their high throughput
counterparts. Second, Grøstl shows interesting performances in this set-
ting, in particular in terms of throughput over area ratio. Third, the
remaining candidates are comparably suitable for compact FPGA im-
plementations, with some slight contrasts (in area cost and throughput).
Personal contribution. For this work, I was in charge of implement-
ing the BLAKE hash function algorithm. It allowed me to acquire a
good practice for implementing cryptographic algorithms with reason-
ably realistic constraints, and to understand how they work and the
implementation trade-o↵ they o↵er. I was also in charge of presenting
our implementation results at the CARDIS 2011 conference.
Towards Green Cryptography: A Comparison of Lightweight
Ciphers from the Energy Viewpoint
Authors: Ste´phanie Kerckhof, Franc¸ois Durvaux, Ce´dric Hocquet, David
Bol and Franc¸ois-Xavier Standaert
Published in Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES
2012 - 14th International Workshop, Leuven, Belgium, September 9-12,
2012.
Abstract. We provide a comprehensive evaluation of several lightweight
block ciphers with respect to various hardware performance metrics,
with a focus on the energy cost. This case study serves as a background
for discussing general issues related to the relative nature of hardware
implementation comparisons. We also use it to extract intuitive obser-
vations for new algorithm designs. Implementation results show that
significant di↵erences can be observed between lightweight ciphers, in
particular when considering both encryption and decryption architec-
tures, and the impact of key scheduling algorithms. Yet, these di↵er-
ences are moderated when looking at their amplitude, and comparing
them with the impact of physical parameters tuning, e.g. frequency /
voltage scaling.
Personal contribution. For this second paper on cryptographic algo-
rithms implementations, I was in charge of implementing the ICEBERG
and KATAN block cipher algorithms. In addition to the results pro-
vided in this paper, these implementations were eventually realized as
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an ASIC. I took part in the fabrication process, which allowed me to get
some practice about the development of integrated circuits.
SleepWalker: A 25-MHz 0.4-V Sub-mm2 7-µW/MHz Micro-
controller in 65-nm LP/GP CMOS for Low-Carbon Wireless
Sensor Nodes
Authors: David Bol, Julien De Vos, Ce´dric Hocquet, Franc¸ois Botman,
Franc¸ois Durvaux, Sarah Boyd, Denis Flandre and Jean-Didier Legat
Published in IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits (JSSC), volume 48,
pp. 20-32, 2013.
Abstract. Integrated circuits for wireless sensor nodes (WSNs) target-
ing the Internet-of-Things (IoT) paradigm require ultralow-power con-
sumption for energy-harvesting operation and low die area for low-cost
nodes. As the IoT calls for the deployment of trillions of WSNs, minimiz-
ing the carbon footprint for WSN chip manufacturing further emerges
as a third target in a design-for-the-environment (DfE) perspective. The
SleepWalker microcontroller is a 65-nm ultralow-voltage SoC based on
the MSP430 architecture capable of delivering increased speed perfor-
mances at 25 MHz for only 7 µW/MHz at 0.4 V. Its sub-mm2 die area
with low external component requirement ensures a low carbon footprint
for chip manufacturing. SleepWalker incorporates an on-chip adaptive
voltage scaling (AVS) system with DC/DC converter, clock generator,
memories, sensor and communication interfaces, making it suited for
WSN applications. An LP/GP process mix is fully exploited for mini-
mizing the energy per cycle, with power gating to keep stand-by power
at 1.7 µW. By incorporating a glitch-masking instruction cache, system
power can be reduced by up to 52%. The AVS system ensures proper
25-MHz operation over process and temperature variations from  40  C
to +85  C, with a peak e ciency of the DC/DC converter above 80%.
Finally, a multi-Vt clock tree reduces variability-induced clock skew by
3 ⇥ to ensure robust timing closure down to 0.3 V.
Personal contribution. During this project, I had to develop some of
the microntroller peripherals, such as the timers or the time-to-digital
converter. The former are used, for instance, for controlling the cycles
while the microcontroller sleeps in order to save its energy. The latter
is the interface with the outside world, namely the sensors, since this
project is intended for sensors network applications.
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5.2 Intellectual property protection
Intellectual Property Protection for Integrated Systems Using
Soft Physical Hash Functions
Authors: Franc¸ois Durvaux, Benoˆıt Ge´rard, Ste´phanie Kerckhof, Franc¸-
ois Koeune and Franc¸ois-Xavier Standaert
Published in Information Security Applications - 13th Intl. Workshop,
WISA 2012, Jeju Island, Korea, August 16-18, 2012.
Abstract. Intellectual property right violations are an important prob-
lem for integrated system designers. We propose a new solution for
mitigating such violations, denoted as soft physical hash functions. It
combines previously introduced ideas of soft hash functions (in the field
of image processing) and side-channel leakage (in the field of crypto-
graphic hardware). For this purpose, we first introduce and formalize
the components of an intellectual property detection infrastructure us-
ing soft physical hash functions. Next, we discuss its advantages over
previous proposals aiming at similar goals. The most important point
here is that the proposed technique can be applied to already deployed
products. Finally, we validate our approach with a first experimental
study.
Personal contribution. Because it was the first work to propose this
specific solution (non-invasive and passive side-channel analysis) in order
to identify intellectual properties, all the steps were made collaboratively
with the other authors. I took part in the framework specification, the
instantiation we used for this 8-bit case-study, and the experimentation
process. I was in charge of presenting our results at the WISA 2012
conference.
Intellectual property protection for FPGA designs with soft
physical hash functions: First experimental results
Authors: Ste´phanie Kerckhof, Franc¸ois Durvaux, Franc¸ois-Xavier Stan-
daert and Benoˆıt Ge´rard
Published in IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Se-
curity and Trust, HOST 2013, Austin, TX, USA, June 2-3, 2013.
Abstract. The use of Soft Physical Hash (SPH) functions has recently
been introduced as a flexible and e cient way to detect Intellectual
Property (IP) cores in microelectronic systems. Previous work mainly
investigated software IP to validate this approach. In this paper, we ex-
tend it towards the practically important case of FPGA designs. Based
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on experiments, we put forward that SPH function-based detection is
a promising and low-cost solution for preventing anti-counterfeiting, as
it does not require any a-priori modification of the design flow. In par-
ticular, we illustrate its performances with stand-alone FPGA designs,
re-synthetized FPGA designs, and in the context of parasitic IPs running
in parallel.
Personal contribution. This work is a natural extension of the WISA
2012 paper to hardware implementations of block cipher algorithms.
Hence, I took part in the instantiation of the detection framework as
well as in the experimentation procedure.
Support Vector Machines for Improved IP Detection with Soft
Physical Hash Functions
Authors: Ludovic-Henri Gustin, Franc¸ois Durvaux, Ste´phanie Kerckhof,
Franc¸ois-Xavier Standaert and Michel Verleysen
Published in Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design -
5th International Workshop, COSADE 2014, Paris, France, April 13-15,
2014.
Abstract. Side-channel analysis is a powerful tool to extract secret in-
formation from microelectronic devices. Its most frequently considered
application is destructive, i.e. key recovery attacks against cryptographic
implementations. More recently, it has also been considered construc-
tively, in the context of intellectual property protection/detection, e.g.
through the use of side-channel based watermarks or soft physical hash
functions. The latter solution is interesting from the application point-
of-view, because it does not require any modification of the designs to
protect (hence it implies no performance losses). Previous work in this
direction exploited simple (correlation-based) statistical tools in di↵er-
ent (more or less challenging) scenarios. In this paper, we investigate
the use of support vector machines for this purpose. We first argue that
their single-class extension is naturally suited to the problem of intellec-
tual property detection. We then experimentally show that they allow
dealing with more complex scenarios than previously published, hence
extending the relevance and applicability of soft physical hash functions.
Personal contribution. This last paper about intellectual property
protection reports the results obtained by a master student during his
master thesis. I supervised his work along with other researchers. We
were also in charge of building his measurement sets with the appropriate
parameters. It allowed me to understand machine learning techniques
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such as the support vector machine, and how they can be applied in the
context of side-channel analysis.
5.3 Side-channel attacks
E cient Removal of Random Delays from Embedded Software
Implementations Using Hidden Markov Models
Authors: Franc¸ois Durvaux, Mathieu Renauld, Franc¸ois-Xavier Stan-
daert, Lo¨ıc van Oldeneel tot Oldenzeel and Nicolas Veyrat-Charvillon
Published in Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications - 11th
International Conference, CARDIS 2012, Graz, Austria, November 28-
30, 2012.
Abstract. Inserting random delays in cryptographic implementations
is often used as a countermeasure against side-channel attacks. Most
of the previous work on the topic focuses on improving the statistical
distribution of these delays. For example, e cient random delay gen-
eration algorithms were proposed at CHES 2009/2010. These solutions
increase security against attacks that solve the lack of synchronization
between di↵erent leakage traces by integrating them. In this paper, we
demonstrate that integration may not be the best tool to evaluate ran-
dom delay insertions. For this purpose, we first describe di↵erent attacks
exploiting pattern-recognition techniques and Hidden Markov Models.
Using these tools and as a case study, we perform successful key re-
coveries against an implementation of the CHES 2009/2010 proposal
in an Atmel microcontroller, with the same data complexity as against
an unprotected implementation of the AES Rijndael. In other words,
we completely cancel the countermeasure in this case. Next, we show
that our cryptanalysis tools are remarkably robust to attack improved
variants of the countermeasure, e.g. with additional noise or irregular
dummy operations. We also exhibit that the attacks remain applicable
in a non-profiled adversarial scenario. These results suggest that the
use of random delays may not be e↵ective for protecting small embed-
ded devices against side-channel leakage. They highlight the strength
of Viterbi decoding against such time-randomization countermeasures,
in particular when combined with a precise description of the target
implementations, using large lattices.
Personal contribution. This work was the opportunity for me to
become familiar with signal processing technique in the context of side-
channel attacks. I was in charge of the preliminary experiments for
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removing the random delay countermeasure, which resulted in a suc-
cessful attack. I took also part in the reasoning in order to design the
advanced solution based on hidden markov models that is used in the
following of that paper and provides better results. Finally, I was in
charge of presenting our results at the CARDIS 2012 conference.
5.4 Internship at Cryptography Research Inc.
When I arrived at CRI for my 3-month internship, I was directly in-
tegrated into the DPA team under the supervision of Dr. Pankaj Ro-
hatgi and Dr. Mike Tunstall. During this period, I contributed to the
development of a new masking scheme. Concretely, I worked on a proof-
of-concept demonstrating (i) that multiplicative masking can be made
resistant to the zero-value DPA (i.e. that exploits the particular case of
a zero-absorbing value), and (ii) that first-order DPA resistant imple-
mentations of first-order masking schemes can also be written in the C
programming language. It resulted in my nomination as co-inventor of
the patent that was filed for this new scheme (no reference is yet publicly
available).

Chapter 6
Conclusion and perspectives
Providing fair side-channel security evaluations raises many questions
and challenges. In this thesis, we aimed to provide answers and solutions
in this direction by investigating di↵erent aspects in the side-channel
analysis flow. Concretly, in a first contribution, we explored leakage
detection and points-of-interest detection procedures, and showed how
they significantly a↵ect the evaluation/attack outcome. We also demon-
strated that these two procedures are in fact connected. As a second
contribution, we developed leakage certification methods that allow an
evaluator to evaluate the models that he built during the modelling step:
one that formalizes the problem and provides a sound statistical anal-
ysis with a non-parametric approach, and the other that simplifies the
method in order to provide better intuitions, but at the cost of a couple
of heuristic assumptions. Both parts led to various and interesting re-
sults that are briefly summarized in this last chapter. We then discuss
the future work and perspectives open by our results.
On the leakage and points-of-interest detection
Detecting the leakages corresponds to determining if there is any leaking
information about the processed data, regardless of its exploitability.
Detecting the points-of-interest is a complementary task that is used in
order to identify the most informative time samples, i.e. the points that
can be exploited by the adversary to lead his attack. In Chapter 3, we
explored and analysed these steps and showed that even though they are
di↵erent tasks with (at first) di↵erent goals, they are in fact connected.
In this regard, our contribution is threefold.
We led our first investigations on the widely spread CRI’s non-
specific “fixed vs. random” t-test used for leakage detection. We aimed
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to provide a better understanding of this test and the underlying leak-
age detection process. For this purpose, we introduced an alternative
test denoted as the ⇢-test, which essentially features the Pearson’s cor-
relation coe cient and the Fisher transformation. The correlation was
selected for its simplicity and because intuitions can easily be extracted.
Moreover, working with the Fisher transformation allowed us to directly
compare the detection results output by the two methods. We estab-
lished our first observations with a simulated setup and further validated
them with real measurements. The main message about this part of the
reported work is that, at the end, the sampling complexity of the test
outcome does not really depend on the choice of the statistic but rather
on the signal-to-noise ratio that can be computed on the leakage traces.
Yet, the ⇢-test, as we instantiated, su↵ers from the estimation of the
model. Besides, the “fixed vs. random” t-test works better, only if it
is applied on the whole AES (whole plaintext and whole execution),
which relies on the fact that extreme values (i.e. the ones maximizing
the SNR) will be manipulated at some point (by chance, since the key
remains secret). Moreover, while the t-test only answers whether leak-
ages are present or not (regardless of their exploitability), the ⇢-test adds
up the available information – which relates to the the POI detection
process – and can be directly extended to higher statistical moments.
Furthermore, we showed that our reasoning based on the SNR not only
allows a better statistical understanding of leakage detection, but can
also lead to more e cient t-tests. Namely, it directly suggests that if the
evaluator’s goal is to minimize the number of samples needed to detect
data-dependent information in side-channel measurements, considering
a partitioning based on two fixed plaintexts (rather than one fixed and
one random plaintext) leads to significantly faster detection speeds.
As a second contribution on this topic, we explored the use of the
projection pursuit algorithms in order to detect and project the points-
of-interest in leakage traces. The methods provided in the literature
(e.g. PCA and LDA) do not allow working with countermeasures such
as the masking that splits the information onto di↵erent time samples
(within a reasonable amount of data). In general, projection pursuits
are heuristic algorithms that track the improvement (or the lack thereof)
of an objective function by applying small random modifications on the
best projection found so far. For this part of the reported work, we
considered two case-studies: (i) an unprotected implementation of the
AES in order to validate the approach, and (ii) a (precomputed) masked
version of the AES S-box:
1. Regarding the unprotected setting, we made use of a linear pro-
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jection of the time samples. The weights (associated to every time
sample) are modified such that the objective function is increased.
We considered two objective functions: the SNR and a profiled
CPA. The former was used in order to have comparable results
with the state-of-the-art (specifically with the LDA). The latter
was used to validate the metric for a further extension to the
masking case. Experimental results showed that both objective
functions equally provide a significant improvement of a template
attack when attacking the projected samples, in comparison to
the same attack on the best available (non-projected) time sam-
ple. This confirmed our claim that in this context, the projection
pursuits provide as comparable projections as the LDA dimension-
ality reduction technique, althought heuristic.
2. Regarding the masked implementation setup, the challenge was to
find a group of points that contained information on all the shares.
For this purpose, we slightly modified the projection pursuit in-
stantiation proposed for the unprotected setting, and made use of
a window-based local search algorithm. Regions-of-interest (i.e.
where the POIs lie) are found by moving and then refining the
windows. We used an MMPC as objective function. This statis-
tic targets the higher statistical moments, i.e. the moments that
carry the information after combining the time samples. With our
results, we showed that this method allows gaining a constant –
but practically significant – factor over the previous methods pro-
posed in the literature in order to find the POIs in this setting.
Moreover, the algorithm can be extended to any order of masking,
simply by considering as many windows as the number of shares.
Yet, the proposed algorithms are heuristic: they need to set a lot
of parameters, for which we provided guidelines. By contrast with
the unprotected setting, this extended search algorithm allows the
evaluator to find the POIs corresponding the di↵erent shares, but
does not combine them in order to maximize the extracted infor-
mation.
Finally, in the last part of our work on this topic, we discussed the
use of the ⇢-test as an objective function in our POI detection automated
tool. The experiments featured the same masked setup and the same
algorithm instantiation. Yet, in this contribution, we showed how the
previous methods and tools can be extended to an unprofiled setting at
the cost of also finding some useless points dependent on the plaintext
only. The purpose of this contribution is mainly to raise awareness
that up to the selection of POIs in leakage traces, side-channel security
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evaluations can essentially be performed in a black box way, and without
any key profiling.
To summarize, we may conclude that leakage and points-of-interest
detection methods are important topics of research. An improper use
may significantly a↵ect the evaluation/attack outcome. It is very impor-
tant for the evaluator to understand the statistics behind the tools he
is using. Otherwise, he may underestimate the amount of information
that is possibly accessible to the adversary. Regarding our contribution,
a future scope of research would be to investigate a combination of the
masked implementation POIs. Indeed, in the method proposed so far,
only the POIs are found, but no combination in order to maximize the
extracted information is provided. This work would require investigating
di↵erent projection and objective functions. It may also be interesting
to explore other stategies to roam the leakage traces in order to find
the POIs. The proposed method is heuristic, hence depends on lots of
parameters that may be changed in order to possibly enhance its func-
tioning. Finally, it may be worth investigating other masking schemes
that have di↵erent structures (i.e. that leak di↵erently) and that may
not be based on precomputed tables.
On the leakage certification
The goal of an evaluator is to accurately determine the worst-case side-
channel security of an implementation, i.e. the amount of information
that is leaked by the device. For this purpose, he ideally needs a leakage
model that exactly corresponds to the true leakage distribution, with a
Bayesian distinguisher. Yet, in practice, such perfect models are gen-
erally unknown, and density estimation techniques have to be used to
approximate the leakage distribution. This raises the fundamental prob-
lem that all security evaluations are potentially biased by both estima-
tion and assumption errors. In Chapter 4, we provided and implemented
methodological tools in order to solve this issue.
In a first part of the reported work on this topic, we tackled both
estimation and assumption errors independently. Regarding the former,
we proposed to make use of the cross-validation technique that allows
generating multiple independent results of perceived information. Their
spread indicates whether the statistic is properly estimated, or not. In
order to answer the assumption issue, we proposed a method taking ad-
vantage of a hypothesis test for which the null hypothesis states that
the model fits the observations. This test features two ingredients: (i)
a distance sampling technique that allows us to capture all the char-
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acteristics of a distribution (even high-order ones) by computing the
distances between pairs of samples, and (ii) a non-parametric goodness-
of-fit test that allows us to determine whether the null hypothesis is
verified through p-values. We validated our approach by comparing
Gaussian templates and linear regression models on measurements of the
AES running on an 8-bit microcontroller. With the proposed method,
it is possible to detect both kinds of errors and determine if the eval-
uator’s model is a↵ected by one or the other. This first part of our
contribution on this topic allows us to formalize the problem. It also
gives a first sound and non-parametric solution to a very practical prob-
lem that may be faced in the security evaluation procedures. Yet, to
the question “How good is my leakage model?”, it gives a qualitative
answer, and not a quantitative one.
In the following, we extended the previous leakage certification pro-
cedure. We showed that the assumption error detection can be signif-
icantly simplified at the cost of mild assumptions: (i) the distributions
are well characterized by their moments, and (ii) the moment estima-
tions are Gaussian distributed. This allows the evaluator to perform a
moment-based comparison between the model and the true distribution.
The Student’s t-test is used for this purpose, and the related p-value is
extracted for every di↵erence between a pair of moments. Similarly to
the previous method, the p-value gives the probability for the model to
correspond to the actual observations. Since the moments are treated
independently, this method also helps the evaluator to determine which
ones are failing. Therefore, he has the possibility to refine his model.
However, not all the moments contain the same amount of information.
We then proposed a further investigation exploiting MMPC that allows
the evaluator to quantify this information in every moments, and to
focus on the most relevant ones. Overall, this new method quite sig-
nificantly simplifies our first proposal. It also gives more insight to the
evaluator in his selection of an appropriate leakage model. If the model
fails, the amount of information in every moment determines whether
it is worth improving the model, or not. This method also allows the
evaluator to set sound bounds on the total information that may be
accessed by the adversary.
To conclude, this work is the first to provide a solution to distin-
guish and treat the estimation and assumption errors that are likely
to be encountered during a security evaluation. The most important
contribution is that we put side-channel evaluations on solid statistical
foundations. The separation between estimation and assumption errors
is fundamental in this respect. Regarding the possible future research
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directions, the application of the described techniques to more imple-
mentations (e.g. protected with countermeasures such as masking), for
which the selection of relevant assumptions will be more di cult, is defi-
nitely worth the while. The combination of our tools with dimensionality
reduction techniques (or any other preprocessing of the measurements),
allowing to e ciently detect/exploit multiple points of interest in leakage
traces, is another interesting question.
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